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FOREWORD
Economic and political hardships associated with plant closure may be
easily forgotten in the current environment of real growth, rising capaci
ty utilization and declining unemployment. However, plant closure is an
ongoing, chronic problem, which does not disappear during times of
economic recovery. We need to consider policy options that recognize
the tenacity, special nature, and institutional context of this problem.
Collective bargaining appears to be the institutional context in which
the solution to the plant closure problem is most likely to be found. Since
labor costs, work rules and productivity frequently are cited as reasons
for closure, collective bargaining appears to be the mechanism ideally
suited to resolving these issues. However, critics of collective bargaining
have emphasized that unions have only one objective: delaying closure as
long as possible.
This study contains a new proposal on the use of collective bargaining
to resolve differences between labor and management that have hitherto
resulted in plant closure. The proposal put forth by Wendling mandates
bargaining over the decision to close, but incorporates measures that will
eliminate bargaining in circumstances where bargaining is not likely to
lead to a solution. Furthermore, limits are placed on the length of time
allowed for a resolution of differences in order to encourage good faith
bargaining and achieve a solution that will maintain profitable opera
tions and preserve jobs.
Facts and observations expressed in this study are the sole responsibili
ty of the author. His viewpoints do not necessarily represent positions of
the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Robert G. Spiegelman
Director
May 1984

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The objective of this study is to answer the following questions. First,
what is the potential for bargaining to alter the decision to close when
continued operation is a reasonable alternative? Second, can bargaining
over the effects of closure provide a reasonable opportunity for workers
to mitigate some of the consequences? Third, have management and
labor used formal contract negotiations to obtain protections and to
develop solutions for workers and firms "at risk of closure?"
The question may be raised: Why the interest in collective bargaining
as a tool to alleviate the plant closure problem? First, a significant pro
portion of closures takes place in unionized facilities. Whereas a survey
of Fortune 500 firms determined that 52 percent of the establishments
were unionized, 66 percent of the closings involved unionized
establishments. Second, the reasons for closure cited in surveys and court
cases tend to be amenable to resolution through collective bargaining.
The above survey revealed that 21 percent of the respondents cited high
labor costs, 17 percent listed price competition from lower cost labor,
and 10 percent referred to crippling union work rules. Reasons for
closure cited in court cases have included low productivity, high wages
and inflexible work rules. Thus, there are a significant number of in
stances in which the reasons cited for closing are topics that have been
and could be handled through the collective bargaining process.
The plant closure issue must be placed in perspective. It appears to be a
relatively infrequent event. For example, the Bureau of National Affairs
reported that in 1982, a year marked by a deep recession, there were 619
closures affecting 215,525 workers in the United States. Of these
closures, 424 were manufacturing facilities and resulted in putting
146,900 employees out of work; but this represented approximately 1
percent of both the manufacturing facilities and the manufacturing
workforce.
Given the nature of the reasons for closure and the magnitude of the
problem, collective bargaining may be the most appropriate institution
to solve the problem. Collective bargaining can address the specific issues
vii

in a plant and may be able to tailor a solution that meets the needs of
both parties, management and labor. Legislation cannot possibly accom
modate all of the varied circumstances in which closure is considered.
To understand and evaluate the role that collective bargaining could
play, both the case law that has evolved in the formulation of the judicial
interpretations and the actual contract provisions negotiated in major
collective bargaining agreements are examined. Furthermore, several
rules and procedures which have been proposed to facilitate the deter
mination of whether there is a duty to bargain over the decision are
analyzed.
The examination of the judicial interpretation of the duty to bargain
has found several troublesome areas. First, substantive labor law has
been formulated regarding plant closure based on cases in which the par
ties to the dispute had not negotiated a formal contract. The closure oc
curred almost on the heels of the union winning the representation elec
tion. Thus, a determination has been made on the efficacy of collective
bargaining resolving an issue even though the parties have never bargain
ed. In fact, the most recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling on this issue oc
curred in First National Maintenance Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Board, a case in which the parties did not have an established
bargaining relationship.
Second, there has been the overriding concern with the terminology
used in cases of displacement, rather than with the outcome. For ex
ample, subcontracting has been differentiated from replacing existing
employees with independent contractors. The outcome has been the
same, the process very similar, but the duty to bargain over the decision
differs. A similar demarcation has occurred between plant closure and
relocation.
Formal collective bargaining already occurs over plant closure, or at
least over provisions to minimize the effects of closure. The results of the
econometric analysis of major collective bargaining agreements has
determined that workers at risk are not necessarily obtaining these pro
tections. Variation in closure rates by industry is not a significant deter
minant of variations in contractual outcomes. Instead, the regression
estimates show that the contractual outcomes are less sensitive to changes
in employment and instead more dependent on the bargaining power of
the union.
Due to the confusion created by the case law and the lack of consisten
cy in the determinants of outcomes of formal negotiations, amending the
viii

National Labor Relations Act's definition of mandatory topics of
bargaining under "terms and other conditions of employment" to in
clude bargaining over the decision to close may be one policy alternative
for the plant closure dilemma. There are positive and negative aspects to
this approach. One positive feature is that coverage would be uniform
throughout the United States. A negative feature is that the National
Labor Relations Act covers only those plants and workplaces where
employees have elected a bargaining agent. Since plant closure is not
restricted to unionized plants, protection will not be afforded in all in
stances.
This monograph contains a new proposal. Specifically, the proposal
assumes that plant closure is a mandatory topic of bargaining. Steps are
incorporated that ensure that actual bargaining occurs only in those in
stances in which there is a real probability that bargaining could lead to a
solution. However, in no instance would more than 90 days elapse be
tween the notice of closure and resolution of the situation, be it either a
new agreement permitting continued operations or closure of the plant.
Neither management not labor have perfect foresight. Formal negotia
tions every two or three years cannot accommodate all contingencies.
Equity considerations suggest that workers be afforded the opportunity
to minimize earnings and/or job loss. Recognizing that doing so also im
poses costs on employers, the proposal has been structured to be flexible
and to expedite the bargaining process.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

I am fully aware that in this era of automation and onrushing
technological change, no problems in the domestic economy
are of greater concern than those involving job security and
employment stability.
(Statement by Justice Potter Stewart in Fibreboard Paper
Products Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board
(85 S. Ct. 398,411 (1964)).

The scope of public policy relating to plant closure and to
those workers who are displaced is still unresolved. Should
something more be done for the employees or required of the
employer after a facility closes? Before it closes? Are the ef
fects of closure mainly short term and corrected by the
market? Are there long term consequences? Could collective
bargaining play a greater role in solving this problem?
There are three ways in which collective bargaining may
mitigate the problems associated with plant closure. First,
judicial interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act
have held that the employer must negotiate with the union
over the effects of a decision to close a plant ("effects
bargaining"). Second, although the decision by the United
States Supreme Court in First National Maintenance Cor
poration v. National Labor Relations Board (101 S. Ct. 2573
(1981)) held that a firm need not bargain with the union over
the decision to close one plant of a multiple plant operation
("decision bargaining"), this avenue has not been closed
completely due to limitations in the opinion. For example,
relocating one operation of a firm may require decision
bargaining. Third, a union and employer may use the formal
collective bargaining process to negotiate contract provisions
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covering plant closure. Advance notice, severance pay and
transfer rights are examples of these types of provisions.
The objective of this monograph is to answer the follow
ing questions. First, what is the potential for bargaining to
alter the decision to close when continued operation is a
reasonable alternative? Second, can bargaining over the ef
fects of closure provide a reasonable opportunity for
workers to mitigate some of the consequences? Third, have
management and labor used formal contract negotiations to
obtain protections and to develop solutions for workers and
firms "at risk of closure?"
Plant closure is of significant legislative interest. The
States of Maine and Wisconsin and the City of Philadelphia
have enacted legislation that prescribes necessary action by
firms to close a plant, and 17 other states had legislation on
this issue formally introduced in their legislative sessions be
tween 1979 and 1981 (McKenzie and Yandle 1982). Califor
nia and Illinois adopted programs in 1982 to assist workers
affected by plant closure and Rhode Island has established a
special commission to study the problems caused by plant
closure (Nelson 1983). In 1983, the States of Alabama, Con
necticut and New York also acted to assist workers displaced
by shutdowns or relocations (Nelson 1984). In addition, at
least four proposals have been introduced in the United
States Congress in previous sessions and the National
Employment Priorities Act (H.R. 2847) was introduced in
the 1983 session. Finally, employee stock ownership plans to
purchase establishments have been facilitated by legislation
and have been used to avert closure (Stern, Wood and Ham
mer 1979). In fact, Wintner (1983) reports that of approx
imately 60 employee buyouts, ony 2 have failed, and approx
imately 50,000 jobs have been preserved through this pro
cess.
Aside from the legislative interest in plant closure, the
topic is of policy interest because it raises several complex
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philosophical questions about the course and control of
economic activity. First, there is the question of whether the
rights of owners of physical capital should take precedence
over the rights of owners of human capital. Are firms and
workers equally positioned to respond to economic change?
Second, there is the conflict between equity and efficiency. Is
it necessary that individuals suffer earnings losses so that
corporations can maximize profits? Conversely, the mobility
of workers and capital are both considered to enhance effi
ciency, but should restrictions be placed on the latter and not
the former? Finally, there is the role of government policy. If
government policies and actions increase the probability of
closing a plant, can or should government policy be neutral
towards the effects of closure?'
One such philosophical question arises when examining
the unequal ability of firms and workers to respond to
economic change (Martin 1983). For instance, a firm may
make a capital investment in an industry. Due to changing
market conditions, however, the firm recognizes that its
future financial health is at stake unless it diversifies or
changes markets. The firm redirects its resources and invests
in a new activity, all of which may be done while it is still
engaged in the original enterprise. In addition, the firm's
new investment may be eligible for favorable tax treatment.
The situation facing the worker is quite different. The
worker also invests in the firm through the accumulation of
firm-specific skills. Assuming the worker recognizes that
continued investment in the firm does not prevent displace
ment, he/she faces considerable difficulties in repositioning
and diversifying his/her human capital. Time is required to
develop new human capital before it can be sold in new
markets, whereas the old human capital cannot be sold as
scrap in a secondary market. Furthermore, investments to
broaden one's human capital are not given special tax treat
ment, whereas investments to deepen it—such as investing
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more in one's current obsolete skill—are considered tax
deductible. Since diversification may be necessary to
minimize the impact of displacement, firms and workers are
unequally positioned to respond to economic change.
However, it is necessary to place the plant closure issue in
perspective. What is the magnitude of the plant closure prob
lem? Since no governmental agency is charged with record
ing the closing of a plant or counting the number of workers
directly affected, the exact magnitude of the plant closure
problem is unknown. Consequently, several researchers have
used auxiliary data to infer the extent of closure or have at
tempted to count the number of closures and workers im
pacted.
Bluestone and Harrison (1982) and Birch (1979) have used
the Dun & Bradstreet data, which are actually collected to
develop credit profiles of firms, to estimate the incidence of
closures, start-ups and relocations. The Bureau of National
Affairs (1983) has begun to tabulate the number of closings,
but uses a combination of newspaper clippings, union
reports and informed sources to develop their count of
closures and affected workers. Schmenner (1982) has
assembled data on the number of plant closures in the 1970s
by surveying Fortune 500 firms.
Bluestone and Harrison's analysis of the Dun & Bradstreet
data indicated that of every 10 manufacturing plants
employing more than 100 workers open in 1969, 3 had closed
by 1976. They also showed that the incidence of closure
across the four major regions of the United States was quite
similar during this time period (see table 1.1). In fact, the
North Central region, which stretches from Ohio to North
Dakota, had the lowest incidence of closure (25 percent) and
the South, which ranges from Maryland to Oklahoma, had
the highest incidence of closure (34 percent).

Table 1.1
Incidence of Closure by Region
Among Manufacturing Plants Employing More Than 100 Employees
From 1969 and 1976

Region
Northeast
North Central
South
West
TOTAL

Number of states

Number of plants
in 1969 sample

Number in sample
closed by 1976

Incidence of closure
of 1969 plants
by 1976

9
12
16
13
50

4,576
3,617
3,101
1,155
12,449

1,437
904
1,042
344
3,727

.31
.25
.34
.30
.30

SOURCE: Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1982, Table 2.2).

O
CL

6 Introduction

Birch (1979) provided closure information on service
establishments, which is presented in table 1.2. Although
plant closure research has tended to emphasize manufactur
ing facilities, the service sector has grown in importance to
the economy over the past two decades. Also, the impact of
closure on individuals is not likely to vary significantly just
because it is a service establishment and not a manufacturing
facility. Furthermore, two of the three key U.S. Supreme
Court decisions pertaining to the "duty to bargain over the
decision to close a plant" have involved service operations.
The data shown in table 1.2 indicate a relatively high rate
of closure among large service establishments, and a rate
that is quite uniform across regions. Thus, the implication
from these two tables is that the closure of firms is not sim
ply a regional phenomena, but is prevalent throughout the
United States.
Another approach to counting the number of displaced
workers is to consider the population at risk. Risk can be
evaluated along several dimensions; industry, occupation,
age, region or tenure on the job are valid criteria. Alter
natively, severity of unemployment can indicate a "risk
group." For example, it most likely is a reasonable assump
tion that job losers who are associated with a declining in
dustry are at risk of never getting back their positions and
therefore of being displaced. Individuals who have been
separated from their jobs for more than 26 weeks also have a
diminishing probability of returning to their jobs.
The Congressional Budget Office (1982) has provided an
estimate of the number of workers in January 1983 who are
at risk of being displaced. Job losers were categorized along
the dimensions listed above, with those meeting the criteria
considered to be at risk. The results are provided in table 1.3.
The Bureau of National Affairs (1983) reported that there
were 619 closures directly affecting 215,525 workers in 1982;

Table 1.2
Incidence of Closure by Region
Among Service Establishments Employing More Than 100 Employees
From 1969 and 1976

Region

Number of states

Northeast
North Central
South
West

9
12
16
13

TOTAL

50

Number of
establishments
in 1969 sample

Number in sample
closed by 1976

633
433
476
284
1,826

237
172
182
117
708

Incidence of closure
of 1969
establishments
by 1976
.37
.40
.38
.41
.39

SOURCE: David Birch, The Job Generation Process (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Program on Neighborhood and Regional Change, 1979, Appen
dix D).
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424 closures were manufacturing facilities and resulted in
putting 146,900 employees out of work. 2 There were over
300,000 manufacturing establishments employing 18.8
million workers in 1982. Thus, slightly more than 1 percent
of the manufacturing facilities and slightly less than 1 per
cent of the manufacturing workforce were affected.
Table 1.3
Estimates of Jobless Workers
at Risk of Displacement in January 1983
Under Alternative Eligibility Standards
Number of workers
________Eligibility criteria_____________(OOOs)
Declining industry
880
Declining occupation
1,150
More than 45 years of age
890
Declining industry and 45 or more years of age
205
Declining industry and other unemployed in
declining area, and 45 or more years of age
395
Declining occupation and 45 or more years of age
280
More than 26 weeks of unemployment___________560____
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office, Dislocated Workers: Issues and Federal Options,
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982. This estimate, which is based on
tabulations from the March 1980 Current Population Survey, also assumes that the number
of displaced workers would not change between December 1981 and January 1983. Thus,
these figures are conservative estimates of the actual figures.

Additional evidence on the incidence of plant closure is
provided by Schmenner (1982) who collected closure data for
the 1970s from Fortune 500 firms. During the 1970s, these
firms closed approximately 8 percent of the plants that had
been in existence at the start of the decade. 3 Although
averages can be misleading, less than 1 percent of the existing
plants of Fortune 500 firms were closed per year, a rate
which is consistent with the BNA findings for 1982. The in-
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cidence of plant closure by industry as tabulated by Schmen
ner is reported in table 1.4.
Table 1.4
Percentage of Plants Closed in Manufacturing Industries
in the 1970s by Fortune 500 Firms
Industry
Food & Kindred Products (20)

Tobacco Manufacturers (21)
Textile Mill Products (22)
Apparel (23)
Lumber & Wood Products (24)
Furniture & Fixtures (25)
Paper & Allied Products
Printing & Publishing (27)
Chemicals & Allied Products (28)
Petroleum Refining (29)

Rubber Products (30)
Leather & Leather Products (31)
Stone, Clay, Glass
& Concrete Products (32)
Primary Metals Industries (33)
Fabricated Metal Products (34)
Machinery, Except Electrical (35)
Electrical Machinery (36)
Transportation Equipment (37)
Scientific Instruments (38)
Miscellaneous Manufacturing (39)
Totals

Number of
plants
2,174
32
383
267
401
183
907
258
1,739
397
494
80

Number
closed
222
1
36
24
30
23
60
15
119
12
38
16

Percentage
closed
10.2
3.1
9.4
9.0
7.5
12.6
6.6
5.8
6.8
3.0
7.7
20.0

44
648
6.8
8.1
49
603
89
947
9.5
7.1
75
1,056
8.8
85
965
37
607
6.1
7.1
23
326
23
212
10.8
1,021
12,679
SOURCE: Calculations based on computer printout provided by Roger Schmenner,
August 16, 1983.
NOTE: Two digit SIC code in parentheses.

It is obvious that there are significant differences in the
estimates of the magnitude of the problem. The analysis bas
ed on the Dun & Bradstreet data clearly signals a much
higher rate of closure—over 4 percent of the plants closed
each year—than do the Bureau of National Affairs and the
Schmenner calculations, which indicate approximately 1 per
cent of the manufacturing plants are closed each year.
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The relative accuracy of the estimates is more than an
academic question because the magnitude of the problem
conditions the potential policy responses. Although Schmenner and the Bureau of National Affairs are derived from in
dependent sources, they appear to be consistent; consequent
ly, these estimates will be accepted. Therefore, the analysis
of this study will be based on the assumption that the closure
of a manufacturing facility is a relatively infrequent event.
As the United States economy moves out of the reces
sionary conditions that have plagued it since late 1979, there
may be a tendency to forget about plant closures and the
dislocated workers. The number of closures and the ranks of
the dislocated always swell during recessions, and the
assumption may be that the economic recovery will solve the
problem.
This viewpoint does not recognize that closure and
dislocated workers are chronic problems. Some plants are
going to be shut down even while the economy is in a period
of sustained growth, and consequently, workers are always
going to be dislocated. Incentives that operate to concentrate
the impact of closure on the older worker, or the immobile,
will continue during recovery as well as recession. Consumer
demands also change through time. Some industries will be
growing and others will be declining. Since the most efficient
locations for producing the new products may not be the
same as for the old products, and since the skills required
may not be identical, this process of change usually will
generate some dislocation.
A more concrete example of this process is offered by the
research findings of Schmenner (1983). He determined that
for major firms in the 1970s, the average age of a plant at
closing was 19.3 years and the median age of closed plants
was 15 years. Fully one-third of the plants that were closed
were only six years old or less, and two-thirds of the plants
were modern single-story structures. Thus, the existence of a
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new plant in a community is not a guarantee that the
workforce will not be displaced by a plant shutdown in the
near future. Furthermore, although the average size of all
plants in his study was approximately 490 employees, the
average employment size of plants opening in the 1970s was
approximately 240 employees.
The question may be raised: Why the interest in collective
bargaining as a tool to alleviate the problem of plant closure
and dislocated workers? First, a significant proportion of
closures takes place in unionized facilities. Whereas 52 per
cent of the facilities surveyed by Schmenner were unionized,
66 percent of the closings involved unionized facilities
(Schmenner 1982). Second, the reasons cited for closure in
surveys and in court cases tend to be amenable to resolution
through collective bargaining. Schmenner's survey revealed
that 21 percent of the respondents cited high labor rates, 17
percent listed price competition due to lower cost labor, and
10 percent indicated crippling union work rules. (Multiple
responses were permitted.) Reasons cited in court cases have
included low productivity, high wages, and inflexible work
rules. Thus, there are a significant number of instances in
which the reasons cited for closing are topics that have been
and could be handled through the collective bargaining pro
cess.
Reich (1981) has argued that desired social goals could be
achieved more efficiently through bargaining rather than
regulation. Collective bargaining can address the specific
problems of the plant and may be able to tailor a solution
that meets the needs of all parties. Legislation cannot
possibly accommodate all of the varied circumstances in
which closure is being considered. Sometimes, the best solu
tion for all would be the end of production. In other cir
cumstances, changes in wages, operating procedures and the
division of responsibilities would result in profitable opera
tions and continued employment. (Wintner's (1983) study
documented one situation in which a 25 percent cut in wages
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and changes in work rules were necessary to make the
employee owned company competitive.) Furthermore, if col
lective bargaining could lead to profitable operations and
continued employment, some older workers would not be
faced with the prospect of seeking new employment while
possessing outdated skills, nor would the economic impact
on the community be as severe. 4
The reasons listed above suggest that not only may the
plant closure problem be amenable to mitigation through
collective bargaining, but using collective bargaining may be
more consistent with institutional and political considera
tions than direct regulation. Bacow (1980) has written that
we need to be concerned with more than economic efficiency
as we seek solutions to problems.
If we are to develop a useful theory for matching
tools to problems, then the criteria used for
evaluating the match must reflect not only efficien
cy considerations, but also the managerial, institu
tional and political factors that determine the effec
tiveness of policies in practice (p. 132).
The other area of concern of this monograph relates to the
labor market. Research on plant closure has paid little atten
tion to the actual functioning of the labor market and
whether the proposed policies are designed to correct market
imperfections. Instead, it has tended to concentrate on one
theme, the reemployment experience of dislocated workers.
The method of analysis usually has been the case study. Bas
ed on this research, policies for alleviating the observed
hardships associated with closure have been proposed.
Issues that have not been addressed or have been discussed
only casually include the relationship between compensation
schedules and estimates of earnings loss. Compensation
schedules also could affect the structure of severance pay.
An additional issue is the dichotomy between large local
labor markets and small local labor markets. Another
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unresolved issue is whether compensating wage differentials
exist for the positive probability of a plant closure.
The outline of this monograph is as follows. Chapter 2 ad
dresses the functioning of the labor market in the presence of
plant closure. Specific topics include: compensation
schedules, estimates of earnings loss and the structure of
severance pay; small and large local labor markets; and com
pensating wage differentials for the probability of plant
closure. One other labor market issue, the impact of closure
on older workers, is treated separately in Appendix A.
Chapter 3 is a discussion of the judicial interpretation of
the duty to bargain over the decision to close and effects of
closure. Also analyzed are the related issues of plant reloca
tion and transfer of work. Chapter 4 discusses guidelines,
rules and tests that have been proposed to facilitate the deter
mination of a duty to bargain over the decision to close. An
alternate proposal also is presented in this chapter. The em
pirical examination of the extent of bargaining over this issue
is presented in chapter 5. The synthesis of the several aspects
of this study and the conclusions are presented in the final
chapter.

NOTES
1. Bluestone and Harrison (1980) asserted that the provisions of the tax
code have provided indirect incentives to construct new facilities rather
than rebuilding or renovating older facilities. These incentives include:
(a) not treating land as a depreciable asset; (b) differential treatment of
new and used facilities for purposes of accelerated depreciation; (c) tax
credits that encourage the purchase of a newer vintage of tools and
machinery; (d) tax deductibility of plant closure costs; (e) the special
treatment of industrial development bonds; and (f) tax deductibility of
many of the costs of homeownership.
2. Note that using the BNA calculation, the average numer of employees
in the manufacturing facilities that closed was 348. The average number
of employees in the typical manufacturing facility in the United States
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was 63. Given that the BNA data set basically was collected by means of
newspaper clippings, there may be a bias to their figures that understates
the number of closures and overstates the average size of the closed
facility. The closure of a smaller facility simply may not be reported.
The data on closure may be confused at times with business failures.
For example, approximately 17,000 businesses failed in 1981. Business
failures are defined as "concerns discontinued following assignment,
voluntary or involuntary petition in bankruptcy, attachment, execution,
foreclosure, etc.; voluntary withdrawals from business with known loss
to creditors; also enterprises involved in court action, such as receiver
ship and reorganization or arrangement which may or may not lead to
discontinuance; and businesses making voluntary compromises with
creditors out of court." (United States, Statistical Abstract, 1982-1983.)
Thus, the definition of business failures is broader than that of plant
closure which is the closing of a plant, establishment or company.
3. This calculation was based on information contained in a computer
printout provided by Roger Schmenner to the author.
4. The role of collective bargaining in alleviating the plant closure prob
lem was examined in more detail in late 1950s and early 1960s. Examples
include the research of Killingsworth (1962) and Shultz and Weber
(1966). At that time it was felt that "collective bargaining by itself cannot
fully solve these problems." (Killingsworth, p. 210). Shultz and Weber
wrote, "It has been asserted that collective bargaining cannot change the
economic climate, that it can only ration the sunshine—or the rain as the
case may be. ... It should not be concluded, however, that collective
bargaining has or will play only a minor role in adjustments to
technological and economic change." (p. 46).

Chapter 2

The Functioning
of the Labor Market
Introduction

Plant closure is considered a significant problem by some
primarily because of the labor market impacts of its after
math: earnings losses, long spells of unemployment, and
altered career expectations. The public policy debate has
revolved around whether direct policy interventions are re
quired to correct these labor market impacts (Gordus, Jarley
and Ferman 1981). 1 Naturally, there are different viewpoints
as to the significance of the problem and whether any solu
tion is possible that will actually improve and not worsen
conditions in the long run.
Some recognize that dislocated workers are the victims of
closure, but assert that no specific policy is necessary because
ex ante and ex post protections are in place. Specifically, it is
asserted that wages paid to workers contain a component
which compensates workers ex ante for the differential prob
ability of being displaced (McKenzie 1981). Furthermore, ex
post protection is afforded for those losing their jobs, even
as a result of plant closure, through unemployment compen
sation. Moreover, any attempt to alter the decision to close
would impede the free movement of capital and lead to inef
ficient outcomes (McKenzie 1979).
Evidence used to support direct intervention includes the
initial and long term earnings losses experienced by workers
as a result of the closure (Jacobson 1979; Holen et al. 1981).
15
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The increased incidence of physical and/or mental health im
pairment among the displaced also is used to argue for in
tervention (Kasl and Cobb 1979). Furthermore, there is the
perspective that workers and firms are unequally positioned
to diversify to meet changing economic circumstances (Mar
tin 1983).
There also is considerable concern with the process of
closure. Companies are thought to be acting irresponsibly
and unfairly when profitable plants are closed because those
resources can be invested more profitably elsewhere. A
related issue is when plants are used as "cash cows": profits
from the plant are not reinvested in that facility but are used
elsewhere, and eventually the plant is closed. Reluctance to
provide advance notice of the closure also is criticized
(Blueston and Harrison 1980). Conversely, some adopt the
stance that the decision to close is solely a management
prerogative and intervention, such as bargaining with union
representatives, is neither appropriate nor necessary.
As we consider the plant closure issue, the question we
must attempt to address is: Assuming closure is a problem
requiring a public policy initiative, how can policy be con
structed so that its disruptive impact is limited, yet it is effec
tive at correcting the problem? Therefore, it is important to
investigate the functioning of the labor market in order to
understand the basis of the undesirable effects and to deter
mine if protections are in place and if they are adequate.
Three labor market issues will be addressed in this chapter.
The first is the structure of compensation schedules, the
resulting estimates of earnings loss and the equitable struc
ture of severance pay. The second is the dichotomy between
small and large local labor markets, with implications for the
job search of displaced workers. The final one is the notion
of equalizing differentials (ex ante adjustments) and its ap
plicability to plant closure. Numerous other issues do in-
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fluence the debate, but an exhaustive treatment of them is
beyond the scope of this study.
Compensation Schedules, Earnings Loss
and Severance Pay
The compensation schedules used by firms is not a topic
that has generated significant policy interest. It is important
in the case of plant closure, however, because the type of the
compensation schedule may affect the estimate of the earn
ings loss and the structure of an equitable severance pay for
mula.
Lazear (1981) suggests that firms may design efficient
compensation schedules in which workers do not receive a
wage equal to the value of their marginal product (VMP).
The usual assumption is that the wage of the worker should
equal his/her marginal productivity times the price of the
product. 2 Lazear contends that it pays for firms "to enter in
to long term wage-employment relationships which pay
workers wage rates less than their VMP when they are
junior, and more than their VMP when they are senior
employees." (p. 607) The motivation of the employer for
this schedule is that it should reduce shirking by workers and
increase employee attachment to the firm because they will
not receive the higher wages later on if they are terminated
now. 3
An example of the type of compensation schedule con
sidered by Lazear is presented in figure 2.1. V(t) is a
representation of a worker's value of marginal product over
time. W't is the schedule of reservation wages for the
worker, the minimum wage at which the worker will supply
labor to the firm. W(t) is a wage schedule in which the pre
sent value of wages paid equals the present value of VMP,
which is the schedule V(t). The worker beginning employ
ment with the firm should be indifferent between being com-
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pensated according to the wage path represented by either
V(t) or W(t). For purposes of analysis, we will use this
schedule as representative for the entire firm, such that dif
ferent points along the horizontal axis represent workers
with different tenure.
Figure 2.1

W(t)

Wages,
Value of
Marginal
Product

Tenure with Firm

Implicit in this form of compensation is employment
through time T, which is the efficient date of retirement. 4 At
this tenure, the worker has been fully compensated for the
below VMP wages received earlier, and the value of his/her
work with this firm is less than the value of his/her time
away from this firm. However, if the employment contract is
broken prior to T, the worker has not been fully compen-
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sated. Plant closure is one example of breaking an implicit
contract. Thus, when this type of compensation schedule is
used, an implicit obligation is created from the firm to the
worker. The firm has "defaulted" to the worker because the
worker has invested in the firm during the early stage of
tenure by accepting a wage less than VMP with the expecta
tion (condition) of being paid back by receiving a wage
greater than VMP in the latter state of tenure with the firm. 5
An examination of figure 2.1 indicates the nature of the
earnings loss. If V(t) also represents the likely next best alter
native in the labor market for the displaced worker, the in
itial earnings loss (L) will be: L = W(t) - V(t). The earnings
loss for more senior workers will be greater than the loss for
less senior workers. This relationship is reasonably consis
tent with the findings of Holen et al. (1981) who determined
that men under the age of 40 suffered a 13.4 percent drop in
earnings in the first year after closure whereas men over the
age of 40 suffered a 39.9 percent drop in earnings. 6
The earnings loss of workers can be analyzed further, as is
presented in figure 2.2. Assume the worker has been with'the
firm t* years when the plant closes. This worker's spot wage
is exactly equal to his/her value of the marginal product.
Given that s/he has been working with the firm since t, the
worker has "invested" an amount equal to the area AVW,
and the firm has implicitly agreed to pay back an amount
equal to area ADE. Assuming that V(t) represents the next
best employment opportunity, there is no immediate earn
ings loss.
Assume there is another worker whose tenure with the
firm is t** years when the plant closes. Given the same cir
cumstances as in the previous example, the initial earnings
loss will be CB. The firm has borrowed the amount AVW,
repaid area ABC, but still is in default area BCDE.
The more senior worker is likely to suffer the greater in
itial wage loss, but the lifetime earnings loss of the junior
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worker is significantly greater. The worker with tenure t* has
not been paid area ADE, whereas the lifetime earnings loss
of the worker with tenure t** is CEDE, which is the smaller
amount.
Figure 2.2

Wages.
Value of
Marginal
Product

W(t)

t*

t**

T

Tenure with Firm

This analysis of earnings loss is consistent with the
estimates developed by Jacobson (1979). His analysis
demonstrated that earnings losses over the course of the
worker's lifetime rose as tenure in the job increased, reached
a maximum at seven years of tenure, and then decreased with
additional years of tenure. The principal reason for this find
ing is that those individuals with greater tenure also tend to
have fewer years left in the labor force, and therefore the
compounded effect tends to be smaller.

The Functioning of the Labor Market 21

Thus, it is necessary to consider the two aspects of wage
loss. There is the transitory wage loss which is the difference
in the wage that one is able to obtain after closure relative to
the previous wage. The second is the permanent earnings loss
due to the interrupted work history, which changes the earn
ings profile. In addition, there is the wage loss due to a spell
of unemployment that may follow closure.
The usual diagram of earnings loss is presented in figure
2.3. The distance MN in figure 2.3 corresponds to CB in
figure 2.2, which is the transitory earnings loss. The usual
estimate of earnings loss is the area of MNP, which cor
responds to the loss incurred until the worker attains his/her
former earnings. However, as Jacobson correctly points out,
the real area of interest is MNQ, which measures both the
transitory loss and the loss associated with a disrupted earn
ings schedule.
An additional point needs to be made in regards to figure
2.2. Suppose a worker is at tenure T when the facility closes.
The measure of wage loss would be ED. However, the firm
has no implicit obligation to the worker since it has fully
repaid what it has borrowed. Conversely, the worker at t*
would be judged to have suffered no immediate wage loss,
although the lifetime earnings loss would be at a maximum.
Therefore, examination of the differences in the wage receiv
ed pre- and post-closure as a measure of policy necessity
would lead to inappropriate judgments about instances in
which there may be the need for remedial action.
The frequency of this type of compensation schedule is
unknown. It may actually take the form of job ladders in
which the marginal product expected increases less than the
wage as one moves up the ladder. Furthermore, other im
plications arise from this type of schedule. For instance, it is
likely that workers demand that wage schedules correspond
more closely to the value of the marginal product in firms
where it is anticipated that closure is more likely. Converse-
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ly, firms that are risky undertakings have the incentive to
establish a schedule which deviates considerably from V(t).

Figure 2.3

Earnings

earnings loss

Time

Earnings Losses Caused by Plant Closure
e^ = expected earnings profile of workers without
plant closure
&2 ~ earnings of workers displaced by plant closure
c

= time of closure

Although the measured earnings loss may be somewhat of
an artifact of the compensation schedule, workers who have
worked less than T years for this firm do indeed incur an
earnings loss if their employment is terminated. Lazear has
shown that a lump-sum payment is a mechanism to fully
compensate a worker whose accumulated compensation is
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less than the accumulated value of his/her marginal product
as the result of the termination of an employment contract.
One form of a lump-sum payment is severance pay, which
has been incorporated in plant closing legislative proposals.
Severance pay is the compensation given to a worker who
is terminated. The connotation associated with it is that the
leaving is involuntary and perhaps unexpected. For example,
severance pay is given to workers who are excised whereas
pensions are paid to workers who retire. The usual presump
tion is that severance pay is given to ease the pain and to tide
the worker over until something new can be found following
the involuntary separation. However, severance pay also can
be used as an incentive, and as a form of deferred but earned
compensation. Finally, severance pay can be used as a deter
rent to closure. All four of these uses have direct bearing on
the plant closure.
A key feature of the employment relationship is that both
parties are bound by certain rules, obligations and expecta
tions, with one expectation being continued employment.
For instance, Hall (1982) determined that 51.1 percent of all
men are likely to work 20 years or more for the same firm.
When the expectation of continued employment is not met
and where performance of the employee has been above cer
tain prescribed levels, the implicit contract has been violated.
To maintain respect for the implicit contract, a payment is
made to the worker that indicates that management is ending
the contract reluctantly.
The second role that the severance payment can play is
that of an incentive. Consider the case of plant closure. As
workers become aware that the plant is to close, they may
engage in job search in order to find alternate employment.
They may do this to get a head start on all the others who
also will become involuntarily laid off or because they may
be aware of specific opportunities.
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Workers quitting in order to find other employment may
not be in the best interest of the firm as it attempts to con
tinue production until closing. Those with the best alternate
employment opportunities also may be the most skilled.
Thus management may offer an attractive severance pay
schedule, but only to those workers who stay until the plant
closes. In order to maintain the most skilled workers, who
may also be the most experienced, the severance pay
schedule is positively correlated with years of experience,
such as two weeks of pay for every year of experience. In this
situation, severance pay is an incentive to stay, but with a
very real cost to the worker if s/he leaves before the plant is
closed.
The third role that the severance payment can play is that
of deferred but earned compensation (Lazear 1981, 1982)
and Stoikov (1969). The conventional schedule for severance
pay establishes it as a positive linear function of the number
of years worked. For example, legislation proposed in
Michigan sought the following form of severance payment.
"The severance benefit shall be equal to the average weekly
wage of the affected employee multiplied by the number of
full and fractional years for which the employee has been
employed." 7 Adopting Lazear's formulation, this proposal
would not fully compensate workers for the deferred but un
paid compensation.
Examining figure 2.4, the conventional proposal envisions
a severance pay schedule suggested by tAB. However, if one
objective of severance pay is to fully compensate workers for
the implicit obligation, the severance pay schedule should
take the form of tAT. The tAT schedule would result in the
severance paid to a worker who has T years of experience
with the firm when the plant closes being the same as the
payment to the person who retires normally: zero. 8
Why would a firm use a compensation schedule such as
this? The argument is that it would reduce shirking. Why
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would the firm concern itself with making a severance pay
ment? Again, it is the importance of maintaining the implicit
contract. Reneging on workers by leaving them with a com
pensation deficit would make it virtually impossible for
firms to implement this type of schedule in the future. Firms
would then have to devise an alternate method, which may
be more costly, to police workers and to minimize shirking.
Consequently, there are advantages for both the firm and
employees associated with severance payments.
Figure 2.4

Severance
Pay

The fourth role of severance pay is to increase the cost of
closing a plant such that closing may be the costlier alter
native. This role seems most appropriate to the circumstance
when the firm is considering relocating the operation. The
firm must compare the cost of continuing operations at the
old site with the sum of the costs of closing the old site and
producing at the new site.
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Consider the following simplified formulation. Define the
cost of continuing operations at the old site as Co, where
and where
oo

£ fio/U + r)1 is the discounted present value of future
/=^
nonlabor factor of production at the old
facility costs, and
oo

£ Wjo/(l + r)1 is the discounted present value of future
/='
labor costs at the old facility.
Define the cost of closing the old site and producing at the
new site (over the same time horizon) as Cp, where
oo
oc
-fe wip + £
i=7
1=7

and where
Xco is the fixed cost of closing down the old facility, and
XCp is the fixed cost of starting production at the new
facility,
and
fjp is the discounted present value of future nonlabor
factor of production costs at the new facility, and
Wjp is the discounted present value of future labor costs at
the new facility, and
Sjo is the severance obligation to the workers at the old
facility.
Obviously, relocation will not take place unless Cp < Co;
but Wjp < Wjo since fewer labor resources are likely to be
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used per unit of output. With regard to nonlabor factor of
production costs, fjp^ fjo, since capital is being substituted
for labor. Assuming fjp = fio, the problem becomes

(Wio " Wip)/(1 + ^

(Xco + xpn+

Therefore, as Sio is increased, it becomes more unlikely that
wage savings at a new location outweigh the fixed costs of
closure. Therefore, increasing the severance obligation of the
firm raises the probability of Cp >Co, which would make
the relocation uneconomical.
It is obvious that there is a conflict between designing a
severance pay schedule that fully compensates workers for
deferred compensation and a schedule that imposes signifi
cant costs on a firm if it decides to close a plant. The pattern
that closings appear to follow is that the actual closing is
preceded by a significant length of time in which employ
ment is reduced gradually. Due to seniority provisions incor
porated into bargained contracts, those remaining at the
time of closure are the most senior employees.
Consider a firm in which the following workers, categoriz
ed by years of experience, are employed and eligible for
severance pay when closure is announced.

Years of
Experience

Number of
Workers

20
15
10
5

20
15
10
5

Total

Total
severancei raymeni
Schedule B
Schedule A
$ 80,000
45,000
20,000
5,000

$ 4,000
15,000
20,000
5,000

$150,000

$44,000
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Severance payments under Schedule A are calculated as
two weeks of average pay for every year worked, where the
average pay is $200 for two weeks. The formula for Schedule
B is designed to compensate for deferred earnings. Conse
quently, two weeks of average earnings ($200) are payed for
each year worked up to 10 years, at which time the schedule
changes to $200 (10+ (11 - t))for each year worked more
than 10 years. T, the efficient retirement tenure, equals 21
years in this example. As can be seen, the severance payment
owed by the firm under A ($150,000) is significantly greater
than under B ($44,000), and therefore, Schedule A is much
more likely to deter a closure.

Small Local Labor Markets
Versus Large Local Labor Markets
The key element in the plant closure debate is the
reemployment experience of those workers who are displac
ed. Recognizing that the problem is one of scale, the public
policy proposals have tended to include only firms employ
ing more workers than some predetermined size. This ap
proach, though, may ignore circumstances of the local labor
market.
The concern is whether the local labor market approx
imates a perfectly competitive labor market. Are workers
likely to have alternate employment opportunities in that
area? Or are real alternatives going to require relocation to
another labor market? Are wages going to be competitive, or
does the closing of the one plant depress the labor market's
wage level?
If the local market is relatively large, as evidenced by
numerous employers and therefore numerous employment
opportunities, the market may approximate the competitive
model. No change of residence is necessary to access new op
portunities; perhaps only changing commuting patterns is re
quired. Furthermore, since there are many employers, no
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one employer can establish a wage scale. Numerous employ
ment opportunities enforce the competitive setting of wages
because if one employer deviates too far from the com
petitive wage, workers will leave and accept new employment
opportunities.
A small local labor market may not approximate the
perfectly competitive model. The local market may not pro
vide the range of options necessary so that workers can
change jobs without undue expense. Instead, job mobility
may entail relocation to another labor market. 9 Further
more, one employer may act as a monopsonist demander of
labor, paying workers a lower wage than would be paid in a
competitive market. 10 Jacobson (1979) determined that
lifetime earnings losses resulting from a plant closure tend to
be inversely related to the size of the local labor market.
Thus, the closure of a plant in a large local labor market
may not require direct intervention because labor can be
highly mobile among a number of alternatives. The incentive
to bargain over the decision to close also may be limited due
to the numerous options available. Relocation to find alter
nate employment is not as likely to be necessary. Conversely,
if that same plant closed in a small community, relocation
may be necessary. Specifically, the market will not function
as hypothesized because the conditions necessary are not pre
sent. Workers in this circumstance may have a greater incen
tive to obtain relocation allowances through the collective
bargaining contract, grant more concessions to keep the
plant open, or as Wintner (1983) has shown, buy out the
plant so that it can continue operating.
The difficulty is in developing an administrative
framework for determining whether the conditions for a
smooth functioning market are present or not. When is a
closure a serious problem in a local labor market? The usual
approach is to require firms with more than 50 or 100
employees to be subject to the statute. Obviously, the scope
of the problem depends on the size of the local labor market.
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The closure of a facility with 100 employees may be inconse
quential in a community of 250,000, whereas it would be
devastating in a community of 5,000.
This comparison would suggest that one approach might
be to convert the numer of employees affected to a percen
tage of the local labor force. This also is problematic because
the size of a facility can be a variable. The result could be
that firms would not establish facilities that exceeded the
percentage threshold. A notch would develop at this point;
but this approach would be more acceptable than one that
automatically covers all firms exceeding some size irrespec
tive of the conditions in the local labor market.

Compensating Wage Differentials
(Ex Ante Payments)
The theory of compensating differentials was introduced
by Adam Smith who observed that some types of jobs re
quired greater compensation than others because the work
had certain undesirable characteristics associated with it such
as greater hazards or frequent interruptions of employment.
If the theory of compensating wage differentials applies to
plant closure, workers employed in firms in which there is
greater likelihood of permanent closure would receive a com
pensating differential as part of their wage (an ex ante pay
ment) . That differential would make their expected compen
sation in that firm equal to the compensation they would
receive in a firm with more stable employment prospects,
everything else being equal. If this is the case, the affected
workers would require no additional policy consideration
because they already have been fully compensated by the
firm. McKenzie (1981) asserts that workers are so compen
sated.
Baily (1974) utilizes this theory in devising wage and
employment strategies for firms. He writes, "To attract
workers, the firm must pay a higher wage if there is some
positive probability of unemployment than it would if
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employment were guaranteed" (p. 38). Abowd and
Ashenfelter (1981) found evidence of compensating differen
tials for workers in industries in which layoffs were an
ticipated. Holding other factors constant, they found that
the value of the differential was directly proportional to the
extent of anticipated unemployment.
There are a number of questions relating to the relevance
of the theory of compensating wage differentials to plant
closure. First, is the permanent layoff resulting from plant
closure anticipated unemployment? Baily (1977) wrote that
workers "are assumed to have an expectation about the
layoff policy of the firm. . . . This assumption is ap
propriate where firms have a history of hiring and firing: a
pattern or reputation for the firm is established." Differen
tials result from accumulated knowledge, but the reputation
developed from plant closure cannot be applied by the
workers to the specific experience because there is no future
employment opportunity with that firm in the local labor
market. That is, there is no opportunity to recontract with
the firm. There is, however, the opportunity to recontract
with another firm in the same industry.
Second, in the theory of compensating wage differentials,
how do workers obtain information about an attribute of the
workplace or the firm? For example, an employee can
observe the degree of workplace hazards and attempt to ob
tain a new wage reflecting those conditions. However, infor
mation about plant closure has been so scarce and
fragmented, as is evident from chapter 1, that it is difficult to
envision reliable estimates of the differential probability of
closing. Schmenner's (1983) analysis, which found one-third
of closures being of plants less than six years old, suggests
that a large element of closure is random, which makes
estimating the necessary differential very tenuous. Since the
policy interest in this issue is leading to more data being col
lected, more reliable probabilities of closure may be
developed in the future.
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Summary
Casual observation of labor market outcomes pre- and
post-closure may provide a distorted view of the earnings
losses of workers. The tendency to emphasize initial losses
rather than permanent losses concentrates attention on the
older worker when, in fact, the worker in the middle of his
career may be most severely impacted because the inter
rupted work history decreases the expected lifetime earnings
profile.
The local labor market is a key determinant of the impact
of closure on workers. Jacobson found earnings losses
associated with plant closure to be inversely related to the
size of the local labor market. Policies that do not recognize
these differences may be onerous in some instances and in
adequate in others, which suggests that the policy approach
needs to be flexible so that it can be adapted to the local cir
cumstances.
Finally, the theory of compensating differentials probably
does not hold in the case of plant closure. The inability to
recontract with a closed firm coupled with the difficulty of
obtaining reliable estimates of the differential probability of
closure make it unlikely that ex ante protection is afforded
workers. One possibility is to encourage recontracting with a
firm that has a high probability of closing.
In conclusion, because the impact of closure depends on
the specific circumstances of the workers, the firm and the
labor market, a uniform policy may be successful in some in
stances and deleterious in others. Collective bargaining,
which by its nature is flexible and sensitive to local condi
tions, may be a socially acceptable way to make adjustments
to some labor market outcomes.
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NOTES
1. There have been two major types of plant closure policy initiatives.
The first has been to prescribe the behavior of firms intending to close.
Advance notice, continued wage payments, and severance payments to
workers and communities are elements of this type of initiative. In some
respects, the purpose of these requirements has been to make closure so
onerous that firms would not carry through with a threat of closure. The
second type has been to develop assistance programs for those workers
displaced including job clubs, retraining, job search skills and relocation.
This approach has been adopted more frequently by individual states,
since it has been thought that the more prescriptive types of governmen
tal action would place a state at a competitive disadvantage for economic
development purposes.
2. The reader will note that according to the economic theory, the wage
only equals the value of the marginal product of the last person hired.
This assumes that workers are homogeneous and are working with a fix
ed and identical capital stock. However, there are different job ladders
within a firm, employees have different responsibilities and they are not
necessarily working with the same capital, which requires deviations in
compensation. Lazear's analysis addresses the long run compensation
schedule within the firm.
3. Lazear develops the model further by demonstrating that firms will
develop compensation schedules that are of this shape, but the present
value of W(t) is greater than that of V(t). When the earnings stream is
greater than the productivity stream, the cost of shirking to the employee
increases, so the compensation schedule essentially becomes a policing
mechanism. His analysis has other interesting implications for plant
closure, but our present concern is with the implications of this schedule
for the measurement of earnings loss.
4. Abraham and Medoff (1983) assert that a deferred compensation
schedule requires that the relative protection against job loss also grows
with length of service so that firms are not permitted to terminate
workers once wages exceed VMP. In fact, they found that written provi
sions specifying seniority as an important determinant of layoff priority
are associated with a reduction in the vulnerability of senior workers los
ing their jobs.
5. Lazear (p. 609) describes this process as follows: The firm has
defaulted "since the firm essentially is borrowing from the worker by

34 The Functioning of the Labor Market
paying him less than VMP when he is young and repaying him by paying
more than the VMP when old."
The relationship of the shape of the earnings profile to the shape of the
value of the marginal product schedule also is an interesting issue. One
set of possible wage paths would be as depicted in figure 2.5.
Value of
Marginal
Product

W(t)

Tenure with Firm

This approach is flawed by the fact that anytime the worker's V(t) ex
ceeds W(t) paid by the firm, there is the incentive to leave the firm. A
firm would not adopt this type of schedule because (a) it does not reduce
shirking, and (b) it does not increase employee attachment. Thus,
although one can envision the situation in which the worker is in debt to
the firm, particularly when there is significant firm-specific training, this
type of schedule does not satisfy any of the motivations of the firm.
6. The initial earnings loss is not strictly a result of Lazear's formulation.
For instance, Wachter and Wascher (1983) use a more general ageearnings profile and also derive an immediate wage loss that is the dif
ference between the wage paid and the opportunity wage. Furthermore,
in their formulation, the early wage with the firm is less than the oppor
tunity wage. The distinction is that their age-earnings profile is the result
of job-specific human capital. The implications of this profile may dif
fer, however, and depend on the financing of the job-specific training.
7. This wording is taken from Substitute for House Bill No. 4330 "A Bill
to Provide for Community Preservation and Recovery After an
Employer Closes, Relocates or Reduces Its Operation." (1981)
8. Of course this ignores the role that pension payments play as deferred
compensation.
9. Baily (1974) incorporates mobility costs in his model of wage and
employment variation. He stresses the role that mobility costs play in the
decision to change jobs and that mobility costs vary by training and the
local labor market.
10. A perfectly competitive market also is a precondition for payment of
an equalizing differential.

Chapter 3

The Duty to Bargain

Judicial Interpretations

Introduction
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted
into law in 1935. It forms the basis of the legal framework
for collective bargaining in the private sector in the United
States. An administrative agency, the National Labor Rela
tions Board (NLRB) is charged with administering the terms
of the NLRA.
The National Labor Relations Act provides for the right
of workers to organize and select a representative to serve as
their exclusive bargaining agent. The Act also imposes "a
mutual obligation of the employer and representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and condi
tions of employment." 1 Because Congress did not specify
what constitutes "other terms and conditions" in detail,
there has been considerable uncertainty as to what actions
and practices are covered by these words.
"Wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employ
ment" are mandatory topics of bargaining. They cannot be
changed unilaterally by either party to the collective bargain
ing contract. Mandatory topics must be negotiated to im
passe. If unilateral changes are made prior to impasse, an
unfair labor practice is committed. However, it is in the case35
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by-case determination of whether an unfair labor practice
has been committed that the NLRB, the Circuit Court of Ap
peals and the United States Supreme Court have decided
what actions and practices are mandatory topics of bargain
ing.
The evolving case law of collective bargaining over plant
closure increasingly has changed the economic considera
tions brought into the analysis. Arguments supporting no
duty to bargain over the decision to close have moved from
the right of management to run its business as it sees fit (the
core of entrepreneurial control), 2 to whether the reasons are
primarily economic in nature, 3 to whether the economic
reasons are amenable to change through collective bargain
ing. 4 Furthermore, the concepts discussed have advanced to
include not only the capital investments by the owners of the
firm, but also to include the human capital investments made
by the employees. 5
The implicit assertion in the former arguments is that
economic efficiency is maximized when the use and move
ment of physical capital is unconstrained (McKenzie 1979).
The implicit contention in the latter arguments is that strict
economic efficiency ignores those costs which are borne by
others as a result of the firm's action—the social costs—and
considers only those costs borne by the firm (Coase 1971).
Consequently, what is efficient for the firm may not be effi
cient for society.
Bargaining over the decision to close a plant presumably
could incorporate both private and social costs in the deci
sion calculus so that a socially efficient decision could be
reached. Conversely, bargaining is not costless. Imposing a
duty to bargain over the decision to close in all partial
closure circumstances could result in a socially inefficient
solution if the extra bargaining costs exceed the benefits
from bargaining.
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There are two types of noncontract bargaining over plant
closure: decision bargaining and effects bargaining. Accord
ing to the interpretation of the United States Supreme Court,
there is no duty to bargain over the decision of the owner to
close down the entire operation of a firm. 6 Recently, it was
established that there is no duty to bargain over the decision
to close one plant (facility) of a multiple plant (facility)
operation, 7 but there is a duty to bargain over the effects of
closure.
The labor law concerning the duty to bargain over the
decision to partially close an operation has been described as
a conundrum (Heinsz 1981). This description is most apt.
The law generally has recognized that the owners of firms
place their capital and their livelihood at risk, and should be
free to take the actions necessary to protect their investment
and to generate a satisfactory return. However, the law also
is cognizant that employees also place their human capital
and livelihood at risk when joining a firm. To some this con
flict between physical capital and human capital may be an
issue of equity versus efficiency. Thus, it is to be expected
that the National Labor Relations Board and the Circuit
Court of Appeals have reached different conclusions on
whether "the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment" 8 also includes
bargaining over partial closure of operations.
The United States Supreme Court, in its ruling in First Na
tional Maintenance Corporation v. National Labor Rela
tions Board (101 S. Ct. 2573 (1981)), did not totally resolve
the issue. 9 The Supreme Court held there was no duty to
bargain over the decision to close one part of an operation
under the National Labor Relations Act. However, even the
Supreme Court's majority opinion states as limitations that
(a) First National Maintenance Corporation "had no inten-
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tion to replace the discharged employees or to move the
operations elsewhere," 10 and (b) the "union was not selected
as the bargaining representative until well after the peti
tioner's economic difficulties had begun." 11 Thus, the union
was not the source of the financial difficulties, nor could it
be expected that the union could effect changes to alleviate
the difficulties.
Justice Stewart wrote almost two decades ago in his con
curring opinion in Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation
v. National Labor Relations Board (85 S. Ct. 398, 411
(1964)) that "no problems in the domestic economy are of
greater concern than those involving job security and
employment stability." This statement probably has never
been more appropriate than now. The economy of the
United States has been undergoing a gradual structural shift
and back-to-back recessions have exacerbated the perceived
decline. Perhaps most important, the plant closure problem
will not go away during a sustained economic upturn.
Schmenner (1983) has determined that there is a long run
process underway in which manufacturing will be shifting
from larger establishments to smaller ones.
This chapter examines the efficiency and equity arguments
associated with the judicial interpretations of the duty to
bargain over the decision to close or relocate a part of an
enterprise. It usually is argued that the unfettered movement
of capital is necessary to achieving economic efficiency. The
most efficient allocation of resources occurs when capital is
free to move to its most profitable use. But a related question
should concern the investment in human capital. Would this
investment be less than optimum when workers are experi
encing frequent earnings losses due to closure? Will there be
a reluctance to undertake firm-specific training?
Although the profit maximization motive leads to the
most efficient allocation of resources, there is the recogni-
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tion that some redistribution may take place. The implicit
assumption is that the redistribution is among firms—that
some will gain at the expense of others. However, these are
potential equity implications of the redistribution involved in
plant closure or relocation. Specifically, because firms are
able to diversify and reposition more easily than workers, the
firm may be maximizing profits at the expense of earnings
losses of its workers.
The following review of the case law provides the institu
tional framework and the background arguments opposing
and supporting the duty to bargain. Based on these it may be
possible to establish a per se rule—the assignment of
rights—that will result in maximizing the production of
goods and services given that social costs are accommodated.
The next chapter examines alternate per se rules that have
been proposed to solve this conundrum and puts forth a new
proposal.

Judicial Interpretations
The conundrum surrounding the duty to bargain over
plant closure has resulted from the conflicting decisions that
have been rendered by the National Labor Relations Board,
the Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme
Court. The cases have been decided by relying on different
sections of the National Labor Relations Act. Specifically,
the National Labor Relations Board has emphasized Section
8(a)5 which defines the refusal to bargain collectively with
the elected representatives of the employees as an unfair
labor practice. The Courts, by and large, have stressed defin
ing the actions and activities that fall under the definition of
other terms and condition of employment (Section 8(d)).
Consequently, competing interpretations exist.
The question of bargaining over the decision to close a
plant, to subcontract work or to move work from one plant
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to another hinges on whether the practice falls within the
definition of wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment. If it does, then it is a mandatory topic of
negotiation. However, just because it is a mandatory topic
does not mean that agreement must be reached. Instead,
there simply must be an attempt at good faith bargaining.
The first case presented here (Borg- Warner) established this
principle. The following cases deal specifically with plant
closure, subcontracting and movement of work issues, and
whether negotiations occur during the course of a contract or
while bargaining over a new contract. The description of the
judicial developments below is not an exhaustive examina
tion of all the cases pertaining to the interpretations of the
duty to bargain. Other studies, such as Swift (1974), Heinsz
(1981) and Miscimarra (1983) have already provided these.

National Labor Relations Board v. Wooster
Division of Borg-Warner Corporation

(78 S. Ct. 718) (1958)
The United States Supreme Court decided this case in
1958. The crux of the case was the distinction between the
duty to bargain over mandatory topics as opposed to per
missive topics.
Borg-Warner Corporation attempted to include two
clauses in the collective bargaining contract it was
negotiating with the United Automobile, Aircraft and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), the
certified representative of the employees. One was the
"ballot" clause which would require a prestrike secret vote
of all employees on the company's last offer. If the
employees reject the offer, the company would have the op
portunity to amend the final offer. The other provision was a
"recognition" clause which was an attempt to exclude the
International Union of the UAW and recognize only the
UAW local as the bargaining representative.
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The union rejected both ballot and recognition clauses
saying each was totally unacceptable. Conversely, BorgWarner Corporation indicated that no agreement would be
reached unless it contrained both of these clauses. After a
strike, the union gave in and signed an agreement incor
porating both clauses. The International Union filed unfair
labor charges with the National Labor Relations Board
citing unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a) (5).
The Supreme Court analyzed Section 8(a) (5), which
defines refusal to bargain collectively with the represen
tatives of the employees, and Section 8(d), which requires
bargaining over "wages, hours and other terms and condi
tions of employment." The Supreme Court indicated that
the duty to bargain is limited to the subjects of wages, hours
and other terms and conditions of employment. Further
more, bargaining can take place over other issues, but at the
discretion of each of the parties.
Mr. Justice Burton wrote what has become the definitive
rule on bargaining rights and obligations surrounding man
datory and permissive topics of bargaining.
But that good faith does not license the employer to
refuse to enter into agreements on the ground that
they do not include some proposal which is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining. We agree with
the Board that such conduct is, in substance, a
refusal to bargain about the subjects that are within
the scope of mandatory bargaining. This does not
mean that bargaining is to be confined to statutory
subjects. Each of the two controversial clauses is
lawful in itself. Each would be enforceable if
agreed to by the unions. But it does not follow that,
because the company may propose these clauses, it
can lawfully insist upon them as a condition to any
agreement. 12
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Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation
v. National Labor Relations Board
(85 S. Ct. 398 (1964))

The United States Supreme Court decided Fibreboard in
1964. The facts of the case were as follows. Just prior to the
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement,
Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation indicated to the
union that substantial savings could be realized by contract
ing out the maintenance work at the expiration of the collec
tive bargaining agreement. Prior to the next meeting with the
union, which was to take place the day before the contract
expired, Fibreboard engaged a firm to do the maintenance
work. The company stated that further negotiations on a
new agreement would be pointless. Formal negotiations be
tween Fibreboard and the union, the United Steelworkers of
America, had existed since 1937.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
... on the facts of this case, the 'contracting out'
of work previously performed by members of an
existing bargaining unit is a subject about which the
National Labor Relations Act requires employers
and the representatives of their employees to
bargain collectively. We also agree with the Court
of Appeals that the Board did not exceed its
remedial powers in directing the Company to
resume its maintenance operations, reinstate the
employees with back pay, and bargain with the
Union. 13
The bases for the decision of the majority were that
(a) contracting out falls within the literal meaning of "terms
and conditions of employment," (b) the industrial peace was
likely to be promoted through the negotiation of the issue,
and (c) the industrial practices of the United States indicated
frequent negotiations over the issue of subcontracting. Fur-

Judicial Interpretations 43

thermore, the changes being considered by the company in
volved no capital investment. It simply was a case of one set
of workers being substituted for the company's employees.
The Supreme Court's majority opinion also addressed the
issue of the likely success of negotiations settling the dispute.
They wrote, "As the Court of Appeals pointed out, (i)t is not
necessary that it be likely or probable that the union will
yield or supply a feasible solution but rather that the union
be afforded an opportunity to meet management's legitimate
complaints that its maintenance was unduly costly." 14
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, however, became
more influential than the majority opinion. Justice Stewart
narrowed the scope of the decision by suggesting that the
Court's decision was not a general rule, but only applied to
the facts of this case—replacement of bargaining unit
workers with others doing the same work in the same loca
tion. Only under circumstances such as these would the
employer be required to bargain with the union over the deci
sion to terminate the activity.
Justice Stewart limited the majority's opinion by stating
that
... it surely does not follow that every decision
which may affect job security is a subject of com
pulsory collective bargaining. . . . An enterprise
may decide to invest in labor saving machinery.
Another may resolve to liquidate its assets and go
out of business. Nothing the Court holds today
should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain
collectively regarding such managerial decisions,
which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control.
Decisions concerning the commitment of invest
ment capital and the basic scope of the enterprise
are not themselves primarily about conditions of
employment, though the effect of the decision may
be necessarily to terminate employment. 15
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National Labor Relations Board
v. Adams Dairy, Inc.

(322 F.2d 553) (1963)
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
decided this case in 1963. The facts of the case were as
follows. Adams Dairy employed driver-salesmen and also
engaged independent contractors to distribute their pro
ducts. The driver-salesmen were members of a union that
had negotiated formal agreements with Adams Dairy since
1954. In the course of negotiating a new contract, the
employer expressed concern about the relative costs of the
delivery service. A new contract was executed, however,
without specifically addressing the costs of delivery service.

After the contract was signed, the employer initiated new
discussions concerning its unfavorable competitive situation
due to these higher costs. No specific proposals were in
troduced, nor was it indicated that the driver-salesmen
would be terminated if no accord was reached. Subsequent
ly, while the contract was still in force, Adams Dairy
substituted independent contractors for its own driversalesmen and terminated these employees.
The question was: Is the decision to terminate distribution
of one's product a subject of mandatory bargaining under
the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act? The
Court began their analysis by asserting that "union member
ship is not a guarantee against legitimate or justifiable
discharge or discharge motivated by economic necessity." 16
The Court also indicated that intent, motivation and natural
consequences cannot be ignored when determining whether
an unfair labor practice has been committed.
The Court held that the decision to terminate was not a
mandatory topic of bargaining because the substitution of
independent contractors for the driver-salesmen was made
for legitimate business reasons. The intent and motivation
was not to destroy the union, as evidenced by the fact that
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they had attempted to negotiate with the employees on
previous occasions concerning an adjustment of the commis
sion payments. The rest of the Court's ruling also is very
significant. Specifically, they wrote: "After that decision
had been made, however, Section 8(a) (5) did require
negotiation with reference to the treatment of the employees
who were terminated by the decision." 17 Thus, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
concept of "effects" bargaining.
In placing this case in perspective, it is important to recall
that the employer had attempted to negotiate with the driversalesmen concerning the commission payments. When no
relief was forthcoming, they substituted the independent
contractors for the driver-salesmen. Therefore, they had
established that this was a legitimate concern of their
business and that if an accommodation could have been
reached with the driver-salesmen, no change would have
been made in employment.

Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington
Manufacturing Company et al., and National
Labor Relations Board v. Darlington
Manufacturing Company, et al.

(85 S. Ct. 994) (1965)
The United States Supreme Court decided this case in
1965. The Textile Workers Union successfully organized the
workers of the Darlington Manufacturing Company in
September of 1956. The Board of Directors met several days
later and decided to liquidate the Darlington Manufacturing
Company. The plant ceased operations in November and all
equipment was sold in December. It was determined in the
proceedings that the owner (Deering Milliken) of Darlington
Manufacturing Company also operated 16 other textile
manufacturers.
The issues to be adjudicated were the following. First, was
Darlington Manufacturing Company a separate manufac-
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turer or part of the entire Deering Milliken enterprise? Sec
ond, does a company have the right to close part or all of its
business regardless of its motives? The Supreme Court im
plicitly held that Darlington Manufacturing Company was a
separate company. It explicitly ruled: "We hold that so far
as the Labor Relations Act is concerned, an employer has the
absolute right to terminate his entire business for any reason
he pleases, but disagree with the Court of Appeals that such
right includes the ability to close a part of a business no mat
ter what the reason." 18
In developing its opinion, the Supreme Court asserted the
primacy of decisions based on sound economic reasons as
opposed to those with a discriminatory motive. Those deci
sions with sound business justifications, irrespective of the
effect on concerted employee activity, would not be found in
violation of Section 8(a) (3), which holds that it is an unfair
labor practice for an employer to discriminate in employ
ment on the basis of membership in a labor organization. 19
The Supreme Court also evaluated the expected future
benefit derived from the antiunion activity, such as
discouraging collective employee activities. The Supreme
Court considered this, but suggested instead that a complete
liquidation of business, even though it was done for antiunion reasons, would not generate future benefits for the
firm. They retreated from this statement by indicating that
the expected future benefit not be in the same line of
business. They stated:
If the persons exercising control over a plant that is
being closed for antiunion reasons (1) have an in
terest in another business, whether or not affiliated
with or engaged in the same line of commercial ac
tivity as the closed plant, of sufficient substantiality
to give promise of their reaping a benefit from the
discouragement of unionization in that business;
(2) act to close their plant with the purpose of pro
ducing such a result; and (3) occupy a relationship
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to the other business which makes it realistically
forseeable that its employees will fear that such
business will also be closed down if they persist in
organizational activities, we think that an unfair
labor practice has been made out. 20

National Labor Relations Board v. The William
J. Burns International Detective Agency
(346 F.2d 897) (1965)
The International Guards Union of America was certified
as the collective bargaining agent for the Burns Detective
Agency, guard employees in the metropolitan Omaha area.
A meeting was arranged between the local Burns' manager
and the union to begin negotiations. However, before this
meeting took place, all but one of the establishments to
which Burns provided services in the Omaha area notified
Burns that they were going to cancel their service contracts
with them. Burns then cancelled their service contract with
the only establishment that continued to demand their ser
vices.
The manager of Burns wrote a letter to the union in
dicating that a negotiating session would not be necessary
since Burns would not have any contracts in the Omaha area.
The union filed charges against Burns alleging failure to
bargain with the union as the exclusive bargaining agent.
Further, it was alleged that the mere refusal to consult with
the union about the termination of services is a violation of
Section 8(a) (5), which defines employment conditions that
require bargaining.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit distinguished
this case from Fibreboard, arguing that Burns had complete
ly discontinued its operation in Omaha.
Unlike the Fibreboard situation, Burns is not conti
nuing the same work at the same plant under
similar conditions of employment. No form of con-
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tracting out or subcontracting is here involved.
Burns for valid economic reasons has withdrawn
completely from providing any services in the
Omaha area. 21
This case raises several intriguing questions. First, there is
the juxtapositioning of the election victory by the union with
the Agency's termination of its one remaining contract,
thereby completely ending service in that market. Was there
an antiunion animus? Second, how much can be expected of
a firm when its services are no longer being demanded? It
would not be able to service this market from a different
location, which would be possible if this was a manufactur
ing facility. Third, is the expected benefit to an unfair labor
practice restricted to that market of operation? Might dif
ferent interpretations be necessary for manufacturing
facilities as opposed to service establishments? Finally, no
agreement had ever been negotiated. What was the expected
return from notification and negotiation?
In terms of the labor law at the time, the only issue on
which this case should have been decided was the antiunion
animus. There was no substitution of employees, so
Fibreboard would not apply. Neither would Adams Dairy. If
it was judged that there was antiunion animus, then it must
be determined whether withdrawing from this market was a
partial or complete closure. Technically, Burns was closing
down one part of its operation. But Burns was completely
leaving this market. However, if one wants to use expected
benefit in defining the status as partial or total, the answer
probably is that unionization attempts could have been
forestalled at other locations. Thus, it would seem that it
should have been considered a partial closure, and therefore
an unfair labor practice.
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National Labor Relations Board v. Royal
Plating and Polishing Company

(350 F.2d 191) (1965)
The Royal Plating and Polishing Company had two plants
located within one block of each other. The two plants com
prised a single bargaining unit. The production and
maintenance workers were represented by the Metal
Polishers, Buffers, Platers and Helpers International Union.
A bargaining relationship had existed for 17 years, although
the union had only been certified as the exclusive agent for
the last 3 years. There had been little labor trouble between
the union and company.
The union and company had just reached a new agree
ment. The Company, however, also was negotiating with the
local housing authority since the property on which the plant
was located was designated for redevelopment. Prior to sign
ing the new contract with the union, the company had given
the housing authority an option to purchase the plant. The
housing authority exercised the option and the company
closed the plant one month after the new agreement with the
union had been signed.
The union charged that the company violated Sections
8(a) (5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by
unilaterally closing the plant. Section 8(a) (1) defines
employer interference in union activities as an unfair labor
practice. 22 In considering this case, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit stressed the fact that the
land on which the plant was located had been designated for
redevelopment by a public body. Thus, "there was no room
for union negotiation in these circumstances. The union
could only attempt to persuade (the owner) to move his
operation to another location." 23 Also, since the decision in
volved a major change in the economic direction of the com
pany, the employer did not have a duty to bargain with the
union concerning the decision to shut down.
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The Appeals Court did raise an important issue for effects
bargaining:
However, under the circumstances such as those
presented by the case at bar an employer is still
under obligation to notify the union of its inten
tions so that the union may be given an opportunity
to bargain over the rights of the employees whose
employment status will be altered by the
managerial decision. 24
This was followed by a statement that had even greater
significance:
There can be no doubt that the Company, by
withholding information of its intention to ter
minate the Bleeker Street operations, deterred the
Union from bargaining over the effect of the shut
down on the employees. 25
This ruling dictated that there was a mandatory duty to
bargain over the effects of the closure, i.e., to negotiate such
issues as severance pay, vacation pay and pensions.
Moreover, the phrase, "by withholding information of its
intention to terminate," could be interpreted as indicating
that the Court of Appeals was requiring timely advance
notice be given to the employees in order to bargain over the
effects. Withholding information can occur only prior to the
actual occurrence. However, this interpretation has not been
adopted, nor has agreement evolved on what constitutes
timely advance notice.
Ozark Trailers Incorporated
and International Union,
Allied Industrial Workers of America,
Local No. 770,AFL-CIO
(161 NLRB No. 48) (1966) (63 LRRM 1264)
The National Labor Relations Board decided this case in
1966. Ozark Trailers Incorporated was one division of a
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multiplant operation, although all three operations had dif
ferent names. In March 1963, the Allied Industrial Workers
union was certified as the bargaining agent, and in April
1963, the union and Ozark Trailers executed their first col
lective bargaining contract, a one-year agreement.
The following January, the board of directors of Ozark
Trailers decided to close the plant for economic reasons.
They claimed that low productivity, poor workmanship and
an inefficiently designed facility were the reasons for the
closure. No notice of closure was given to the union; in fact,
the union representative was told that the layoff was tem
porary. The plant was closed prior to the end of the contract.
The National Labor Relations Board determined that
there was a duty to bargain over the decision. Its decision
was based on four separate considerations. They were:
1. Decisions important to management are likely to be im
portant to employees.
2. The economic reasons for closing were particularly
suited to resolution through collective bargaining.
3. The duty to bargain only requires that full and frank
discussions of the topic be held, not that an agreement
be reached by the parties.
4. Bargaining limited to the effects is not likely to be mean
ingful when there is no possibility of reversing the deci
sion.
In making the argument concerning the importance of the
decision to both management and employees, the Board
drew the parallel between physical capital and human
capital. Specifically, the Board wrote:
For, just as the employer has invested capital in the
business, so the employee has invested years of his
working life, accumulating seniority, accruing pen
sion rights, and developing skills that may or may
not be salable to another employer. And, just as the
employer's interest in the protection of his capital
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investment is entitled to consideration in our inter
pretation of the Act, so too is the employee* s in
terest in the protection of his livelihood. 26
The second consideration drew heavily from the
Fibreboard decision, in which the majority opinion stressed
the fact that issues involving labor costs were particularly
suited to resolution through the collective bargaining pro
cess. Furthermore, they pointed out that there were strong
similarities between subcontracting and the partial closure,
therefore rendering the latter amenable to resolution through
collective bargaining.
In developing the argument pertaining to the duty to
bargain, but not necessarily the duty to agree, the Board re
jected the argument that this would impede management
decisionmaking. The basic purposes of the National Labor
Relations Act would be furthered by requiring bargaining,
and since the partial closure is a relatively infrequent event,
the cost to society of requiring bargaining would not be
unreasonable.
The final consideration is based on the relationship be
tween decision bargaining and effects bargaining. What is
the source of bargaining power for the union when bargain
ing over the effects? Since it is after the fact, there is only the
goodwill of the employer to rely on to generate a fair out
come. When there is a duty to bargain over the decision,
potentially there is greater bargaining power because the
enterprise is still an active concern. Tradeoffs can be made in
the process of arriving at a decision that is mutually
beneficial.

International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America, UA W and its Local 864,
v. National Labor Relations Board
(470 F.2d 422) (1972)
General Motors (GM) owned and operated a facility in
which retail trucks were sold and serviced. The employees at
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this facility were represented by the United Auto Workers
(UAW) and had been covered by a collective bargaining
agreement for four years before GM began negotiations to
sell the outlet to an independent operator.
The UAW requested that they be kept informed of the
potential transfer and also that GM and the UAW bargain
over the decision before it was made. GM asserted there was
no reason to discuss the decision until after it was made. The
UAW filed suit. Subsequently, GM completed the transac
tion with the independent dealer. Several days later the in
dependent dealer advised the current employees that no jobs
would be available for any of them. GM officials then began
discussing the effects of the sale and offered assistance in
securing employment in other GM facilities.
In a marked reversal from its earlier decisions, the Na
tional Labor Relations Board ruled that the transfer was a
"sale of the business." Therefore bargaining was not re
quired under Section 8(a) (5) because this decision was at the
"core of entrepreneurial control." The UAW countered that
the action was a case of "contracting out" because GM
maintained substantial control and essentially retained its
position in the market.
The Circuit Court of Appeals sided with GM's assertion
that this sale was part of a national strategy to get out of the
business of running dealerships. Therefore, GM was under
no obligation to bargain over the decision.
This decision was not unanimous. Judge Bazelon
dissented on the grounds that there had been inadequate con
sideration of the employees' interest in bargaining and an
overestimation of the employer's interest in not bargaining.
Specifically, he wrote:
The employer's duty to bargain may cost him time
and it may threaten the confidentiality of his
negotiations; these problems exist whether he is
negotiating a subcontract, a sale or a franchise. But
these costs can hardly be said to increase because
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"title" passes, because day-to-day management
changes hands, because he used the words "buyer"
and "seller"; or even necessarily because capital is
withdrawn by the employer and invested by the
"buyer." 27
The issue may not have been defined correctly from the
start. There had not been a change in the business. The
business operation still was engaged in the same services. The
only change had been in the financial arrangement. There
had been a substantial change in the scope of General
Motors; they were no longer in the dealership business. Con
versely, they did not totally extricate themselves from this
line of business.
Brockway Motor Trucks,
Division of Mack Trucks, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Board
(582 F.2d 720) (1978)
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
decided this case in 1978. According to the record, Brockway
operated a number of truck manufacturing plants that also
served as sales facilities. Employees at the plant, who were
represented by the International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, were covered by a collective
bargaining agreement. After a three-year contract expired,
negotiations ensued for about nine months prior to the union
calling a strike. After two months of the strike, management
unilaterally decided to close the struck plant. Management
did not consult the union about the decision nor did it pro
vide any advance notice of the closing.
The union brought suit arguing that management had
violated Sections 8(a) (1) and (5) of the National Labor Rela
tions Act. Management stipulated that closing the facility
was based on "economic considerations" and was not the
result of antiunion animus. The economic considerations
necessitating closure were not specified, however.
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The Board ruled that Brockway's action violated Section
8(a) (5) because when an action directly affects the condi
tions of employment, there is a duty to bargain irrespective
of the assertion that the requirement significantly restricts
the employer's ability to run the business. Moreover, the
Board ruled that there is only a duty to bargain, not
necessarily a duty to reach an agreement.
The Court of Appeals first of all stressed the need to
specify the economic considerations leading to the decision
to close one plant or change the direction of the business. In
recounting previous cases in which economic considerations
had been at issue and the finding had been that there was no
duty to bargain, it noted that economic considerations were
major ones such as being necessary to remain in business or
the firm having lost considerable sums of money.
Both parties advanced perse rules. Brockway asserted that
"when a partial closing is predicated on * economic con
sideration,' whatever they may be, there can be no duty to
bargain about it." 28 The Board's rule was "that an employer
has a duty to bargain about a decision to close one of its
facilities, for such an action intimately affects the interests of
the employees and is the sort of subject that the NLRA was
designed to reach." 29 The Court of Appeals rejected both
per se approaches and attempted to fashion an alternative.
They started with the premise that the aims of collective
bargaining would be furthered by requiring negotiations be
tween an employer and the union before irrevocably closing
a plant. They also added that closing a plant was likely to
lead to the termination of employment and therefore it might
be called a "condition of employment." Thus, the initial
presumption was that "a partial closing is a mandatory sub
ject of bargaining." 30
However, because the Court had rejected both per se
rules, additional analysis was necessary after the initial
presumption. First, the Appeals Court stated that the in
terest of the employees in bargaining must be considered
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since, in most circumstances, it is hard to imagine that
workers would not have a strong interest in trying to change
a decision that affected their employment.
The next element to be considered is the likelihood that the
decision could be altered through the bargaining process.
The Court recognized that there are certain areas in which
the union has greater or lesser expertise and control. The
area of labor costs is one area in which labor has more con
trol. Thus, there is a positive likelihood that bargaining can
be successful. Furthermore, as in Fibreboard, the Appeals
Court cited that considerable bargaining had taken place
over plant closure.
The final element to consider is the employer's counter
vailing interest in not bargaining. To presume that all
economic considerations outweigh the employee's interest is
as inappropriate as arguing that management's interest could
never be so great as to eliminate the duty to bargain over the
decision. The Court stated that it could not use the balancing
test in this case because Brockway did not specify the nature
of the economic considerations. 31

First National Maintenance Corporation
v. National Labor Relations Board
(101 S. Ct. 2573) (1981)
The most recent ruling of the United States Supreme
Court on the plant closure issue was its decision in First Na
tional Maintenance. The facts of this case are as follows. The
company provided housekeeping, cleaning, maintenance and
related services for commercial customers in the New York
City area. In return for the maintenance services, the com
pany was reimbursed for its labor costs and also received a
set management fee. Personnel were hired separately for
each contract (location) and employees were not transferred
among locations.
In March 1977 a certification election was conducted
among the employees at this location, and the National
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Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees was certified
as the bargaining agent. First National Maintenance Cor
poration (FNM) was experiencing difficulties with a pur
chaser of its services at this time due to disagreement over the
management fee. In July the union wrote FNM of its desire
to begin negotiations. FNM never responded. Later in July,
FNM notified the purchaser of its maintenance services that
it was cancelling the agreement unless the management fee
was increased. The purchaser would not increase the fee, the
agreement was cancelled and the employees were given three
days notice that they were being discharged.
The union filed an unfair labor practice charge against
FNM charging that FNM interfered in the activities of the
union, Section 8(a) (1), and refused to bargain with the
elected representatives of the union, Section 8(a) (5). Both
the Administrative Law Judge and the National Labor Rela
tions Board adopted the position that FNM had failed to
satisfy its duty to bargain about the decision to terminate or
about the effects. The Court of Appeals adopted the position
of the Board, but put forth a different line of reasoning.
Following Brockway, they indicated that no per se rule was
appropriate under the law. Rather, there was a presumption
in favor of mandatory bargaining over the decision, with
that position being rebuttable if the purposes of Section 8(d)
would not be furthered. Examples of such circumstances
might include:
1. Bargaining would be futile.
2. The decision to close was due to emergency financial cir
cumstances.
3. Firms in that industry customarily had not bargained
over such decisions, as demonstrated by their absence
from collective bargaining contracts.
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The Supreme Court's majority decision, which was writ
ten by Justice Blackmun, did not adopt the rebuttable
presumption rule developed by the Court of Appeals. In
stead, it developed its own balancing test.
In view of an employer's need for unencumbered
decisionmaking, bargaining over management deci
sions that have a substantial impact on the con
tinued availability of employment should be re
quired only if the benefit, for labor-management
relations and the collective bargaining process,
outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of
business. 32
The Supreme Court, on the basis of its balancing test,
determined that the employer's need to operate freely
outweighed the incremental benefits that might arise from
permitting the union to participate in the decision.
Therefore, when a business is shut down for purely economic
reasons, there is no mandatory duty to bargain over the deci
sion under Section 8(d). If the shutdown is due to an antiunion animus, the duty to bargain is protected under Section
8(a) (3), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of union
membership.
The Supreme Court took great pains to limit the
generalizability of the holding. First, they wrote: "In this
opinion we of course intimate no view as to other types of
management decisions, such as plant relocations, sales, other
kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc., which are to be
considered on their own particular facts." 33 Second, the
Court noted that the union had no control over the size of
the management fee, which was the reason for closing. Thus,
bargaining would not have been a factor in changing
management's mind. Third, the Court pointed out that the
management fee had been an issue prior to the selection of
the union as the bargaining representative.
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Because of the caveats given by the Court, it must be ques
tioned whether they established a per se rule for shutdowns
of operations based on economic reasons. It appears that the
Court felt it established a perse rule because it expounded on
the difficulties of case-by-case adjudication such as would be
necessary under the rebuttable presumption rule. First, the
employer never totally knows if his shutdown requires
bargaining or not. Second, if the employer bargains and does
not reach an agreement, he does not know with certainty
whether he has met the requirements for good faith bargain
ing. Third, if the employer does not bargain, feeling that the
purposes of the Section 8(d) would not be advanced, and is
incorrect, the potential cost of that decision could be
onerous due to the requirement of paying wages back to the
day of the decision.
The Supreme Court raised the most pertinent issue. What
is the real purpose of requiring bargaining over the decision
to close? Is the purpose to compel discussion of the closure?
Is it to forestall closure or is it to provide information? The
Court adopted the positions that (a) the union will seek to
halt the shutdown, (b) bargaining will occur volun
tarily—initiated by management—if labor costs are an im
portant consideration, and (c) requiring bargaining will not
improve the flow of information.
The counter position is that information will not be made
available without mandatory bargaining. Information is
needed to determine (a) the reason for the shutdown and
(b) what changes will be necessary to continue operations if
the reason for shutting down is amenable to bargaining.
Once that information is available, the union can make the
decision whether it should pursue bargaining. This issue is
addressed at greater depth in the next chapter.
Negotiations in the formal contract also were used as
evidence. Whereas the majority in Fibreboard drew upon

60 Judicial Interpretations

current practice in negotiated contracts to find a duty to
bargain over subcontracting, the majority in First National
Maintenance cited current practices to find no duty to
bargain over the decision to close. Specifically, they wrote:
"We note that provisions giving unions a right to participate
in the decisionmaking process concerning alteration of the
scope of an enterprise appear to be relatively rare. Provisions
concerning notice and 'effects' bargaining are more
prevalent." 34
In conclusion, due to the facts of this case, the Supreme
Court probably only could rule that there was no duty to
bargain over the decision. It is questionable, however,
whether this case should serve as a significant precedent for
future decisions. It is severely limited due to the facts of the
case.

Los Angeles Marine Hardware Company
v. National Labor Relations Board
(602 F. 2d 1302)(1979)
A significant recent development in labor law concerns the
relocation of work during the course of the collective
bargaining agreement. The position that has been taken by
the National Labor Relations Board, which has been upheld
by the United States Court of Appeals, is that the relocation
of work, even if it is for economic reasons, while the contract
is in force, violates Sections 8(a) (1) and (5) and Section (d)
of the National Labor Relations Act. Although several cases
have helped to develop this rule, the two principal cases are
Los Angeles Marine and Milwaukee Spring which are
discussed below.
Mission Marine Associates was a holding company for
two divisions, Los Angeles Marine Hardware Company and
California Marine Hardware Company. Cal Marine was an
inactive shell prior to March 1977 whereas LA Marine was
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an active division. LA Marine had an established bargaining
relationship with the Chauffeurs, Sales Drivers, Ware
housemen and Helpers Union dating back to 1956.
LA Marine was facing potential operating deficits that in
part were due to the high union wages it was paying. The
company tried to obtain relief from the union during the
1975 round of negotiations, but was unsuccessful. The com
pany met with the union in 1977, indicated it was planning to
relocate and proposed a new contract for the relocation. The
union refused to discuss the matter, given the existing con
tract. The company proceeded with the relocation, ter
minated the union workers and activated Cal Marine.
For purposes of establishing whether an unfair labor prac
tice had been committed, it was determined that LA Marine
and Cal Marine were the same employer. Cal Marine was
simply continuing the operations of LA Marine and,
therefore, the relocation, firing of union workers and
establishing a new pay schedule all constituted mid-term
repudiations of the contract. LA Marine countered that the
collective bargaining agreement only covered work done at
the old location.
The two principal legal points made by the Appeals Court
were:
1. An employer cannot alter mandatory contractual terms
while a contract is in effect without the agreement of the
union.
2. An employer is not relieved of its duty to recognize the
union by relocating when the relocation is an unfair
labor practice.
The results potentially could generate some interesting
twists. The unfair labor practice arose because the terms and
conditions of the collective bargaining agreement were not
applied to the new employees at the new location—wages
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had been changed unilaterally. What if the company had
simply relocated from LA Marine to Cal Marine and had not
lowered wages? Would this have been a strict instance of
relocation and therefore not subject to bargaining? The firm
could have used this tactic and then subsequently sought
decertification and reduced the wage costs at the new loca
tion, say one year later. The reason for the relocation could
simply have been a more efficient structure or the potential
for a more efficient operation.
According to one writer, "good faith bargaining under
Section 8(a) (5) requires not only that the parties abide by the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, but that
neither party will undermine, circumvent, or avoid the provi
sions of the agreement." (Bosanac 1983) Conversely,
another writer indicated that "An employer that is not
specifically prohibited by an agreement from relocating
bargaining unit work during the term of the agreement re
tains the right, after bargaining, to relocate that work during
the term of the agreement if the relocation is taken in
response to a need to reduce high labor costs." (Klaper 1983)
It is obvious that there is considerable disagreement about
the extent of this ruling. It also brings out the fragile demar
cation that exists between unfair labor practice cases and
justifiable actions. Specifically, according to the Board's rul
ing, the unfair labor practice did not arise from relocating
the work, it was due to reducing wages. Had the company
argued that the new work relocation was more efficient, and
had it maintained the collective bargaining agreement, the
employer's actions most likely would not have been found to
be an unfair labor practice. 35
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Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois
Coil Spring Company and United
Automobile Workers (UA W)
and its Local 547
(265 NLRB No. 28, 111 LRRM 1486) (1982)
This case was decided by the National Labor Relations
Board in 1982. The Board applied the theory developed in
Los Angeles Marine to decide this case.
The facts of this case were as follows. The parent com
pany, Illinois Coil Spring Company, had a union facility in
Milwaukee and a nonunion facility in McHenry, Illinois.
While a contract was in effect at the Milwaukee facility, the
company asked the union to forego a wage increase and to
grant other contract concessions, partially because some
business had been lost. The company then proposed to
relocate the assembly operations from Milwaukee to
McHenry, where wage payments were considerably lower.
The union refused to grant the concessions, but it did in
dicate that it was willing to continue discussions. The com
pany proceeded with the plans to relocate the work to the
McHenry facility.
The union charged that the decision to relocate work dur
ing the course of the contract constituted a mid-term
repudiation of the collective bargaining contract. The reloca
tion was due solely to the desire to go from the higher labor
costs at the union facility to the lower labor costs at the
nonunion facility.
The company asserted that because it had engaged in deci
sion bargaining, and because it had offered to engage in ef
fects bargaining, it could relocate the work. Furthermore
this was possible because the collective bargaining agreement
had no express prohibition against relocation.
The Board ruled that the company's relocation of work
during the contract violated Section 8(d) because the union
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had not waived its right to object to the move, even though it
had bargained over it, and the collective bargaining contract
also did not contain language indicating the union had un
equivocally waived its right to object to the relocation.
Specifically, the Board wrote:
The Board has held that Section 8(d) forbids altera
tion by an employer of the terms and conditions of
employment embodied in a collective bargaining
agreement during the term of the agreement
without the consent of the union, even though the
employer may have previously offered to bargain
with the union about the change and the union has
refused. 36
Both the company and the union were bound by the terms of
the collective bargaining contract while it was in force.
In some respects, the thrust of the decision is counter
productive. Consider the following scenario. A collective
bargaining contract is in force. The firm begins to experience
financial difficulty. It approaches the union for some
assistance in making it through the period of difficulty.
However, no agreement is reached with the union to alter
mandatory terms. The firm has four choices.
1. The company can close the operation and there is no
violation of Section 8(d).
2. The company can continue operating at the facility until
the financial difficulties become so severe that it has no
choice but to close the facility. There is no violation of
Section 8(d).
3. The company can operate the facility until the contract
expires, at which time it proposes Draconian terms. If
no agreement is reached, it can relocate the work
without violating Section 8(d).
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4. The company can relocate the work in an attempt to ob
tain financial relief and incur a violation of Section 8(d).
Loss of markets or other financial difficulties do not
necessarily occur on the same cycle as the collective bargain
ing contract. As the options above indicate, without a
mechanism for mid-term flexibility, all or nothing solutions
will be used. It is somewhat incongruous that closure is a
"legal" solution whereas relocation while a contract is in ef
fect is not, even though both can generate the same impact
on the workers at the site. 37
Although an appeal had been filed with the Seventh Cir
cuit Court of Appeals, the National Labor Relation Board
requested that Milwaukee Spring I be remanded to the
Board. In July 1983, the Court of Appeals relinquished
jurisdiction; oral arguments were presented in September
1983 and the Board reversed its decision January 1984 in
Milwaukee Spring II (268 NLRB No. 87).
In reversing its decision, the NLRB ruled that the firm did
not violate Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act
because the contract did not expressly cover the condi
tion—relocating work from one facility to another. Since
there was no contract provision under which the union had
to agree to a change, Milwaukee Spring's obligation simply
was to bargain in good faith to impasse over moving work
before instituting the change.
The Board adopted the logic presented in Los Angeles
Marine, but to the advantage of the employer. The Board
agreed that the contract was still in force at the Milwaukee
facility and there had been no change in terms and condi
tions at that facility. Had any workers been employed at the
Milwaukee location, they would have been entitled to the
contractually agreed on wages.
This writer's reading of the opinion suggests that an
unintended precedent may have been set. It appears that the
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Board considered relocation of work a mandatory topic of
bargaining. Specifically, the Board wrote: "If the employ
ment conditions the employer seeks to change are not 'con
tained in' the contract, however, the employer's obligation
remains the general one of bargaining in good faith to im
passe over the subject before instituting the proposed
change." Prior to this ruling, relocation was not necessarily
considered a term or condition of employment. The wording
in this context implies that it is.
Although the NLRB has ruled that a firm can relocate its
work, this question is still not resolved. Specifically, there
now is a "split in the circuits." Los Angeles Marine also still
serves as a precedent. Depending on which case a court relies
on—Los Angeles Marine or Milwaukee Spring II— the out
come could be quite different, with vastly different cost im
plications for firms.
Summary and Conclusions
The summation of the 12 cases, provided in table 3.1, in
dicates several disturbing features of the decisions. They are
(a) the concern with process and not outcomes, (b) the
unspecified nature of economic considerations, (c) the treat
ment of antiunion animus, (d) the sharp distinction between
relocation and plant closure, and (e) effects bargaining.
The concern with process and not outcomes is very evident
in the Fibreboard and Adams Dairy cases. What is the dif
ference in the outcomes between replacing drivers-salesmen
with independent contractors to distribute and market pro
ducts, and subcontracting out maintenance activities that
had been performed by employees? In both instances,
employees were replaced with nonemployees. Both activities
were designed to reduce the costs of a particular operation.
The products produced did not change nor did the firms
change their lines of business. They did not change their at-
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tachment to a particular market. They changed an activity.
Although A dams Dairy did engage in some disinvestment of
capital because it no longer needed to own a fleet of trucks, it
is an overstatement to say that it was a major change in the
operation of business.
Conversely, suppose Adams Dairy had not been able to
reduce its labor costs associated with the delivery of its pro
duct and had gone out of business as a result. That would
not have been a satisfactory solution, either. Numerous
employees would have lost their jobs. Thus, the distinction
between Fibreboard and Adams Dairy is unclear, and
therefore, the determination whether there is a duty to
bargain over the decision on the basis of terminology of the
process.
In this regard, consider the UAW-GM dealership case.
There was no change in the actual business, the dealership.
Ownership of it had changed by means of a sale. Although
GM was changing the nature of its business, there was no
change in the product/service nor probably in the skills of
the individuals necessary to produce the product/service.
However, because it was a sale, the NLRB considered it a
totally different situation, even though the impact on the
employees was the same as closure.
Economic considerations are evident in all of these cases.
Examples could include unsatisfactory profits, loss of
market share, high labor costs, poor workmanship and low
productivity, and managerial difficulties with clients/sup
pliers. All of these are economic difficulties and considera
tions. The key difference is that some issues are more likely
to be resolved through collective bargaining, whereas in
other situations the economic considerations are likely to be
beyond the scope of the bargaining relationship.
Consider Los Angeles Marine and Milwaukee Spring I in
this light. The economic difficulty was high labor costs in the
former, and high labor costs and a lost subcontract in the lat-
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ter. The higher labor costs also were coupled, though, with
having alternate facilities available. Presumably, it would
have been possible in both cases to begin bidding projects
from the alternate plant. As projects were completed at the
current facility, those workers could be phased out, and the
plant eventually closed. Instead, at least in the latter case,
they attempted to negotiate. What could have facilitated
those negotiations so that they would have resulted in
satisfactory outcomes for both management and labor? The
ruling in Milwaukee Spring II comes closer to this position
by implicitly holding that relocation is a mandatory topic of
bargaining.
The treatment of antinuion animus also is problematic
throughout these cases. Darlington closed to avoid having to
negotiate a contract with the duly elected representatives of
the workers. Burns Detective Agency closed shortly after a
representation victory. Ozark Trailers closed one year after a
representation election was won by the union. First National
Maintenance decided to discontinue the particular opera
tions shortly after the representation election was won by the
union. Only in Darlington were there no mitigating cir
cumstances, however. The juxtapositioning of certification
and closure has clouded (a) whether there is a duty to
bargain, (b) whether the reason for closure is amenable to
resolution through collective bargaining, and (c) whether antiunion animus is present in these cases.
Are there differences in the nature of markets and goods
and services produced that should impact on the determina
tion of antiunion animus? For example, in Darlington the
Supreme Court's ruling was partially premised on the ra
tionalization that there must be some potential benefit for
the firm from unfair labor practices in order for there to be a
judgment of antiunion animus. Thus, complete closure
would generate no future benefits because the owner would
not be in business to take advantage of them.

Judicial Interpretations 71

Partial closure of a manufacturing facility would generate
these benefits because (a) the company still could serve the
market with goods produced at the other facility and (b) the
action would have a chilling effect on union organizing ac
tivities at the other plants.
Would partial closure of a service operation arising from
antiunion animus generate these same benefits? For a firm
providing services, the market area is limited geographically.
It may not be possible to provide the same services from a
geographically separate location. Thus, the closure of a ser
vice establishment is tantamount to complete closure; it is a
total withdrawal from a market. However, the diffusion of
the information and the benefit derived from an unfair labor
practice are not restricted in the same way. The timing of the
representation election victory and the closure of the Omaha
operation in Burns Detective could have sent a clear signal to
other establishments, if they were not already organized,
that selection of a representative could result in closure.
Another area of concern is the sharp distinction that has
arisen between relocation and plant closure. The outcomes
for the employees, again, are the same—loss of employment.
However, in the former case it might be suggested that the
economic considerations in the decision to relocate are not
quite as severe as they are in the closure decision. The
judicial interpretations encourage the firms to take the more
drastic step, closing the facility. As spelled out in Milwaukee
Spring I, the firm could escape the unfair labor practice
charge by closing the plant outright. However, the firm
could not relocate the work because it is an unfair labor
practice.
Milwaukee Spring II maintains the distinction between
relocation and closure, and some of the logic is questionable.
But the broad interpretation, which mandates bargaining
over relocation but permits relocation during the contract if
the bargainers reach impasse, is more consistent with main
taining profitable operations and employment.
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The final issue is effects bargaining. There seems to be no
disagreement that bargaining over the effects of closure is a
mandatory topic of bargaining under Section 8(a) (5). The
closing bargain is the last resort position. "Effects bargain
ing usually involves rights of employees that arise as a result
of closing, such as severance pay, pensions, other accrued
benefits, grievances and possible reemployment in other
parts of an employer's enterprise." (Heinsz 1981)
Whether actual bargaining can take place when there is
only a duty to bargain over the effects must be questioned.
The Appeals Court in Royal Plating and Polishing wrote:
There can be no doubt that the Company, by
withholding information of its intention to ter
minate the Bleeker Street operations, deterred the
Union from bargaining over the effect of the shut
down on the employees. 38
The Board in Ozark Trailers doubted the meaningfulness of
bargaining over the effects when there is no possibility of
reversing the decision.
If effects bargaining could be combined with decision
bargaining, a number of the concerns expressed above could
be alleviated. First, notice would be given so the plant would
still be in operation. Second, tradeoffs could be made be
tween the duties to bargain. For example, the union could
waive future effects bargaining, with its associated cost, in
return for a commitment to keep the plant operating. On the
other hand, the union could seek a more attractive closing
bargain by waiving the duty to bargain over the decision to
close.
In conclusion, the judicial interpretations of the duty to
bargain over the decision to shut down a plant are proble
matic. The decisions reviewed have demonstrated (a) the
concern with process and not outcome , (b) the unspecified
nature or narrow interpretation of economic considerations,
(c) the treatment of antiunion animus, (d) the sharp distinc-
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tion between relocation and plant closure, and (e) effects
bargaining.
The uncertainties associated with case-by-case adjudica
tion have prompted some students of these issue to propose
alternatives, such as per se rules which would define more
clearly when there is a duty to bargain over the decision to
close. These per se rules, which would require a legislative
amendment to the National Labor Relations Act or enuncia
tion by the United States Supreme Court, are presented and
evaluated in the next chapter.
NOTES
1. The administrative procedure requires that charges of unfair labor
practices be filed with the National Labor Relations Board. The regional
staff of the NLRB investigates the charges and attempts to promote a set
tlement. If the Regional Director files a complaint, a hearing is held
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
If a party disagrees with the finding by the ALJ, it can appeal to the
NLRB in Washington. That appeal is heard by a team composed of three
of the five appointed members of the National Labor Relations Board.
Appeals to the NLRB's decision are filed with the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals. Finally, the United States Supreme Court may agree
to hear an appeal of the decision of the circuit court.
2. Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Board, 85 S. Ct. 398 (1964).
3. National Labor Relations Board v. Royal Plating and Polishing Com
pany, 350 F. 2d 191 (1965).
4. Ozark Trailers Incorporated and International Union, Allied In
dustrial Workers of America, 161 NLRB No. 48 (1966).
5. 161 NLRB No. 48.

6. Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Manufacturing
Company, et ai, and National Labor Relations Board v. Darlington
Manufacturing Company, et ai, 85 S. Ct. 994 (1965).
7. First National Maintenance Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Board, 101 S. Ct. 2573 (1981).
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The Duty to Bargain
Per Se Rules

Chapter 4

Introduction
A number of the students of labor-management relations,
as well as the National Labor Relations Board and the
Courts, have attempted to develop guidelines, tests or rules
for determining whether and under what conditions there is a
duty to bargain over the decision to close. Naturally, the
determination could be made on a case-by-case basis, but
that is extremely costly. As St. Antoine (1981) has written,
"this has the attraction of maximizing fairness in individual
situations, but it can lead to uncertainty and unpredictabili
ty."
Notions of equity have led to the rejection of the polar per
se rules: (a) there is no duty to bargain over partial plant
closures, relocations or major technological changes
resulting in large scale displacement of labor; (b) there is a
mandatory duty to bargain over all decisions leading to the
permanent displacement or dislocation of workers from a
particular employment. Furthermore, the more recent rul
ings on mid-term contract repudiations also are unsatisfac
tory because they encourage closure rather than achieving a
solution that maintains employment and profitable opera
tions.
The guidelines, tests or rules that have been suggested have
several features in common. They hope to cover as many of
77
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the potential circumstances as possible without requiring
bargaining in all situations. Also, they hope to be
straightforward and easily interpretable so as to create the
least confusion possible. The four approaches to be con
sidered below are Schwarz's employment substitution rule,
Rabin's seven point guideline, the three part test developed
in Brockway and Heinsz's rule of rebuttable presumption.
This chapter ends with the presentation of a new proposal
addressing the determination of the duty to bargain over the
decision to close.

Employment Substitution Rule
Schwarz (1970) proposed the employment substitution
rule in his article, "Plant Relocation or Partial TerminationThe Duty to Decision-Bargain." The rule is:
Decision-bargaining should be required in all cases
where the employer plans to substitute non-unit
workers for unit workers.
It is a straightforward restatement of the decision presented
in Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Board, which involved "the replacement of
employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an in
dependent contractor to do the same work under similar con
ditions of employment." 1 However, whereas the above
represented a definition of contracting out, Schwarz's rule
also would apply to relocations.
Schwarz's approach has the desirability of being
straightforward. There are no probability statements
associated with it. The union would need to be consulted if
employment is substituted; if not, there would be no need for
consultation.
However, this rule would not require bargaining in all cir
cumstances where a solution may be forthcoming and would
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require bargaining in others where perhaps there is no
possibility of a solution being reached. To evaluate this, it is
necessary to develop a taxonomy of closures. They can take
the following forms:
1. The firm continues operations at the location, but some
employees are displaced by individuals who have been
contracted to perform the same duties.
2. The firm relocates its operation so that it is producing
the same or similar product in a different facility and
with new employees.
3. The plant closes because it is no longer competitive due
to high labor costs or low productivity.
4. The plant closes or relocates because the present market
for its product no longer exists.
The employment substitution rule would require decision
bargaining in the first two instances, and also sometimes in
the fourth circumstance. It would not apply in the third in
stance, which may be the critical one. According to Schmenner's (1982) analysis, high labor costs or work rules were the
principal reason for closure in over one-fifth of the cases.
Thus, the expectation is that negotiations possibly could save
jobs and restore profitable operations in the third instance,
yet decision bargaining would not be required.
Bargaining could be required when there is no possibility
of a solution being reached. This rule would require bargain
ing when a firm relocates its operation because the present
market for its product no longer exists. For instance, con
sider the firm that has been a supplier to a firm that has
relocated. In order to stay in business, it is forced to relocate
to an area in which it can negotiate new contracts. It still is in
the same line of business, although it has substituted
employees. Bargaining would have a very low probability of
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altering the decision to relocate. In this instance, effects
bargaining would be more important.

Rabin's Seven Point Criteria
Rabin (1971) proposed a seven point criteria for determin
ing when there should be and when there should not be a
mandatory duty to bargain over the decision to close a plant.
The seven points are as follows:
1. The impact on employees must be certain and direct.
2. The decision must not be minor or recurrent.
3. The issue must be within the expertise of both parties.
4. The decision to terminate operations must be based on
factors that are not so compelling that the bargaining
process could not possibly alter them.
5. An "established," not merely "technical," bargaining
relationship must have been in effect prior to the deci
sion.
6. The statutory requirement of good faith bargaining,
particularly as to notice, must be interpreted flexibly so
that the employers freedom to act is not unduly imped
ed.
7. The parties should be given wide latitude to allocate
management functions by consent.
The first two points remove such decisions as new sales or
marketing strategies, which may ultimately diminish employ
ment, from mandatory bargaining. Conversely, a plant clos
ing, a major technological change or a relocation all have
certain and direct impact on employment in the short run
and do not necessarily recur on a regular basis. Therefore,
decision bargaining would be mandatory on these issues
assuming the other criteria are met.
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The third and fourth points establish that the reason for
the relocation or partial closure possibly could be altered
through the bargaining process in order to mandate decision
bargaining. Stating that the "issue must be within the exper
tise of both parties" can be interpreted narrowly or expan
sively. The narrow interpretation would hold that only labor
costs and work rules would be within the expertise of both
parties. A more expansive interpretation would contend that
production processes, major purchases of equipment and
perhaps new markets also fall in the area of expertise of both
parties. The quality of work life movement, quality circles
and other manifestations of labor-management cooperation
have shown that production processes and the general opera
tion of facilities also are within the expertise of some labor
organizations.
The definition of compelling factors is not sufficiently
clear to forestall case-by-case adjudication. For example, is
loss of a key source of a factor of production a compelling
reason? Consider the case when another source becomes
available, albeit at a higher price. The higher price does not
permit profitable production of the product, but bargaining
with the union results in labor costs being reduced so that
production can be resumed with the new source of the fac
tor, and the output can be sold at a profit. Although the
compelling reason was altered through bargaining, the prob
ability of bargaining being successful in this instance is likely
to be quite low.
Restricting the duty to bargain to established bargaining
relationships would accomplish two things. First, it would
separate the duty to bargain controversy, Section (8) (d),
from the unfair labor practices issue, Section (8) (a) (3). If a
closing occurred on the heels of a union representation elec
tion, without a contract formally bargained, the issue could
simply be settled on whether this was an unfair labor prac
tice. By bringing in the duty to bargain, precedents are
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established about the duty to bargain even though no
bargaining has ever occurred.
Second, there would be a history of bargaining between
the two parties which could be built upon in developing ex
pectations for a settlement. Several cases, the most impor
tant being First National Maintenance Corporation v. Na
tional Labor Relations Board, involved a situation where the
union selected in the representation election never had
negotiated a contract with the employer. Thus, the facts of
the case did not lend themselves to making a judgment about
the potential efficacy of bargaining.
One criticism raised frequently of the duty to decision
bargain is that there is no incentive for the union to reach an
agreement concerning the potential closure because the
longer bargaining continues, the longer the plant remains in
operation. Furthermore, there is the fear that breaking off
negotiations, even if no progress is being made, will be judg
ed as failure to bargain in good faith, with penalties assessed
accordingly. Rabin's sixth point, by suggesting flexibility in
the interpretation of good faith bargaining, hopes to en
courage sincere bargaining by ensuring that the process can
be ended without requiring management to reach an un
favorable bargain. However, a flexible interpretation does
not necessarily reduce uncertainty or unpredictability until
after sufficient experience exists to develop a reasonable ex
pectation of the definition of flexible interpretation of good
faith bargaining.
Mature bargaining relationships may specify prerogatives
of both management and labor in the bargaining contract.
Rabin's seventh point suggests that judicial interpretations
should not overrule these prerogatives so that both partners
can be reasonably certain about what issues they must
negotiate and those in which management can act unilateral-
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ly without fear of being found in violation of the National
Labor Relations Act.
It is very ironic that neither Schwarz's employment
substitution rule nor the seven point criteria developed by
Rabin would have required the First National Maintenance
Corporation to negotiate with the union over the decision to
close. Yet this case served as the vehicle for the most recent
United States Supreme Court ruling on the duty to bargain in
partial plant closures.

Three Part Test of Brockway
The majority opinion in Brockway Motor Trucks, Divi
sion of Mack Trucks, Inc., v. National Labor Relations
Board took exception with per se rules that either mandate
no duty to bargain or mandate a duty to bargain in all cases
of plant closure. The majority opinion reflected that the
basic problem is that no simple per se rule can adequately
protect the interests of all parties in all of the factually
divergent situations in which shutdowns may occur. The opi
nion also took exception to the argument by Brockway
Motor Trucks that because the closure was due to
"economic considerations," although unspecified, there was
no duty to bargain.
Instead, the majority opinion fashioned a three part test to
determine when bargaining should be mandated in cases of
partial plant closure. The three considerations are as follows:
1.The strength of the employees5 interest in altering
management's decision.
2. The likelihood that bargaining would lead the employer
to alter its decision.
3. Management's countervailing interest in not bargaining.

84 Per Se Rules

The major problem with this three part test is that the
determination of the duty to bargain must be adjudicated.
The firm planning to close one part of its operation would
not know with certainty whether it can do so without
bargaining because both the strength of the employees' in
terest and the countervailing interest of management cannot
be evaluated a priori.
The strength of the employees' interest in altering manage
ment's decision requires two pieces of information, of which
only one can be obtained through the bargaining process.
First, the probability of obtaining alternate employment and
at what wage elsewhere in the area must be established. Sec
ond, the concession necessary to change management's deci
sion also must become known. If alternate employment op
portunities are available at essentially the same wage rate,
employees may have only a weak interest in changing the
decision to close. Conversely, if the next best employment
alternative, the opportunity wage, is considerably less than
that received from the current employer, the interest in alter
ing management's decision may be quite strong. It might be
suggested that the strength of interest is directly proportional
to the divergence between the current wage and the oppor
tunity wage. But the union would not attempt to alter
management's decision if the concession necessary placed
their wage below the opportunity wage.
The likelihood that bargaining would lead the employer to
alter its decision also is problematic. What is the reason for
the decision to close? Is it loss of raw materials, a shrinking
market, labor costs or greater opportunities elsewhere? All
of these could be termed economic reasons, but they differ in
their suitability to change through bargaining. Another con
sideration is the bargaining history of these parties. Have
they shown an ability to reach agreement in the past on
troublesome issues?
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The countervailing management interest in not bargaining
is the most frequently alluded to, yet the least explained.
Dire financial distress may force the firm to close, but the
firm should have some indication of its worsening financial
condition prior to the actual decision. Strategic plans to alter
the nature of the business also are undertaken prior to any
decision to close. Decisions to enter new markets may re
quire greater secrecy, but those decisions would require
bargaining only if a line of business was being discontinued.
Management's interest in not bargaining appears to be
grounded in (a) the uncertainty of the length of bargaining
required to bargain in good faith, and (b) the ideological
position that certain decisions are exclusively management
prerogatives.

Rule of Rebuttable Presumption
The rule of rebuttable presumption was proposed in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in its decision
in National Labor Relations Board v. First National
Maintenance Corporation. 2 The following passage from this
decision is a statement of that rule.
We believe, however, that the critical question is
whether the purposes of the statute are advanced by
imposition of a duty to bargain and that determina
tion does not depend solely on whether the costs
precipitating the decision to terminate were not
labor originated. What appears to us to be the
decisive factor, is whether, regardless of the origin
of the cost which precipitated a management deci
sion to terminate an operation, bargaining could
reasonably be expected to modify or reverse that
decision. 3
This rule differs from the three part test of Brockway in
which the interests of employers and employees are to be
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balanced. Rather, in the rebuttable presumption rule, the
key concern is whether the purposes of the statute can be ad
vanced.
Heinsz (1981) has attempted to formalize the rule of rebut
table presumption and to make it operational as it applies to
plant closing. He specified six steps, which are as follows:
1. The initial presumption is that the decision to close is a
mandatory subject of bargaining.
2. If the employer fails to bargain over the decision to
close, the employer bears the burden of proving that the
primary reason for closing was economic necessity out
side the employment relation.
3. If the employer has avoided all bargaining and has fail
ed to present evidence overcoming the presumption in
favor of negotiations, the National Labor Relations
Board should order back pay from the date of refusal to
bargain.
4. If the employer has bargained before announcing the
closing decision, it should be presumed that he has
fulfilled his duty to bargain.
5. The presumption of having fulfilled the duty to bargain
will be nullified if the bargaining has been done in bad
faith, e.g., providing insufficient advance notice for the
bargaining to affect the decision to close.
6. The union also has the obligation to bargain in good
faith. That is, it should bargain in recognition of con
cluding the negotiation in a timely fashion and treating
all data provided by the employer as confidential.
The rule of rebuttable presumption also appears to have
some promise, but initial implementation would be difficult.
Initially, Point 2 would be the subject of contention as both
employers and employees would disagree over whether the
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primary reason for closing was outside the employment rela
tion. For instance, assume the firm is closing the plant
because its costs of production are too high in order to re
main competitive. One approach is to build a new plant with
state of the art technology. The other approach is to reduce
the costs of labor inputs. Would the primary reason for clos
ing be outside the employment relation?
Numerous observations would be necessary to develop the
parameters of reasons of "economic necessity outside the
employment relation." Initially, there would be no dif
ference between the rule of rebuttable presumption and a
simple mandatory duty to bargain, because the incentive
would be to bargain due to the uncertainty of what reasons
are acceptable and the high potential cost of not bargaining,
as specified in Point 3.
Related to Point 3 is a concern that frequently emerges in
the partial closure issue. Some assert that a case-by-case ap
proach is necessary in order to be equitable to all—to max
imize fairness; a per se rule is arbitrary because it does not
distinguish among the various possible reasons for closing a
plant. However, there is the potential in the case-by-case
determination of the firm not knowing until after the judicial
determination has been made whether the closure and the
failure to bargain over the decision is legal. If illegal, the
usual remedy—back pay to the date of closure—is extremely
costly. But it appears that the costly remedy has been an
underlying reason for not finding an unfair labor practice in
some instances, when, in fact, an unfair practice has occur
red.
In summary, each of the four rules reviewed here has a
significant shortcoming. Schwarz's employment substitution
rule would not require bargaining in plant closure cases.
Rabin's seven point rule leaves the definition of "compelling
factor" open, and specifying flexible interpretation of good
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faith bargaining does not necessarily reduce the uncertainty
associated with meeting its requirements. The three part test
of Brockway would still require case-by-case adjudication
because determining the strength of the employees' interest
requires negotiations; therefore, there still is extreme uncer
tainty associated with whether or not there is a duty to
bargain. Finally, Heinsz's formalization of the rule of rebuttable presumption still leaves undefined what is "economic
necessity outside the employment relation." Thus, other
than Schwarz's rule, each of the rules still relies heavily on
the case-by-case determination.

A New Proposal
The four alternatives presented in the previous section are
designed to expedite the determination of whether there is a
duty to bargain over the decision to close. In this section, I
will present a new proposal. The proposal has its basis in
Coase's (1971) concept of social costs and bargaining to
reach a solution that is satisfactory to both parties and that
maximizes the value of production. Initially, the concept of
social cost is examined and its application to the plant
closure problem is detailed. The new proposal is presented at
the end of this section.
The concept of social cost is loosely defined. Coase used
the following definition to introduce his discussion: "those
actions of business firms which have harmful effects on
others." One difficulty is making Coase's concept opera
tional, given the practicalities of collective bargaining. The
system of collective bargaining requires that (a) negotiations
be expeditious and confidential, (b) relative bargaining
power be maintained, and (c) penalties be costly enough to
deter prohibited practices but are not so severe that they are
never levied.
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Coase's concept is based on the following five points.
1. The problem must be looked at in the total and at the
margin.
2. The efficient allocation of resources and not necessarily
the distribution of income is the fundamental issue.
3. The room for bargaining is between the resources' cur
rent use and their next best use.
4. The result which maximizes the value of production is
independent of the legal position if the pricing system is
assumed to work without cost.
5. The result is achieved by means of a bargain between the
parties.
The potential harmful effect on workers, the social cost
associated with plant closure, is their lost earnings. Earnings
loss, however, is not a given, but depends on conditions in
the local labor market, the compensation schedule used by
the firm, and the preferences of workers and their tenure
with the firm, as was discussed in chapter 2. Thus, depending
on these factors, the potential earnings loss could be signifi
cant or negligible; but it is impossible to determine the extent
of harmful effect on workers without negotiations. 4
The other side of the issue is whether the action by the firm
increases productive capacity of whether it is unavoidable.
There is no room for bargaining if the closure is the only ac
tion possible. Bargaining, however, could address unex
plored alternatives to closure. Finally, the action by the firm
may be solely designed to maximize private profits, such as
relocation to a lower wage area. Thus, alternatives for firms
could be (a) closure because it is the only alternative,
(b) closure although not all alternatives have been explored,
and (c) relocation to a more profitable area or region.
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Therefore, there are six potential combinations of the ef
fect of closure on workers and the motivations of the firm.
They are as follows:
1. Harmful effect on workers - No alternative to closure
for the firm.
2. Harmful effect on workers - Alternatives to closure not
explored.
3. Harmful effect on workers - More profitable oppor
tunities for the firm.
4. No effect on workers - No alternative to closure for the
firm.
5. No effect on workers - Alternatives to closure not ex
plored.
6. No effect on workers - More profitable opportunities
for the firm.
Decision bargaining is only meaningful when there is the
potential of changing a closure decision. No such potential
exists in 1 or 4. Although deferred compensation may be an
issue in 1 or 4, the only reasonable option is to address it dur
ing "effects bargaining." In some instances, closure would
not necessarily result in a loss of current earnings for a ma
jority of the workers. The experience of workers under 40
cited by Holen (1981) fits this category.
"Alternatives to closure not explored" could include
reasons ranging from low productivity or higher wages, to
producing a product for which the market is shrinking, to
loss of line of credit. In some circumstances closure could be
averted but not in others. Bargaining also might improve the
profitability of the current plant, making relocations less at
tractive. Thus, of the six possible interactions spelled out
above, Cease's concept would suggest that there be an op
portunity for "decision bargaining" in four of them, situa
tions 2, 3, 5 and 6.
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The following are two possible scenarios. Assume a plant
announces that it is going to close. It is located in a relatively
small local labor market. The reason for closing is loss of
market share due to noncompetitive prices. Alternative job
opportunities are limited and wages are 30 percent lower in
those opportunities. The firm indicates that a 20 percent pay
cut is necessary to retain competitiveness, and that figure is
verified. Thus, the range of bargains is between a 30 percent
and a 20 percent cut in pay. Workers agree to a 20 percent
pay cut because it represents the best alternative. They have
incurred an earnings loss, but that loss is less than it might
have been, and the productive capacity has been maintained
in the community. This represents the minimum social cost
associated with maintaining production capacity.
The second scenario assumes that a plant announces that it
is closing in order to relocate its facility to a low cost area.
The local labor market affords numerous opportunities and
most workers can obtain alternate employment and incur on
ly a 10 percent cut in pay. The firm claims a 20 percent cut in
pay plus significant technological changes are necessary in
order to make the current location competitive. In this in
stance closure is the best alternative for both parties because
resources can be reallocated to more productive uses without
significantly damaging the earnings potential of workers. 5
The discussion of the court cases and NLRB rulings has
demonstrated that the courts generally have been willing to
accept economic reasons as a justifiable circumstance for
closing a plant or displacing a large part of the workforce.
The term "economic reasons" is a bit contrived, however.
For instance, closing a plant to avoid bargaining with a
union is expected to generate economic benefits for the firm.
Labor costs that are sufficiently high to make a firm noncompetitive also would appear to be an economic reason.
Below are described the types of actions of firms that appear
to constitute economic reasons according to the definitions
of the courts.
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1.A major capital investment. The capital investment
could result in the displacement of a significant part of
the workforce as the process becomes more automated.
Presumably, the physical capital investment is under
taken to maintain or enhance the competitive position
of the firm. The major capital investment also could
take the form of a relocation.
2. Altering the line of work. By altering its line of work,
the skills possessed by a significant part of the
workforce and the skills required to produce the new
product or service may no longer match. Stated dif
ferently, the firm has diversified to meet changing
market conditions.
3. Loss of market. The loss of market, which results in
closure, could be for several reasons.
a. the firm is no longer competitive in its industry or
market.
b. the market for the product no longer exists because
consumer demands have shifted.
c. the firm loses its ability to produce for this market.
It may have lost its line of credit or no longer have
access to its natural resource base.
To these a fourth point is added which is:
4. The firm is no longer competitive because wages are too
high, productivity is too low, or restrictive work rules
impair flexibility.
If one takes a very narrow view of what bargaining can
resolve, bargaining reasonably could be expected to generate
a solution only in the fourth situation.
A more expansive view of issues that might be resolved
through decision bargaining could also include the first
point. For instance, a change in work rules or a decrease in
wages could make a major capital investment less necessary.
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Altering the line of work and changing the skill needs of
workers, the second point, could be facilitated by bargaining
over retraining programs for workers, but this is effects
bargaining. The loss of a market is the one general area in
which the potential impact of bargaining is expected to be
quite limited.
Calabresi (1970) has attempted to develop liability rules
that promote efficiency, which is defined as minimizing the
sum of accident costs and accident prevention costs. Acci
dent costs are those costs directly associated with the closure
such as the earnings loss of workers. Accident prevention
costs are those costs incurred to regulate or limit the occur
rence of the accident.
Calabresi has concluded that the sum of accident costs and
accident prevention costs would be minimized if liability for
the costs was assigned to the party best able to affect the
decision. If we consider a plant closure an accident, since
costs are imposed on individuals not party to the decision,
this would suggest that liability be assigned to the employer.
The employer has the information—the reason for closure
and what changes are necessary to avoid closure. 6
If management has the necessary information, why not
simply rely on management to initiate discussions when
economic considerations can be altered through bargaining?
Are they not in the best position to determine if there is
something that labor can do to forestall the closure or
displacement?
The question has merit, but it ignores several issues. First,
whether the concessions demanded by the firm will increase
productive capacity for society depends on the alternatives
available and the preferences of the workers. The value of
goods and services produced is less than that attainable if
workers are not employed in their best alternative. Second,
since both the worker and the firm have invested capital, is it
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equitable to permit only management to determine those
cases in which bargaining should occur—to assign priority
rights to physical capital? Firms and workers are unequally
positioned to respond to change due to the time input re
quirement of human capital. 7 Third, where is the bargaining
power for the union? The only power is the right to not
agree, which would be very costly to exercise when the union
is given only selective opportunities to participate in decision
bargaining. Fourth, it ignores the potential of workers pro
viding innovative ideas that may be effective in situations
that management did not consider possible. Fifth, there is
the fear that employers may misuse the threat of closure, us
ing it to gain concessions in situations where there is no real
potential for closure.
Placing the decision rather than obligation with manage
ment may result in fewer agreements being reached than
desirable. Management does not know the union perfectly. It
is not fully aware of the concessions the union will be willing
to make, nor the internal political positioning of members. A
concession that management may think the union would be
willing to make may be rejected, whereas one they thought
impossible may be agreed to readily. Moreover, not all
plants should remain open. In some instances the economic
sacrifice by employees would be greater than the improve
ment in productive capacity. Most important, closures are
relatively infrequent, so the expected transactions cost is
relatively small.
Although others have attempted to establish criteria for
the duty to decision bargain, there is excessive uncertainty
associated with case-by-case adjudication. Making Coase's
concepts operational requires a per se rule: there is a man
datory duty to bargain over the decision to close a plant or
relocate its operation. The key consideration is expeditiously
determining when additional bargaining is warranted. The
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new proposal presented below attempts to have a quick
determination of when additional bargaining could lead to a
socially more productive solution than closure.
Recall that bargaining potentially could resolve the situa
tion in four of the six combinations of effects of closure and
motivations of firms. In the other two of the combinations,
bargaining could not possibly alter the decision: closure is
the only alternative. In two more of the combinations (2 and
5) some bargaining is necessary to explore the alternatives to
closure. In some instances alternatives may be available, but
not in others. Finally, bargaining is needed to explore the
more profitable alternatives for the firm in light of the op
portunities for workers. Consider the following procedure
for implementing the duty to bargain over the decision to
close a plant and for meeting this obligation:
1. Firms are required to notify the NLRB and the union of
the plan to close one part of an operation or to relocate.
This notice should contain a detailed explanation of the
reasons for closure and financial data as appropriate.
2. The NLRB determines if bargaining might be fruitful
using the criteria established in Brooks-Scanlon;* the
reasons for closure are beyond the control of the parties
to the collective bargaining agreement.
3. Information bargaining occurs in those instances where
it is determined that bargaining might be fruitful.
4. Based on the information provided, the NLRB, the
union or bargaining unit, and the firm determine
whether further bargaining is appropriate.
5. Bargaining continues in those instances where two of
the three (the NLRB, the union or bargaining unit, and
the firm) think progress is being made and/or a solution
is possible, but for no more than 90 days after the initial
notice.
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6. If bargaining has been in good faith, but no agreement
is reached within the time period, the firm is free to pro
ceed with its action.
7. The firm is required to bargain over the effects.
This proposal establishes a per se rule, but attempts to in
troduce steps that ensure that decision bargaining will not be
required in circumstances where there is no reasonable
chance of resolution. The proposal places a greater obliga
tion on management than is currently required, but reduces
uncertainty and the potential of costly penalties. The
bargaining power of the union is limited, but is more than
currently exists for effects bargaining.
One of the employer's concerns that surfaces is the uncer
tainty associated with meeting good faith bargaining re
quirements. The 90-day time limitation addresses this. The
limitation should be absolute in order to discourage play
acting, and to promote bargaining.
The NLRB is charged with furthering the purposes of the
National Labor Relations Act, which is to establish and
maintain industrial peace to preserve the flow of commerce.
It may be felt that the initial reaction of the Board will be
that these purposes are best served by requiring bargaining in
all situations, irrespective of the probability of changing the
outcome. However, the Board, in its Brooks-Scanlon deci
sion, has moved to the position that bargaining should not
be required over the decision to close when there is no
likelihood of reversing the decision. In Brooks-Scanlon, the
firm lost its source of raw materials and the Board rejected a
duty to bargain.
The proposal envisions a two step process. After initial
bargaining has occurred, the progress will be reviewed to
determine if a solution is likely. If none is likely, as indicated
by two of the three parties agreeing so, further bargaining
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over the decision will not be required in order to meet good
faith requirements. This second step would cover the situa
tion where the market has changed so rapidly that the firm
cannot possibly keep the plant open 90 days.
An important element of establishing a per se rule is that
plant closure is a relatively infrequent event. Therefore, the
additional costs of administering the proposal would be
limited. Furthermore, it would use existing structures, but
require that the National Labor Relations Act be amended to
include plant closures and relocations as falling within the
"terms and other conditions of employment."

Summary
Perse rules to guide the duty to bargain have been propos
ed because the judicial determination of the duty to bargain
over closure is problematic. Perhaps the most troublesome
aspect is that substantive labor law has been made in the area
of plant closure through cases in which management and
labor have never negotiated a contract. For example, neither
Schwarz's nor Rabin's criteria would have required decision
bargaining in the First National Maintenance decision.
One of the appealing features of using collective bargain
ing to help resolve the plant closure problem is that closure is
a relatively infrequent event. As reported earlier, there were
619 closures in 1982, a year that has been compared to the
Great Depression in terms of its impact on some sectors.
Although the impact on the workers dislocated may be
severe, the administrative impact for an agency such as the
National Labor Relations Board should not be overly
burdensome. For example, in fiscal year 1980, the NLRB
handled over 44,000 unfair labor practice cases (Forty-fifth
Annual Report of the NLRB, 1981).
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Conversely, case-by-case determination can be extremely
costly in the individual situation. Other per se proposals to
accommodate the partial closing judicial conundrum have
been reviewed. Each attempt is noteworthy, but each one is
flawed. The two areas on which they seem to stumble is en
suring that the negotiations are expeditious and introducing
certainty into who is required to bargain over the decision.
The proposal presented above requires decision bargain
ing, but sets a time limit to the bargaining. It establishes a
per se rule, but envisions a quick determination if further
bargaining would be fruitful. For example, closure due to
the loss of market likely would lead to the quick determina
tion that bargaining over the decision would be fruitless and
would permit early negotiations over the effects. 9
NOTES
1. Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Board, 85 S. Ct. 398, 405 (1964).
2. National Labor Relations Board v. First National Maintenance Cor
poration, 628 F.2d 596 (1980).
3. 627 F.2d 596, 602.
4. For the purposes of this monograph, earnings losses are divided into
two components: (a) the difference in wages received between the posi
tion in the closed plant and the new job, and (b) the uncompensated
deferred compensation.
5. Naturally, there may be short-run adjustment costs for workers
associated with the closure. But the extent of opportunities should
minimize the income loss, and therefore the adjustment costs.
6. Although one of Cease's five points held that the efficient result is in
dependent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work
without costs, that may not be the case due to the unequal distribution of
information. Bargaining then becomes the mechanism for equalizing the
distribution of information.
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7. The importance of human capital to firms is evidenced by the fact that
some service firms have issued stock. These firms do not produce goods
in the traditional sense, so there is no physical capital—buildings,
machines, inventories—which could be liquidated to generate some
return to the shareholder. For example, consider investment houses or
consulting firms. Some have gone public and shares in the company are
being traded. The company may lease space and have no inventory,
although it may have a portfolio of stocks. In actuality, the values of the
shares of stock are based on the human capital of the individuals
employed by the company. Thus, one must question the preoccupation
of the Courts with physical capital.
8. Brooks-Scanlon, Inc. v. Local 1017, Lumber and Sawmill Workers,
102 LRRM 1606 (1979).
9. A difficult feature of the proposal is that it does not accommodate the
Adams Dairy problem. The establishment continues, but a subset of
workers is replaced. Do we continue to rely on Fibreboard or do we at
tempt to bring this situation under the proposal?

Chapter 5

Plant Closure Protections
and the Collectively
Bargained Contract
Introduction

When a plant is closed or a large scale dislocation occurs,
certain protections may be in place or may have been provid
ed for workers to ease the transition between jobs. Severance
pay, usually a lump sum, may be paid to those who have
stayed until the plant is closed. Supplemental unemployment
benefits (SUB) may have been negotiated to augment
unemployment compensation. Job search or relocation
assistance may be provided or advance notice of the closure
or dislocation may have been given. Other workers may have
secured the right to transfer to a new facility or obtained
preferential hiring rights in those instances when the closure
actually represents a relocation of the production facilities of
the plant.
Several decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have
referenced the incidence of negotiated provisions in the con
tract. In Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation v. Na
tional Labor Relations Board, the finding that a significant
number of contracts included provisions limiting the ability
of firms to contract out work was an important piece of
evidence in leading the Supreme Court to rule that subcon
tracting was a mandatory topic of bargaining. In First Na101
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tional Maintenance Corporation v. National Labor Rela
tions Board, the U.S. Supreme Court used the fact that pro
visions requiring management to bargain with the union over
the decision to close, or similar decisions, were relatively rare
as an indication that mandatory bargaining over these deci
sions was not warranted. Instead, the greater frequency of
bargaining over advance notice, interplant transfer and
relocation, and other "effects" issues indicated to the court
that "effects bargaining" and not "decision bargaining"
was more appropriate. Therefore, the extent of bargaining
over plant closure is important not only as an indicator of
the number of workers covered, but also of how changes in
the extent of bargaining may portend adjustments to judicial
interpretations.
Why individual contracts contain some plant closure pro
visions and others do not may go beyond differences in sheer
bargaining power. There are economic incentives involved in
these types of protections for both management and labor.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine these incentives for
bargaining over plant closure. The first general question con
cerns the incidence of bargaining over the contractual pro
tections. The second question concerns whether the inclusion
of these protections is a response to changed realities about
employment security. Specifically, have management and
labor used formal contract negotiations to obtain protec
tions and to develop solutions for workers and firms "at risk
of closure?"

Incentives Associated With Plant
Closure Provisions

Severance Pay
Severance pay is the compensation given to a worker who
is terminated. The connotation associated with it is that the
leaving is involuntary and perhaps unexpected. For example,
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severance pay is given to workers who are let go whereas pen
sions are paid to workers who retire. The usual presumption
is that severance pay is given to ease the pain and to tide the
workers over until something new can be found following
the involuntary separation. However, severance pay also can
be used as a deterrent to closure.
Because severance pay is multifaceted, it may be the most
desirable contractual provision covering plant closure from
the union's perspective. (As was shown in chapter 2, increas
ing severance payments due workers may reduce the prob
ability that a firm will close one plant in order to relocate to a
new location.) This conjecture is consistent with the finding
(reported below) that severance pay is the most frequently
negotiated contract provision of this group.

Supplemental Unemployment Benefits
Supplemental unemployment benefits (SUB) are payments
to workers who are separated from their jobs, either tem
porarily or permanently. This is a payment in addition to the
benefits received through the unemployment insurance
system of the state. However, rather than being part of a
pool of firms in which some cross subsidization occurs, the
program is funded directly by the firm. The cost of the pro
gram is borne by the firm that is laying off the workers or
closing the operation.
Just as with severance pay, SUB increases the costs to the
firm of shutting down an operation. By the same token, SUB
benefits are likely to be available only to those employees
who are terminated or who remain with the firm until
closure, and not to those who leave voluntarily. For the
worker, it also provides an extra financial cushion such that
the loss of employment does not result in a drastic drop in in
come, and permits greater selectivity in searching for a new
position. Because SUB payments generally are available to
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most workers in a union, there is not likely to be the conflict
in union bargaining goal determination between more senior
and less senior workers.

Advance Notice
One issue at the heart of the plant closure policy debate is
whether a firm should be required to provide advance notice
of the closing. Workers assert that advance notice is
necessary so that (a) they may investigate options to save
their jobs, (b) they have time to adjust psychologically to the
loss of their job, and (c) they may begin the search for a new
job immediately in order to minimize the period of
unemployment and the potential wage loss. Firms, on the
other hand, have tended to oppose advance notice arguing
that (a) employee morale and productivity would be reduc
ed, (b) employees would leave so the firm would be unable to
fill its final orders, and (c) employees would sabotage the
plant and equipment, therefore reducing the value of these
assets.
What are some of the potential costs associated with pro
viding advance notice? All of the reasons provided above are
somewhat speculative. Will employee productivity decline?
Will the attrition of workers increase? Will workers sabotage
plant and equipment? For instance, consider employee pro
ductivity. Employee productivity tends to decline as the
economy enters the downturn of a business cycle in order to
make the work last as long as possible before layoffs begin.
Weber and Taylor (1963), in their classic article on plant
closure, indicated that this problem had not developed in the
plant closings they studied. But this must still be considered a
real possibility, because there appears to be the potential for
increased costs due to reduced productivity.
Another source of costs would be if advance notice in
creased the quit rate above the normal level of attrition.
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There are fixed costs associated with hiring and training new
workers, or retraining existing workers, so if advance notice
increased the quit rate, the firm would experience an increase
in costs. But the impact on the quit rate is likely to be a func
tion of the reasons for closure. If the closure is due to
cyclical circumstances either for the industry or the
economy, workers may not quit because there are fewer op
portunities available. If the closure is due to circumstances
specific to the firm, attrition may increase, and therefore
there would be additional hiring, training, or retraining costs
for the firm.
The issue of sabotage probably is most speculative; as
Weber and Taylor (1963) also found, "all reports indicate
that this problem has not developed." (p. 312)
The greatest benefits of advance notice probably are in the
potential to avert closure. With advance notice, the union
may have the opportunity to propose alternatives that might
keep the plant open, that is, to engage in "decision bargain
ing." However, resistance to this may occur since this could
give workers a foothold in an area traditionally reserved as a
management right. The benefit derived from the opportunity
to adjust psychologically to the loss of employment is ob
vious, although not necessarily quantifiable. Since severance
pay and supplemental unemployment benefits generally re
quire staying until closure, it is questionable whether the ad
vance notice would be used to engage in labor market search.
Advance notice might be more beneficial to workers when
displaced worker programs are available.

Relocation and/or Transfer Rights
Relocation and/or transfer rights provide the potential for
employment continuity with the same firm, albeit at a dif
ferent location. They differ from the other plant closure pro
visions in that they are not necessarily deterrents to the firm.
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Facing a requirement to relocate its workforce could deter a
firm from closing one plant and opening another elsewhere;
but one could suggest that the firm also might desire this type
of provision, particularly if its labor force is specially skilled.
It is expected that these provisions would be more prevalent
in single-firm, multiple plant operations or industries that
have faced changing geographical markets for their pro
ducts. 1

The Frequency of Plant Closure Provisions
The frequency of key plant closure provisions in major
collective bargaining agreements is presented in this section.
Two major comparisons are made: (1) frequency by region,
and (2) frequency by "right-to-work" status of the state.
The first comparison is made because there is the presump
tion that establishments in the Northeast and Midwest are
more likely to be losing employment and that the plants are
at greater risk of being closed.
The second comparison is made because states have used
their right-to-work status as an indicator that unions are less
powerful and that the collective bargaining environment is
more favorable to management. Right-to-work laws essen
tially limit a union's right to negotiate a union security clause
which requires workers to pay periodic dues and initiation
fees as a condition of employment. Such a clause is con
sidered crucial to a union's strength because it enhances the
financial resources the union can count on and mitigates the
potential "free-rider" problem. 2
The key plant closure provisions are advance notice of
shutdown (SHUTDWN), relocation allowances
(RELOCATE), transfer rights (TRANPLT), preferential
hiring rights (TRANHIRE), a combination of transfer rights
and hiring rights (TRANCOMB), severance pay
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(SEVRANCE), supplemental unemployment benefits
(SUB), and advance notice of technological change
(CHANGE).
The data source is the United States Department of
Labor's file of contracts covering more than 1,000 workers
in effect in 1974, and the contracts covering more than 1,000
workers in effect in 1980. These contracts were negotiated
principally in 1971, 1972 and 1973, and in 1977, 1978 and
1979, respectively. Only those agreements in the manufactur
ing sector (SIC 200 through SIC 399) were used. After
editing the data and limiting the analysis to just those con
tracts covering production workers, 631 contracts were
available for analysis for 1974 and 676 for 1980. The Depart
ment of Labor coded the provisions in the contract, usually
indicating the presence or absence of the provision. Due to
the method of coding, the provisions have become
homogeneous even through there may have been con
siderable variation in the way they were written or have been
interpreted by the parties to the contract.
Table 5.1 provides a listing of the incidence of provisions
related to plant closure by region in 1974. The same data for
1980 are presented in table 5.2. 3 The most frequently
negotiated provision in 1974 was severance pay, which was
included in as few as 24 percent of the contracts in the
Pacific region to as many as 47 percent of the Interstate con
tracts. Interstate contracts cover establishments in more than
one state. Since severance pay usually is a money payment to
employees who have been terminated and since termination
can occur for a variety of reasons, severance pay protection
is not exclusively a plant closure provision.
Supplemental unemployment benefits (SUB) tended to be
the second most frequently negotiated provision. It was most
common in the Interstate contracts (39 percent) and least
common in those contracts covering establishments in the

Table 5.1
Percentage of Major Contracts Containing Plant Closure
Related Provisions in 1974, by Region*
Northeast
(percent)

Midwest
(percent)

South &
Plains
(percent)

Pacific
(percent)

Interstate
(percent

RELOCATE
TRANPLT
TRANHIRE
TRANCOMB
SEVRANCE
SUB
SHUTDWN
CHANGE

4
13
2
4
40
23
11
12

8
17
5
8
43
27
12
6

2
13
4
2
36
14
14
11

4
16
4
7
24
10
16
9

31
20
16
19
47
39
20
12

Total contracts

166

160

160

70

75

Provisions

SOURCE: Computer run from Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1974.
*The states grouped in the following regions:
Northeast: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania.
Midwest: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin.
South & Plains: Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia,
Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Loui
siana, Oklahoma, Texas, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada.
Pacific: Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, Hawaii.
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Table 5.2
Percentage of Major Contracts Containing Plant Closure
Related Provisions in 1980, by Region
Northeast
(percent)

Midwest
(percent)

South &
Plains
(percent)

RELOCATE
TRANPLT
TRANHIRE
TRANCOMB
SEVRANCE
SUB
SHUTDWN
CHANGE

6
15
3
4
40
19
12
13

8
21
5
8
34
31
9
6

5
22
6
2
38
13
16
14

Total contracts

160

Provisions

155

172

SOURCE: Computer run from Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1980.

Pacific
(percent)

Interstate
(percent

9
24
7
5
32
11
16
8

34
17
20
23
47
55
24
13

74

115

JB
C3
r*
0
o*
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Pacific region (10 percent). Provisions providing relocation
allowances and preferential hiring rights were the least fre
quently negotiated for those contracts covering
establishments in any of the four distinct regions. However,
relocation allowance was a relatively common provision in
the Interstate contracts.
Given the usually strong opposition to legislative pro
posals with advance notice requirements, the presumption is
that significant union bargaining power is required to obtain
them. The stronger, more aggressive unions are concentrated
in the Midwest. Thus, it is somewhat paradoxical that the ad
vance notice provisions are slightly more frequent in the
South & Plains. This issue is addressed more rigorously later
in this chapter.
Contract outcomes related to plant closure in 1980 were
characterized by significant changes in the incidence of both
severance pay and transfer rights provisions. Specifically,
the incidence of severance pay provisions dropped 9 percent
age points between 1974 and 1980 in contracts covering
establishments in the Midwest, but increased 8 percentage
points in contracts in the Pacific regions. There also was a
marked increase in most regions in the incidence of transfer
rights between 1974 and 1980. For instance, there was a 9
percentage point increase in the frequency of TRANPLT in
the South & Plains region and an 8 percentage point increase
in the Pacific region. One explanation is that this increase
may have been a response to the fear of industrial relocation.
On the other hand, given the reluctance of workers to
relocate, this provision may be a low-cost concession for
firms, thereby increasing its frequency.
T-tests were conducted to determine if the differences be
tween regions in the frequency that these provisions were in
cluded in the contracts were statistically significant. For the
1974 file, the only statistically significant difference between
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the Northeast and the South & Plains was for the SUB provi
sion. Only the incidence of transfer rights was significantly
different between these two regions in 1980.
In 1974, differences in the frequency of contract provi
sions, relocation allowance, a combination of transfer rights
and preferential hiring rights, and supplemental unemploy
ment benefits in the contracts covering establishments in the
Midwest versus the South & Plains were statistically signifi
cant. The incidence of the three provisions was greater in the
Midwest. However, by 1980, the incidence of advance notice
of shutdown and advance notice of technological change
also were significantly different between these regions, but
these two provisions were more common in contracts cover
ing establishments in the South & Plains.
The t-tests conducted involving the Northeast and the
Pacific found statistically significant differences between
these two regions in the frequency of severance and sup
plemental unemployment benefits in 1974, whereas in 1980,
the only difference was in transfer rights, with the frequency
being greater in the Pacific region.
The comparison of the Midwest with the Pacific followed
a similar pattern. Specifically, there were statistically signifi
cant differences in the frequency of supplemental unemploy
ment benefits and severance pay in 1974, but in 1980, the on
ly difference in the contracts covering establishments in these
two regions was the frequency of supplemental unemploy
ment benefits.
The final step was to determine if there were any
statistically significant differences in the frequency of these
contract provisions between the South & Plains region and
the Pacific region. In 1974, the differences in the frequency
of a combination of preferential hiring rights and transfer
rights, and severance pay were statistically significant. In
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1980, however, no statistically significant differences in these
contract provisions emerged.
The expectations concerning contractual provisions
related to plant closure were based on the accepted cliche
that manufacturing establishments in the Northeast and
Midwest had been losing employment. However, an ex
amination of production worker employment growth in
those 3-digit industries represented in the major contracts
file portrays a different picture.
As shown in table 5.3, the largest proportion of firms in
industries with growth rates exceeding 25 percent in the 1967
to 1979 period were in the Midwest and Northeast. Fully 18.1
percent of the contracts in the Midwest covered
establishments in industries where employment growth ex
ceeded 25 percent in that period. Furthermore, only in the
Midwest region were there more contracts in industries in
which employment was growing rather than declining. Thus,
the growth rate in plant closure provisions in contracts
covering establishments in the South & Plains and the Pacific
is quite consistent with relative employment growth in those
regions.
Instead of separating the incidence of provisions by
region, the states were grouped into right-to-work (RTW)
states and states which do not have right-to-work laws.
There were 19 states in 1974 that had right-to-work laws, and
those states are listed in table 5.4. 4 Generally, right-to-work
laws are an indicator of the political climate towards
organized labor. Therefore, we would expect the frequency
of plant closure provisions to be less in right-to-work states. 5
As indicated in table 5.4, this expectation holds more for
the contracts covering establishments in 1974 than for 1980.
In fact, there is no difference statistically between these two
groups of states in the frequency of provisions covering
preferential hiring rights, transfer rights, severance pay, ad-

Table 5.3

Percent of Establishment by Industry's Manufacturing Growth Rates
Over the 1967 to 1979 Period for 3-Digit SIC Industries*
South &
Interstate
Pacific
Plains
Midwest
Northeast
Manufacturing growth____(percent)____(percent)____(percent)____(percent)____(percent
Greater than or equal
to 25 percent
10 percent to 24 percent
0 percent to 9 percent
-9 percent to -1 percent
-24 percent to -10 percent
Less than or equal
to-25 percent

9.0
18.7
17.5
19.3
19.9

18.1
15.0
19.4
18.1
22.5

6.9
17.5
16.9
26.2
20.6

5.7
22.9
8.6
25.7
28.6

5.3
20.0
13.3
30.7
25.3

15.7

6.9

11.9

8.6

5.3

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

SOURCE: Author's calculations based on data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings,
United States, 1909-1978 and Supplement. Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1978 and 1982.
-The 3-digit industries are those in which an establishment or establishments with more than 1,000 production workers are covered by a collective bargaining contract.
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vance notice of plant closings and advance notice of major
technological changes in either 1974 or 1980. Therefore, at
least in the area of plant closure, the differential impact of
unionization on contractual outcomes in the right-to-work
states relative to the other states is minimal.
Table 5.4
Percentage of Major Contracts Containing Plant Closure
Related Provisions in 1974 and 1980, by Right-to-work Status
of State in Which Establishment is Located**

Provisions
RELOCATE
TRANPLT
TRANHIRE
TRANCOMB
SEVRANCE
SUB
SHUTDWN
CHANGE

1980
1974
RTW NoRTW RTW No RTW
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
6*
7
4
0
15
13
22
21
4
1
4
6
6*
6*
1
1
39
33
37
35
23*
22*
8
10
14
10
12
16
10
10
10
12

104
Total contracts
Number of workers_____207.100

113
452
1.217,250 231,400

448
1,029,300

SOURCE: Computer run from Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 1980.

NOTE: Contracts classified as Interregional are not included in this analysis.
•Statistically significant difference in mean values at .10 percent level using a t-test.
**Right-to-Work states in 1974 were: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming.
Louisiana adopted a Right-to-work law in 1976. New Hampshire has no Right-to-work
law statute, but a decision by the New Hampshire Supreme Court effectively provides the
same requirements of a Right-to-work law.

Several points need to be highlighted. Severance payments
are the most frequently negotiated provision, both in rightto-work states and the other states. Severance payments

Plant Closure Protections 115

serve a dual purpose. They provide income protection in the
case of closure, but they also increase its cost. There also has
been a substantial growth in the incidence of interplant
transfer rights. Between 1974 and 1980, the proportion of
contracts including interplant transfer rights increased 8
percentage points and 7 percentage points in right-to-work
states and the other states, respectively.
One of the difficulties of analyzing collective bargaining
contracts is that there is a need to place provisions into
categories, yet this assumes that similar provisions are
homogeneous across contracts, when in fact they are not.
For instance, one contract may provide for a $500 relocation
allowance and another contract may require a $1,000 reloca
tion allowance. According to the framework used thus far,
the contracts simply would be categorized as having a reloca
tion allowance provision. Yet the differences in the provi
sions covering relocation could indicate significant dif
ferences in bargaining power, industry conditions, et cetera.
Unfortunately, when using the population of contracts
covering 1,000 workers or more, which already has been cod
ed by the U.S. Department of Labor, it is not possible to
recognize the heterogeneity of most contract provisions. Nor
is it usually practical to attempt to account for these dif
ferences in statistical analyses.
Two instances in which this is possible are advance notice
of plant closure (SHUTDWN) and advance notice of
technological change (CHANGE). The provisions have been
coded according to the number of days of advance notice
that is to be given. Table 5.5 provides this information for
SHUTDWN and similar data for CHANGE is provided in
table 5.6.
As shown in table 5.5, in 1974 the majority of the con
tracts did not specify the actual number of days of advance
notice of closure. By 1980 greater specificity had been incor-
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porated in the contract. Between 1974 and 1980 there was a
substantial increase in the number of contracts and the
number of workers covered specifying 1 to 30 days of ad
vance notice. In 1974, 12 contracts covering over 23,000
workers had provisions requiring 1 to 30 days of notice. By
1980 there were 19 contracts covering more than 112,000
workers requiring this length of notice. There also was a
doubling in the number of contracts and workers covered
receiving 61 to 90 days of notice of closure over the six years.
Table 5.5
Variations in Advance Notice
of Closure (SHUTDWN) Provisions
1974 and 1980
Length of notice

1980
1974
Contracts Workers Contracts Workers
7
7
12
49

23,650
47,950
14,750
37,150
220,990

19
7
14
13
47

112,250
47,050
30,350
40,400
172,350

Total contracts
with advance notice______87

344,490

100

402,400

1 to 30 days
31 to 60 days
61 to 90 days
91 days or more
Notice, but unspecified

12

SOURCE: Computer run from Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 1974 and 1980.

Provisions providing for advance notice of technological
change were even less specific than those described above. In
both 1974 and 1980, almost 60 percent of the major con
tracts including advance notice of technological change did
not specify the length of advance notice. The largest share of
contracts that did specify length provided between 1 to 30
days notice. The paucity of contracts covering technological
change is quite surprising. Not only is there the more recent
interest in the impact of technological change, but the late
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1950s and early 1960s were influenced by the automation
scare. The Manpower Development and Training Act of
1962 initially was targeted to workers impacted by
technological change. Thus, one would have anticipated
greater sensitivity to this issue.
Table 5.6
Variations in Advance Notice
of Technological Change (CHANGE) Provisions
1974 and 1980

Length of notice

1980
1974
Contracts Workers Contracts Workers
19
1
4
1
37

78,300
3,500
11,400
3,300
210,300

20
3
7
1
44

78,950
7,750
16,150
1,650
579,750

Total contracts
with advance notice______62

306.800

75

684.250

1 to 30 days
31 to 60 days
61 to 90 days
91 days or more
Notice, but unspecified

SOURCE: Computer run from Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 1974 and 1980.

Provisions designed to mitigate the problems arising from
plant closure are not widespread in major collective bargain
ing agreements. The two most frequently negotiated provi
sions, SEVRANCE and SUB, however, are not exclusively
"closure" or "significant technological change" provisions.
There also is considerable variation in the frequency of the
eight provisions. Between 1974 and 1980, there was a marked
increase in the frequency of only one provision, transfer
rights (TRANPLT). One unanticipated finding is that dif
ferences in these bargaining outcomes among the regions are
disappearing.
Contract provisions do not have to be widespread,
however, to suggest that bargaining is moving toward solu-
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tions and protections. All that is necessary is that the popula
tion at risk has obtained such protections. Determining
whether this has occurred is the subject of the next section.

The Determinants of Plant Closure Provisions
in Formalized Negotiations
The objective of this section is to investigate the deter
minants of the inclusion of provisions addressing plant
closure or permanent dislocation of workers in the formally
bargained contracts in effect in 1974 and 1980. The underly
ing hypothesis is that changes in bargaining outcomes are
responses to long-run changes in the structure of manufac
turing and in the location of economic activity. Through this
analysis it is hoped that the following question can be
answered: Have management and labor used formal contract
negotiations to obtain protections and to develop solutions
for workers and firms at risk of closure? "At risk of
closure" is defined in two ways. In the first instance, it is
those industries in which production worker employment
declines have been relatively great. In the second instance it
is those industries in which the rate of plant closure has been
relatively high.
Much has been made of the "concession bargaining" that
occurred in a number of key negotiations in 1981 and 1982.
The one side of concession bargaining has been the union
givebacks of wages and/or fringe benefits. The other side is
that, in a number of these negotiations, management has
conceded employment security guarantees and greater input
in plant closure decisions. Kassalow (1983) indicates that
new protections, such as improvements in severance pay,
supplementary unemployment plans and transfer rights,
were gained by unions during the 1981-82 period of conces
sion bargaining in exchange for waiving future benefits. The
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (1983) reported that 50 of
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the 203 concessionary agreements provided explicit employ
ment security guarantees and 9 of these contracts gave the
unions a say in company decisions. Kassalow also notes that
unions not under pressure to make concessions obtained ad
vance notice provisions for plant closure or transfer of work
while negotiating substantial improvements in the economic
conditions of their employment.
Establishing the determinants of plant closure provisions
can indicate which workers have either the greatest taste for
the protection afforded by these provisions or consider
themselves most at risk to be affected by closure.
Establishing the determinants also should demonstrate
which workers have the bargaining power necessary to ob
tain these protections.
However, the concession negotiations of 1981-1982 may
not be indicative of labor-management relations in the long
run. Establishing the determinants of these outcomes under
less severe circumstances, the 1970s, may provide a better
understanding of the underlying conditions and motivations.
The 1970s also was a period, as Cappelli (1983) has noted, in
which import penetration was increasing and union represen
tation was decreasing in a number of industries. The
economy was stagnating. Union success in certification elec
tions decreased precipitously relative to the 1960s (Prosten
1979). The average size of manufacturing plants in the
largest Fortune 500 firms decreased from 895 to 855
employees and, more important, the average size of the new
plants they opened was only 307 employees (Schmenner
1983).
Because of these factors, the distinct difference between
employment reductions due to cyclical factors and those due
to large scale reductions or plant closure should have become
more apparent. As Mitchell (1983) has indicated, traditional
employment security provisions protect senior workers from
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cyclical reductions but not from plant closure. Since senior
employees are more likely to be involved in developing union
bargaining policy objectives, union policy should have
become more sensitive to the threat of closure or large scale
reductions during the 1970s.

Conceptual Framework
The underlying premise of this research is that contract
provisions over plant closure are scarce resources.
Therefore, an economic choice in addition to the expenditure
of bargaining capital is involved in their inclusion in
negotiated contracts. Economic choice not only entails
deciding whether to attempt to bargain over plant closure
provisions, it also includes deciding over which provisions to
bargain.
There are general trends in the economy that impact
workers and to which some response is expected. For exam
ple, the rapid inflation of the second half of the 1970s in
creased the pressure for cost-of-living adjustments. Similar
ly, it is hypothesized that significant employment declines
and the increased attention given to the problems arising
from plant closure would sensitize workers to the need for
contractual protections. Since contract provisions are scarce
resources, it is expected that the workers in those industries
and locations undergoing the greatest structural changes
(shifting demand for their labor) would be willing to make
the tradeoffs required to obtain these provisions. 6
Based on this scenario, the following hypotheses are con
sidered.
1. Variations in the incidence of provisions addressing per
manent job dislocation in individual contracts should be
negatively related to variations in employment growth
across manufacturing industries, holding other factors
constant.
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2. Variations in the incidence of provisions addressing per
manent job dislocation should be positively related to
variations in the percent of plants closed in that in
dustry, holding other factors constant.
3. Since plant closure provisions place a cost on the
employer, the union's ability to obtain plant closure
provisions depends on the strength of the union. Thus,
variations in the incidence of contract provisions should
be positively related to the extent that the industry's
workforce is covered by collective bargaining
agreements and negatively related to the extent of union
rivalry, holding other factors constant.
4. Since right-to-work (RTW) laws are a positive signal of
a pro-business environment, contractual outcomes
should vary negatively with whether the contract covers
an establishment(s) in a state with a right-to-work
statute, holding other factors constant. 7
It is not possible in the data sets available to observe in
dividual contracts over time due to limitations in the ability
to track contracts. Therefore, cross-sectional analysis is con
ducted on each of the data sets. By examining relationships
at two different long-run positions, we should be able to
observe changes in the ultimate determinants of bargained
outcomes during this period.
Although most of the research on collective bargaining
outcomes has addressed wage levels and wage changes,
several studies recently have been conducted on the deter
minants of other contract provisions such as cost-of-living
clauses in bargained contracts (Hendricks and Kahn 1983;
Ehrenberg et al. 1982), the bargaining structure (Hendricks
and Kahn 1982) and the correlates of general bargaining out
comes (Kochan and Block 1977).
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One of the main difficulties in examining bargaining out
comes other than wages is that the outcome is not easily
quantifiable. Furthermore, it is the expectation that these
provisions are particularly sensitive to the characteristics of
the workers in the bargaining unit. Some years ago, Sayles
and Strauss (1952) found that bargaining units with older
workers tended to seek pension benefits through collective
bargaining whereas units with younger workers tended to
seek health insurance coverage. Since we seldom know the
demographic characteristics of the bargaining unit, calibra
tion of the demand for nonwage provisions is more difficult.
Not only is it difficult to obtain the demographic
characteristics of the bargaining unit, union bargaining goal
determination moves us into the realm of voting behavior
and the power of relative interest groups within an organiza
tion (Farber 1978).
One other problem that plagues research on the deter
minants of bargaining outcomes is that the main
hypothesis—the response of workers to a condition affecting
their employment prospects—really is an attempt to model
the propensity to negotiate over an issue. However, since on
ly outcomes are observed, we may not be measuring the ac
tual responsiveness of the union. Negotiating over these
types of protections does not assure that they will be includ
ed in the final contract—hence, the need to emphasize the
relative bargaining power of the union and the political en
vironment for collective bargaining.

Data and Methodology
The basic sources of data were the U.S. Department of
Labor's files of major collective bargaining agreements in ef
fect for 1974 and 1980. These files include all major
agreements in effect in the respective years. The major
agreements are limited to those covering more than 1,000
workers. Only those agreements in the manufacturing sector
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(SIC 200 through SIC 399) were used. After editing the data
and limiting the analysis to just those contracts covering pro
duction workers, the number of contracts available for
analyses were 631 for 1974 and 676 for 1980.
Eight contract provisions were categorized as addressing
the permanent worker displacement issue. They were:
(a) relocation allowances (RELOCATE), (b) transfer rights
(TRANPLT), (c) preferential hiring rights (TRANHIRE),
(d) a combination of b and c (TRANCOMB), (e) severance
pay(SEVRANCE), (f) supplemental unemployment benefits
(SUB), (g) advance notice of plant shutdown (SHUTDWN),
and (h) advance notice of technological change (CHANGE).
The Department of Labor also coded the structure of the
bargaining relationship, single firm-single plant (PLANT),
single firm-multiple plant (MULTI), industry (INDUS),
association (ASSOC); the number of workers covered by the
contract (WORKERS); and the state in which the establish
ment is located. The state variable was used to segment the
data by region and also to create a variable indicating
whether or not the contract covered workers in a right-towork state (RTW).
The structure of the bargaining relationship variables are
primarily control variables, but there is an expected
systematic relationship. 8 It is expected that multi-employer
agreements result in less favorable agreements than singleemployer agreements. The theoretical arguments lead to an
ambiguous conclusion, but empirical work has shown that
multi-employer outcomes lead to less favorable outcomes for
unions (Kochan and Block 1977). However, if the negotia
tion is with a single firm, a firmwide agreement rather than a
single plant agreement tends to be more advantageous for
the union because it is not possible for the firm to whipsaw
the union when all or most of the plants of an employer are
covered in the same agreement.
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The expectation for the coefficient of the number of
workers is ambiguous. On the one hand, the greater the
number of workers, the more resources the union is likely to
have access to, which should enhance the union's ability to
negotiate a more favorable bargain. On the other hand,
management resistance to contract provisions may be in
creased as the number of workers covered increases.
Collective bargaining coverage (COV) at the 3-digit SIC
level, a measure of union bargaining power, was taken from
the estimates developed by Freeman and Medoff (1979).
Their estimates of contract coverage were for 1968-1972
period.
Following Hendricks (1975), collective bargaining
coverage also was measured by three dichotomous variables.
Low coverage was defined as between 0 and 50 percent of the
industry organized. Moderate coverage set the bounds at be
tween 50 percent and 80 percent of the industry organized,
and the high coverage dichotomous variable was assigned to
those industries in which the percent covered by collective
bargaining agreements exceeded 80 percent. The reasoning
underlying this specification is that the relation between
union bargaining power and coverage of industry does not
increase in a smooth and continuous manner. Rather, there
are critical levels of bargaining coverage beyond which a
union's bargaining power changes by a disproportionate
amount.
Changes in production worker employment (GROW74)
and (GROW80) at the 3-digit SIC code for the periods 1967
to 1973 and 1973 to 1979, respectively, were calculated from
Employment and Earnings. 9 These periods were chosen
because each starting and ending year were near or at the
peak of a cycle of economic activity. Consequently, the
measured change in employment should be reflecting long-
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run structural influences as opposed to short run cyclical
changes.
The probability of plant closure (CLOSE) is calculated as
the ratio of the number of plants that were closed by Fortune
500 firms in the 1970s to the total number of plants at the
start of the decade by 3-digit industries. This ratio was then
multiplied by 100. This value was calculated from a com
puter printout provided by Roger Schmenner to the author.
Schmenner's data set is based on his survey of Fortune 500
firms (see Schmenner 1982). However, it was not possible to
calculate separate closure rates for the early part of the
decade and for the latter part. Although the data used in the
analysis is for 3-digit industries, an indication of the varia
tion in closure rates across 2-digit industries is provided in
table 5.7. 10 Closure rates varied from 20 percent of all plants
in the leather and leather products industry to 3.0 percent in
petroleum refining.
A variable that is included in several specifications is the
length of the contract (LENGTH). As the contract length in
creases, greater risks are assumed by both sides. One of these
risks is that changed market conditions could place the
establishment and employment security in jeopardy.
Although reopening a contract is possible, it generally re
quires the agreement of both parties. Thus, it is expected that
more protections would be sought as the length of the con
tract increases.
Two other variables that were calculated are the degree of
product market concentration at the 3-digit SIC level
(CONC) and the extent of union rivalry (RIVAL). CONC
was calculated as the weighted average value of the percent
of shipments accounted for by the four largest companies in
those 4-digit SIC industries comprising the 3-digit SIC. 11 The
basic data were collected from the Census of Manufactures
for both 1972 and 1977. CONC also was respecified as a set
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of dichotomous variables where low concentration,
moderate concentration and high concentration were defined
as ratios of 0-40 percent, 40-70 percent and 70-100 percent,
respectively. The expected association between CONC and
the dependent variable is ambiguous. Weiss (1966) asserted
that it should be advantageous for the union to negotiate
with firms in which the degree of product market concentra
tion is high because these large firms will attempt to buy
public favor by granting more union demands. Levinson
(1967) argued that the large firms characteristic of concen
trated industries have the financial resources to not grant
union demands, but to incur long strikes.
RIVAL was calculated as the inverse of the number of
unions negotiating major agreements at the 2-digit SIC, and
therefore was derived from the 1974 and 1980 data sets. In
creases in RIVAL represented increased concentration of
major agreements with one union. The expected relationship
is that as RIVAL rises, more resources are concentrated with
the union, thereby increasing the union's ability to bargain
more effectively.
The measures of employment growth, GROW74,
GROW80, and the probability of closure (CLOSE) are in
dicators of expected job security. If employment in the in
dustry declines, it may signify the increased probability that
the establishment may close in the future, which should
prompt the union to place provisions concerning closure as
priority bargaining goals. 12 If a larger percent of plants close
within an industry, it may indicate a structural shift such as
increased foreign competition, which places all firms at risk.
As indicated above, senior workers are not protected from
job loss resulting from plant closure and the goals of senior
workers tend to receive greater weights in the formation of
union bargaining goals.
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Table 5.7
Percentage of Plants Closed in Manufacturing Industries
in the 1970s by Fortune 500 Firms
Industry
Food & Kindred Products (20)
Tobacco Manufacturers (21)
Textile Mill Products (22)
Apparel (23)
Lumber & Wood Products (24)
Furniture & Fixtures (25)
Paper & Allied Products (26)
Printing & Publishing (27)
Chemicals & Allied Products (28)
Petroleum Refining (29)
Rubber Products (30)
Leather & Leather Products (31)
Stone, Clay, Glass
& Concrete Products (32)
Primary Metals Industries (33)
Fabricated Metal Products (34)
Machinery, Except Electrical (35)
Electrical Machinery (36)
Transportation Equipment (37)
Scientific Instruments (38)
Miscellaneous Manufacturing (39)

Number of Number Percentage
closed
closed
plants
2,174
32
383
267
401
183
907
258
1,739
397
494
80

222
1
36
24
30
23
60
15
119
12
38
16

10.2
3.1
9.4
9.0
7.5
12.6
6.6
5.8
6.8
3.0
7.7
20.0

648
603
947
1,056
965
607
326
212

44
49
89
75
85
37
23
23

6.8
8.1
9.5
7.1
8.8
6.1
7.1

10.8

SOURCE: Calculations based on computer printout provided by Roger Schmenner,
August 16, 1983.
NOTE: Two-digit SIC code in parentheses.

The concern with right-to-work status of the state is it
reflects that the division of political power between manage
ment and unions favors management, and that there are
limits on unions' access to resources. All of these would sug
gest that the ability to obtain protections would be limited in
these states.
The provisions were grouped into three categories and in
dices were developed for each category. An overall index
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also was calculated based on the eight provisions for each
contract. Each provision was weighted equally in the con
struction of each index. The value of each index ranges be
tween 0 and 100. The first index, INDEX1, is constructed
from RELOCATE, TRANPLT, TRANHIRE and TRANCOMB. The second index, INDEX2, is constructed from
SEVRANCE and SUB. The third index, INDEX3, is con
structed from SHUTDWN and CHANGE. INDEX4 is con
structed from all eight provisions. Indices of bargaining pro
visions have been used by other researchers, most notably
Gerhart (1976) and Kochan and Block (1977). 13
The associations are estimated using ordinary least squares
(OLS) multiple regression analysis. Although OLS violates
the assumptions of the best linear unbiased estimator, the
estimates are consistent, and since the relationships primarily
are associative and not necessarily causal, statistical
significance rather than the exact marginal change is of
greater interest. Furthermore, it has been shown that the im
provement in the reliability of the estimates using alternate
techniques such as logit or probit can be limited. (Werner,
Wendling and Budde 1979)

Results
First Hypothesis: This hypothesis concerns whether the in
cidence of contract provisions addressing permanent job
dislocation is directly related to negative employment growth
in the industry in which the contract is negotiated. The key
variables for testing this hypothesis are the percentage
changes in production worker employment between 1967
and 1974 (GROW74), and between 1973 and 1979
(GROW80), respectively, in the three-digit industry. (It
should be noted that contracts covering establishments in
more than one state, interstate agreements, have been ex
cluded from this phase of the analysis.)
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The results for 1974 are listed in table 5.8 and the 1980
results are presented in table 5.9. Mean values and standard
deviations for the variables are reported in table 5.10. The
estimating equations explain only a relatively small percent
age of the variation in the incidence of the contract provi
sions. As shown in table 5.8, the R-squared value ranges
from .144 for INDEX1—relocation allowances, transfer
rights—to .029 for INDEX3—advance notice of plant shut
down and technological change. GROW74 is of the
hypothesized sign and statistically significant at conventional
levels when INDEX3 and INDEX4 are the dependent
variables for the 1974 analysis. Other findings of note are
that collective bargaining coverage (COV) is positive and
statistically significant for three of the tests, and the same
finding holds for the number of workers covered
(WORKERS). Thus the incidence of these provisions in con
tracts is strongly related to decreasing employment oppor
tunities, size of the bargaining unit and collective bargaining
coverage of the industry (union bargaining power).
The results for 1980 differed considerably, as is evident in
table 5.9. GROW80 was not statistically significant in any of
the analyses. Instead, variations in the incidence of plant
closure provisions tended to be related to size of the bargain
ing unit, union bargaining power and the absence of rivals
for the union. Perhaps as interesting a result is that the rightto-work dichotomous variable is not statistically significant
in three of the four estimates. The presence of a right-towork law usually is taken as a signal of a less favorable at
titude towards unions. Yet, there does not appear to be a dif
ference in bargained outcomes relating to plant closure
depending on the presence or absence of a right-to-work law.
Thus, on the basis of this analysis, there was only limited
response to changed employment opportunities, and that
response disappeared in the latter part of the 1970s.
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Table 5.8
Determinants of the Incidence of Plant Closure Provisions
in Major Collectively Bargained Contracts, 1974
(standard errors in parentheses)
Independent
variables
GROW74
RIVAL
CONC74
COV
WORKERS (100s)
RTW
PLANT
MULTI
INDUS
INTERCEPT
R-Squared
N

INDEX1
-.033
(.033)
-.011
(.044)
.057*
(.034)
.055*
(.027)
.037*
(.015)
-3.860*
(1.420)
2.009
(1.792)
10.844*
(1.978)
1.396
(3.233)
-2.837
.144
556

Dependent variable
INDEX2 INDEX3 INDEX4
-.060*
-.102*
-.074
(.035)
(.059)
(.081)
.110
.055
.134
(.047)
(.109)
(.080)
.061
.031
.099
(.036)
(.061)
(.084)
.099*
-.027
.312*
(.029)
(.050)
(.068)
.040*
.100*
-.014
(.016)
(.028)
(.038)
-4.871*
-11.113*
-.650
(1.516)
(2.576)
(3.521)
-5.792*
-1.975
-6.130
(1.912)
(4.441)
(3.249)
-8.504*
3.434
.554
(2.111)
(3.588)
(4.903)
-.908
-10.023
3.599
(3.451)
(8.013)
(5.864)
3.819
14.122
6.830
.105
.029
.085

* Statistically significant at .10 percent level (two-tailed test).
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Table 5.9
Determinants of the Incidence of Plant Closure Provisions
in Major Collectively Bargained Contracts, 1980
(standard errors in parentheses)
Independent
variables

Dependent variable
INDEX1 INDEX2 INDEX3 INDEX4

GROW80

.076
(.052)

-.140
(.111)

-.081
(.082)

-.017
(.050)

RIVAL

-.005
(.055)

.221*
(.118)

.189*
(.053)

CONC80

.030
(.038)

.165*
(.081)

.526*
(.087)
-.113*
(.059)

COV

.051*
(.031)
.068*
(.022)

.042
(.034)

.089*
(.030)
.068*
(.021)

1.952
(2.516)

-1.918
(1.549)

-.004
(.050)

.028
(.036)

RTW

-1.091
(1.599)

.260*
(.067)
.093*
(.047)
-7.443*
(3.415)

PLANT

3.044
(2.095)

-3.594
(4.477)

1.072
(3.298)

.891
(2.030)

MULTI

8.585*
(2.250)

-1.215
(4.808)

4.394
(3.542)

5.087*
(2.180)

INDUS

7.502*
(3.648)

-.893
(7.794)

9.584*
(5.742)

5.924
(3.534)

INTERCEPT

-1.437

-1.405

6.134

1.416

R-Squared

.074

.070

.093

.080

N

561

WORKERS (100s)

* Statistically significant at .10 percent level (two-tailed test).
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Table 5.10
Mean Values and Standard Deviations of Variables
1974 and 1980
(standard deviations in parentheses)
Year
1980
1974
Variables
2.03
-8.62
GROW74, GROW80
(12.28)
(16.57)
7.90
7.90
CLOSE
(4.74)
(4.57)
13.58
13.58
RIVAL
(11.91)
(12.45)
71.25
69.87
COV
(22.50)
(22.23)
22.47
25.61
WORKERS (100s)
(28.24)
(35.48)
37.90
37.52
CONC74, CONC80
(18.30)
(17.88)
.20
.18
RTW
(.40)
(.39)
.60
.61
PLANT
(.48)
(.48)
.21
.21
MULTI
(.41)
(.40)
.03
.03
INDUS
(.18)
(.18)
8.91
6.92
INDEX1
(14.96)
(13.47)
28.07
28.86
INDEX2
(31.91)
(32.30)
11.76
11.24
INDEX3
(23.80)
(22.94)
14.41
13.48
INDEX4
(14.55)
(14.06)
561
556
Number of contracts
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The most interesting results relate to INDEX3, the
measurement of the incidence of advance notice of shut
downs or technological change. These provisions probably
have been the most frequently mentioned in policy discus
sions of plant closure. They also most directly address the
question of management rights. 14 The equation, particularly
for 1974, explains a very small percentage of the total varia
tion. The industry's growth rate was negatively related to the
frequency as hypothesized; but union bargaining power was
not statistically significant. Thus, there is very little insight
into what features of the bargaining relationships or en
vironments have resulted in approximately 15 percent of the
contracts containing these provisions.
Second Hypothesis: This hypothesis addresses whether the
incidence of contract provisions relating to plant closure is
positively related to variations in the rate of plant closures
across industries. Recall that the closure rates reported in
table 5.7 ranged from 3.0 percent in the petroleum industry
to 20.0 percent in the leather and leather products industry.
Closure rates vary by industry because changes in consumer
demands, foreign competition and other factors associated
with structural change do not affect all industries to the same
degree.
The percent of plants closed by Fortune 500 firms by
3-digit industry (CLOSE) was substituted for the employ
ment growth measures in the estimating equation of the four
indices. The results for 1974 and 1980 are reported in table
5.11 and table 5.12, respectively.
CLOSE is not statistically significant in any of the
specifications, and the sign generally is negative, which is
counter to expectations. The statistical insignificance of
CLOSE is quite surprising. The frequency of plant closure in
the industry should be a reasonably good indicator of the "at
risk" potential for the workers and the bargaining unit.
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Table 5.11
Determinants of the Incidence of Plant Closure Provisions
in Major Collectively Bargained Contracts, 1974
(standard errors in parentheses)
Independent
variables

Dependent variable
INDEX1 INDEX2 INDEX3 INDEX4

CLOSE

-.164
(.121)

.265
(.302)

-.090
(.221)

-.171
(.130)

RIVAL

-.014
(.043)

.124
(.108)

.092
(.079)

.047
(.046)

.049
(.034)
.050*
(.027)
.040*
(.015)
-3.678*
(1.416)

.086
(.086)
.302*
(.068)
.106*
(.038)
-10.749*
(3.513)

.030
(.060)

2.305
(1.795)
11.140*
(1.973)

-5.595
(4.452)

-.268
(2.576)
-5.403*
(3.266)

.053
(.037)
.092*
(.029)
.045*
(.016)
-4.593*
(1.514)

-7.925
(4.894)

1.124
(3.590)

-1.596
(1.919)
3.870*
(2.109)

INDUS

1.899
(3.242)

-9.138
(8.040)

4.168
(5.898)

-.292
(3.466)

INTERCEPT

-1.153

9.570

15.117

2.740

.145
556

.085

.024

.103

CONC74
COV
WORKERS (100s)
RTW
PLANT
MULTI

R-Squared
N

* Statistically significant at .10 percent level (two-tailed test).

-.034
(.050)
-.007
(.028)
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Table 5.12
Determinants of the Incidence of Plant Closure Provisions
in Major Collectively Bargained Contracts, 1980
(standard errors in parentheses)
Independent
variables

Dependent variable
INDEX1 INDEX2 INDEX3 INDEX4

CLOSE

-.089
(.142)

.121
(.303)

-.161
(.223)

-.055
(.137)

RIVAL

-.006
(.055)

.242*
(.118)

.023
(.039)
.050
(.032)
.070*
(.022)
-1.268
(1.596)
3.666*
(2.069)
8.994*
(2.237)

.175
(.084)
.259*
(.068)
.088*
(.047)
-7.081*
(3.409)
-4.701
(4.418)

.532*
(.086)
-.124*
(.062)
-.012
(.050)
.041
(.034)
2.354
(2.510)
.622
(3.252)

.190*
(.053)
.024
(.038)
.087*
(.031)
.067*
(.021)
-1.816
(1.544)
.813
(2.000)

-1.963
(4.779)

3.982
(3.518)

5.002*
(2.164)

7.879*
(3.694)
-.601

1.418
(7.890)

10.170*
(5.808)

1.417

8.457

6.127*
(3.573)
2.167

.071
561

.068

.092

.080

CONC80
COV
WORKERS (100s)
RTW
PLANT
MULTI
INDUS
INTERCEPT
R-Squared
N

•Statistically significant at .10 percent level (two-tailed test).
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Perhaps, the risk of closure must be more immediate, such
as a closure in the same county or another plant of the same
company in order for statistically significant variations to
emerge. On the other hand, even though there was variation
in the risk of closure in the 1970s, the absolute rate, 8.0 per
cent for the entire decade, may not have been significant
enough to make unions and workers consider it a critical
issue. Inflation or workplace safety and health may have
been more pressing issues.
The sizes, signs and statistical significance of the coeffi
cients of the other variables parallel those when employment
growth was the key variable. Specifically, collective bargain
ing coverage and workers are positive and statistically
significant when INDEX1, INDEX2 and INDEX4 are the in
dependent variable. RTW is negative and statistically signifi
cant in three of the estimates. The findings for 1980 corres
pond very closely to those reported above.
Third Hypothesis: This hypothesis concerns the use of
union bargaining power to obtain contractual protections.
Bargaining power entails both union coverage of the in
dustry's workforce (COV) and rivalry among the industry's
unions (RIVAL). As indicated in table 5.8 and table 5.9, the
extent of bargaining coverage is a positive and significant
determinant of the frequency of these provisions in the
negotiated agreements. For the 1974 analyses, RIVAL is not
a determinant, but becomes positive and statistically signifi
cant in three of the equations for 1980.
An alternate version of the union bargaining power
hypothesis, particularly as it relates to the differences in the
bargaining environment between states that do have right-towork laws and those that do not, is that two unions, the
United Auto Workers (AUTO) and the United Steel Workers
(STEEL), possess sufficient strength to obtain their demands
irrespective of the bargaining environment. Both unions
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have organized major plants throughout the United States.
Two new dichotomous variables have been specified. The
first, AUTO, takes on the value 1 if the contract is
negotiated by the United Auto Workers. The second,
STEEL, takes on the value 1 if the contract is negotiated by
the United Steel Workers. The contracts also are segmented
by right-to-work status of the state in which the organized
establishment is located and separate analyses are con
ducted. The results are reported in table 5.13 through table
5.16.
The analyses for 1974 are reported in tables 5.13 and 5.14,
with the contracts covering establishments in RTW states
analyzed in table 5.13. As expected, the coefficients of
AUTO and STEEL are positive and statistically significant
in three of the four estimates covering contracts in states
where there is no right-to-work law. However, contrary to
expectations, these two variables are not significant predic
tors of contractual outcomes of contracts covering
establishments in right-to-work states.
The importance of these two unions in those states without
RTW statutes is evident in table 5.14. Both AUTO and
STEEL are statistically significant and positive for INDEX 1,
INDEX2 and INDEX4 in 1974. The impact on the frequency
of the provisions also is greater for STEEL than AUTO.
There are two somewhat surprising findings reported in table
5.14. First, there is the absence of a statistically significant
relationship between GROW74 and variations in the indices.
The second one is the lack of explanatory power of both
AUTO and STEEL in INDEX3. These provisions simply
may not have been bargaining goals for these unions, or they
may not have been evaluated to be worth the necessary
tradeoff. The analysis was repeated for 1980. The results
were very similar to those for 1974. Although not reported
here, they are available from the author.
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Table 5.13
Determinants of the Incidence of Plant Closure Provisions
Covering Establishments in Right-To-Work States
in Major Collective Bargaining Contracts, 1974
(standard errors in parentheses)
Independent
variables

Dependent variable
INDEX1 INDEX! INDEX3 INDEX4

GROW74

-.023
(.052)

-.200
(.174)

-.196
(.134)

-.111*
(.066)

WORKERS (100s)

.092
(.060)

.172
(.201)

-.085
(.155)

.067
(.076)

PLANT

.200
(8.260)

-37.709
(27.641)

8.649
(21.247)

-7.164
(10.471)

MULTI

7.544
(8.494)

-33.764
(28.424)

11.776
(21.850)

-1.724
(10.768)

AUTO

10.128*
(3.459)

8.641
(11.575)

-2.251
(8.898)

6.661
(4.385)

STEEL

4.501*
(2.492)

16.166*
(8.340)

-9.919
(6.411)

3.812
(3.159)

-.705

50.396

3.064

13.012

.195
104

.068

.058

.102

INTERCEPT
R-Squared
N

* Statistically significant at .10 percent level (two-tailed test).
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Table 5.14
Determinants of the Incidence of Plant Closure Provisions
Covering Establishments in States Without Right-To-Work Laws
in Major Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1974
(standard errors in parentheses)
Independent
variables
GROW74
WORKERS (100s)
PLANT
MULTI
AUTO
STEEL
INTERCEPT
R-Squared
N

Dependent variable
INDEX1 INDEX2 INDEX3 INDEX4
-.061
(.066)

-.051
(.039)
.040*
(.017)

-.043
(.037)
.035*
(.016)

-.055
(.087)
.104*
(.038)

2.110
(1.660)
10.991*
(1.932)
5.304*
(2.403)
7.268*
(1.850)

-3.344
(3.841)
-7.340
(4.471)
17.895*
(5.560)
35.140*
(4.281)

-.009
(3.398)

-2.087
(3.254)

-1.542
(1.716)
3.658*
(1.997)
8.039*
(2.484)
11.897*
(1.912)

1.611

25.236

15.946

11.101

.151
452

.156

.026

.124

'Statistically significant at .10 percent level (two-tailed test).

.015
(.029)
-7.048*
(2.919)

3.655
(4.226)
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Table 5.15
Determinants of the Incidence of Plant Closure Provisions
Covering Establishments in Right-To-Work States
in Major Collective Bargaining Contracts, 1980
(standard errors in parentheses)
Independent
variables
GROW80
RIVAL
CONC2
CONC3
COV2
COV3
WORKERS (100s)
LENGTH
PLANT
MULTI
INDUS**
INTERCEPT
R-Squared
N

Dependent variable
INDEX1 INDEX2 INDEX3 INDEX4
-.502*
-.271
.223
-.081
(.274)
(.137)
(.252)
(.131)
.644*
.026
.020
.153
(.182)
(.198)
(.099)
(•095)
10.585*
4.245
-2.852
4.055
(5.614)
(6.107)
(3.055)
(2.922)
22.090* -19.120*
-.166
.659
(5.710) (11.413) (10.493)
(5.461)
23.085* 23.799* 10.845*
-1.251
(4.972)
(9.137)
(9.939)
(4.755)
21.380*
20.658*
8.652*
-3.713
(4.473)
(8.941)
(8.219)
(4.278)
.091
.053
-.128
.017
(.094)
(.173)
(.189)
(.090)
.052
-.020
-.061
-.012
(.024)
(.045)
(.049)
(.023)
5.137 -28.932
23.762
1.276
(13.879) (27.740) (25.502) (13.274)
11.411
-20.876
26.359
7.076
(14.255) (28.490) (26.191) (13.633)
———
—2.953
.094
113

22.611
.182

-29.944
.184

•Statistically significant at .10 percent level (two-tailed test).
**No industry wide agreements existed in RTW states in the 1980 contract file.

-.356
.122
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Table 5.16
Determinants of the Incidence of Plant Closure Provisions
Covering Establishments in States Without Right-To-Work Laws
in Major Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1980
(standard errors in parentheses)
Independent
variables
GROW80
RIVAL
CONC2
CONC3
COV2
COV3
WORKERS (100s)
LENGTH
PLANT
MULTI
INDUS
INTERCEPT
R-Squared
N

Dependent variable
INDEX1 INDEX2 INDEX3 INDEX4
.051
(.060)
.027
(.070)
-.736
(1.710)
-.579
(2.844)
2.635
(2.038)
4.429*
(2.120)
.068*
(.023)
.000
(.040)
3.594
(2.254)
9.198*
(2.431)
7.352*
(3.754)
.008
.078
448

-.122
(.128)
.219
(.149)
4.675
(3.651)
11.397*
(6.075)
1.128
(4.352)
11.774*
(4.529)
.100*
(.050)
.146*
(.087)
-.595
(4.814)
2.028
(5.192)
.204
(8.018)
13.954
.073

•Statistically significant at .10 percent level (two-tailed test).

-.042
(.089)
.483*
(.105)
-4.649*
(2.561)
-3.446
(4.261)
-3.405
(3.053)
-3.470
(3.177)
.049
(.035)
-.012
(.061)
.863
(3.377)
4.867
(3.642)
9.468*
(5.625)
6.574
.097

-.015
(.057)
.189*
(.067)
-2.699*
(1.650)
1.697
(2.746)
.748
(1.967)
4.290*
(2.047)
.071*
(.022)
.033
(.039)
1.864
(2.176)
6.323*
(2.347)
6.094*
(3.624)
5.136
.090
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The inability to explain variations in the inclusion of ad
vance notice provisions in these contracts is frustrating.
Traditional determinants of bargained outcomes are not ef
fective. But this inability may explain why advance notice of
plant closure has been the frontispiece of numerous
legislative proposals. The bargaining power of unions may
be insufficient to obtain this provision through contract
negotiations, and therefore they are seeking this protection
through legislations.
Fourth Hypothesis: This hypothesis addresses the dif
ferences in bargaining outcomes that may arise in states with
right-to-work laws relative to those outcomes in states
without right-to-work laws. Although the coefficient of the
RTW variable is negative in all equations in table 5.8 and
table 5.9, it is statistically significant in only one instance in
1980. The surprising feature is that it is insignificant since the
existence of a RTW statute is seen as an indicator that
employers have significantly greater political power than
unions. Thus, it is expected that this distribution of power
would hold in the bargaining relationship, particularly for
provisions that may impinge on management rights.
The analyses for 1980 are provided in table 5.15 and table
5.16. The analysis for 1974 is not reported here. The
measures of union bargaining power tend to be positive and
statistically significant in over half of the estimates covering
establishments in right-to-work states. However, there is a
lack of consistency in the relative values of COV2 and COV3
in table 5.15. Specifically, COV2 tends to be greater than
COV3, whereas the normal expectation is the converse. This
may represent a measurement error problem since the
estimates of contract coverage are from 1968-1972 and those
estimates may no longer be representative of more recent
conditions. It also may simply indicate moderately organized
industries have pursued these nonwage provisions.
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In states without right-to-work laws, the influence of the
product market concentration measures is not predictable.
However, COV3 and RIVAL emerge as statistically signifi
cant determinants in several of the estimates. GROW80 is
not a significant determinant in this set of estimates.
Summary
These estimates do not indicate that workers and firms "at
risk of closure" have moved toward protections and solu
tions through the bargained contract. The regression
estimates show that contractual outcomes became less sen
sitive to changes in employment, and instead became more
dependent on the bargaining power of the union in 1980
relative to 1974. Even more surprising, however, was the
lack of statistical significance of the frequency of closure in
the industry as a determinant of successful negotiations over
these provisions. Furthermore, the results were not consis
tent. Variables that were significant in one time period were
not in the following one, or vice versa. This lack of
robustness raises severe doubts whether the negotiations are
sufficiently deterministic.
There are a number of factors which may have contributed
to the disappointing findings. First, the cross-sectional
analysis of the incidence of provisions may have obscured
the changes that did take place. It would have been desirable
to track individual contracts from one period to the next, so
that the analysis could have been conducted on the actual
changes in the contract, but this was not possible. Second, it
was not possible to measure other bargaining outcomes that
occurred in the same negotiations. Thus, no estimate could
be made of the actual tradeoff that may have been required
to obtain plant closure provisions.
A troubling feature of the analysis is the very low ex
planatory power of the equations for variations in INDEX3,
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the advance notice provisions. The issue of advance notice of
plant closure has been one of the most hotly debated topics
in the plant closure debate. Is it a question of bargaining goal
determination, or of employer resistance to granting this
provision? Making this protection the frontispiece of
legislative proposals simply may be a response to the inabili
ty to obtain it directly in negotiations.
One conclusion that seems quite tenable is that significant
bargaining power is required to obtain plant closure contrac
tual protections in RTW states. However, there are restric
tions on this conclusion because when two of the most
powerful unions were entered explicitly in the specification,
AUTO and STEEL, their coefficients generally were not
statistically significant. Combining this latter finding with
the generally low explanatory power of these equations sug
gests that we do not have a good understanding of these
negotiations and outcomes. Of course, it may simply be the
problem mentioned above: union bargaining goals do not
necessarily become contract provisions.

NOTES
1. The data set available limits some of the questions that can be asked in
this monograph about the presence or absence of these provisions in a
contract. Several interesting hypotheses could include the following:
first, it is expected that workers in local labor markets where employ
ment alternatives are limited would tend to pursue relocation/transfer
right provisions; second, it is expected that relocation/transfer right pro
visions would be more prevalent where union-management relations
have been "good"; and finally, it is expected that bargaining units that
are dominated by young and more mobile workers would be more likely
to negotiate relocation/transfer right provisions.
2. The "free-rider" problem is when individuals receive the benefit of
some collective activity, but do not pay to support the collective activity.
For example, the nonpayment of union dues by individuals covered by a
collective bargaining contract is a free-rider problem.
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3. The frequencies in both 1974 and 1980 of the plant closure provisions
are as follows:
1980
1974
percent
percent
PROVISION
SUB
SEVRANCE
RELOCATE
TRANPLT
TRANHIRE
TRANCOMB
SHUTDWN
CHANGE
Number of Contracts

22
39
8
15
5
7
14
10

26
38
11
19
7
3
15
11

631

676

4. To ensure comparability, the set of states having right-to-work laws in
1974 were used throughout the analysis. New Hampshire was not includ
ed because it does not have a specific right-to-work statute.
5. This assumes that these provisions represent primarily union imposed
constraints on management rights. This seems like a reasonable assump
tion for most of these provisions.
6. See Audrey Freedman (1978). She wrote: "Still it seems axiomatic that
as an individual job hunter's chances in the open labor market worsen,
job security becomes more important." (p. 67)
7. Newman (1983) has demonstrated that the favorable economic growth
consequences of right-to-work laws are not purely a Southern
phenomenon.
8. There is a simultaneity question with the structure of bargaining rela
tionship variables. Specifically, Hendricks and Kahn (1982) determined
that the actual structure used is a function of industry and union
characteristics.
9. Although the demarcation is necessitated by the data sets, it also is
fortuitous given that Lilien (1982) has suggested that the structural shift
accelerated after 1973.

10. Three-digit closure rates are available on request from the author.
11. The 3-digit concentration ratio was calculated as follows:
CONCj= £ /CONj
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where
CONCj = concentration ratio in the jth 3-digit industry.
CONjj = percent of shipments accounted for by the 4 largest firms in
in the ith 4-digit industry of the jth 3-digit industry.
VSjj = Value of shipments of all firms in the ith 4-digit industry of the
jtn 3-digit industry.
VSj = Value of shipments of all firms in the jth 3-digit industry.
12. Cappelli (1983) used two other measures to address a related concept,
variations in the demand for union labor. He used the trend in import
penetration in the particular industry and the trend in union coverage in
the particular industry. The trend in union coverage is a more direct
measure of the pressure on the union sector to attempt to stabilize
employment demand. For example, employment growth could be stable,
but the unionized sector could be declining in number and the nonunionized sector could be increasing in number. Since the emphasis is on
overall change, however, employment growth will continue to be used.
13. Using equal weights implies that each provision is equally desirable
or effective. This is a tenuous assumption, particularly when only eight
provisions are involved and may be partially responsible for the results
that follow.
14. A series of regressions were run incorporating whether the bargained
agreement included a management rights clause. The coefficient on this
variable was not statistically significant.

Synthesis
and Conclusions

Chapter 6

The principal economic impact of plant closure on
workers is the earnings loss that they may experience. First,
there is the direct earnings loss due job loss. Second, there is
the initial reduction in wages because the available oppor
tunities simply do not pay as much as the former job. Third,
the earnings profile of the worker may be reduced because
his/her career has been disrupted. Another type of loss is the
deferred compensation the firm may owe its workers, but
which is never paid because the plant closes.
The deferred compensation arises from compensation
schedules that pay junior workers less than the value of their
marginal product and pay senior workers more than the
value of their marginal product. There is nothing inherently
wrong with such a schedule. However, if some event occurs
that interferes with the worker being employed until the
deferred compensation has been paid back, this unpaid
deferred compensation may establish an obligation from the
firm to its workers beyond the closure. This may represent a
classic case of social costs since the firm's action imposes
costs on people not party to the decision. The question is:
Can collective bargaining play a role in minimizing social
costs while promoting greater productive capacity?
Collective bargaining and plant closure are linked in three
ways. First, judicial interpretations of the National Labor
147
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Relations Act (NLRA) have held that the employer must
negotiate with the union over the effects of closing a plant,
the closing bargain. Second, the current judicial interpreta
tion is that there is no duty to bargain over the decision to
close one plant of a multiplant operation. There are,
however, certain ambiguities in this interpretation that limit
its applicability. Third, a union and an employer may use the
formal bargaining process to negotiate contract provisions
covering plant closure.
To understand and evaluate the role that collective
bargaining could play, both the case law that has evolved in
the formulation of the judicial interpretations and the actual
contract provisions negotiated in major collective bargaining
agreements have been examined. Coincident with the
analysis of the case law, several rules and procedures, which
have been suggested to expedite the determination of
whether there is a duty to bargain over the decision, also
have been studied.
The examination of the judicial interpretation of the duty
to bargain found several troublesome areas. First, substan
tive labor law has been formulated in the plant closure area
based on cases in which the parties to the dispute had not
negotiated a formal contract. The closure occurred almost
on the heels of the union winning the representation election.
Thus, a determination has been made on the efficacy of col
lective bargaining resolving an issue even though the parties
have never bargained. As pointed out in the text, the most re
cent U.S. Supreme Court ruling on this issue occurred in
First National Maintenance Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Board, a case in which the parties did not have an
established bargaining relationship.
Second, there has been an overriding concern with the ter
minology used in cases of displacement rather than with the
outcome. For example, subcontracting has been differen
tiated from replacing existing employees with independent

Synthesis and Conclusions

149

contractors. The outcome has been the same, the process
very similar, but the duty to bargain over the decision dif
fers. A similar demarcation is occurring between plant
closure and relocation. In both instances a facility is closed,
and the reason for closure may be quite similar—the firm is
no longer competitive at the location—but the case law treats
these quite differently.
The case law draws the marked distinction between the
rights and privileges of the owners of physical capital as op
posed to the rights and privileges of the owners of human
capital. Human capital is not positioned equally with
physical capital in its ability to respond to economic change.
However, giving priority to the owners of human capital in
all situations would move us to a system of property rights in
jobs, which is not necessarily desirable. As was stated in
Adams Dairy, "union membership is not a guarantee against
legitimate or justifiable discharge or discharge motivated by
economic necessity." What is necessary is a balancing be
tween the rights of the owners of physical capital and human
capital. Collective bargaining may be uniquely positioned to
conduct this balancing test.
The major concerns over the use of collective bargaining
to mitigate the plant closure problem are establishing criteria
which (a) require bargaining only in those instances in which
the circumstances suggest a positive probability of success,
and (b) introduce certainty into the process as to who must
bargain and what shall constitute good faith bargaining.
Perhaps, however, there has been more concern than war
ranted about not requiring bargaining in low probability
cases. Recall that there were 619 plant closings in 1982, a
year in which the economy was mired in a recession. The
relatively infrequent nature of plant closing increases the at
tractiveness of collective bargaining as a policy alternative.
Formal collective bargaining already occurs over plant
closure, or at least, over provisions to minimize the effects of
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closure. Contractual provisions that have been negotiated in
clude severance pay, supplemental unemployment benefits,
relocation allowances, transfer or preferential hiring rights,
and advance notice in case of shutdown or major
technological change. The concern from the policy perspec
tive is whether management and labor have used formal con
tract negotiations to obtain protections and to develop solu
tions for workers and firms "at risk of closure."
The results of the econometric analysis of major collective
bargaining agreements (631 contracts in 1974 and 676 con
tracts in 1980) did not find that workers at risk were obtain
ing these protections. Variation in closure rates by industry
was not a significant determinant of variations in contractual
outcomes. Instead, the regression estimates showed that the
contractual outcomes became less sensitive to changes in
employment, and instead became more dependent on the
bargaining power of the union in 1980 relative to 1974. The
results also were not consistent. This lack of robustness
(a) pointed out the difficulty of modeling some processes
and outcomes, and (b) raised doubts about whether formal
negotiations could be relied on to accommodate these
disruptions.
Therefore, amending the National Labor Relations Act's
definition of mandatory topics of bargaining under "terms
and other conditions of employment" to include bargaining
over the decision to close may be one policy alternative for
the plant closure dilemma. There are positive and negative
aspects of this approach. The most obvious negative aspect is
that the NLRA covers only those plants and workplaces
where employees have elected a bargaining agent. Since plant
closures are not restricted to unionized plants, protection
will not be afforded in all instances. However, workers in
nonunionized facilities generally are not protected by the
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. Although
this lack of coverage is problematic, it is not fatal.
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A positive feature of using the NLRA is that coverage is
uniform throughout the United States. As mentioned earlier,
two states have statutes placing obligations on employers in
the event of closure, legislation has been proposed in many
other states, and the National Employment Priorities Act
(H.R. 2847) has been introduced in the U.S. Congress.
However, state-by-state adoption of legislation would only
increase the competition among the states. Kochan (1979)
wrote:
those states most interested in stemming the tide of
plant closings and job loss are most likely to act,
but by doing so, may further increase the incentives
of businesses to locate in the southern states that do
not pass this type of legislation (p. 19).
Unions may find fault with this approach because they will
be expected to use up their bargaining capital in order to ob
tain the protections that they would prefer be provided
through legislation. The greater the number of areas
prescribed by governmental regulation, the more bargaining
power can be concentrated in other areas. Management also
may disagree with the proposal because it places a greater
burden on them than currently required. Given the unique
circumstance of each workplace and the preferences of
workers, collective bargaining may be ideally suited to
developing solutions to this problem. Regulation and
bargaining are both designed to get employers and unions to
do something they do not want to do and, therefore, to a
degree they are substitute policies.
What is being considered is a policy that neither manage
ment nor labor prefers. But perhaps that is the only type of
policy possible. "The political problem is to shift the focus
of public discussion away from the fruitless search for
painless solutions to the question of how costs of adjustment
can be allocated in the most equitable way." (Martin 1983,
p. 105)
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The proposal of this monograph attempts to permit
bargaining to minimize the earnings loss of workers while ex
ploring more profitable opportunities for the firm. The pro
posal is based on Coase's (1971) concept of minimizing
social cost while maximizing the value of production. As
always, the difficulty is making an abstract concept opera
tional. The following per se rule and implementation pro
cedures are proposed.
1. Firms are required to notify the NLRB and the union of
the plan to close one part of an operation or to relocate.
This notice should contain a detailed explanation of the
reasons for closure and financial data as appropriate.
2. The NLRB quickly determines whether bargaining
might be fruitful using the criteria established in
Brooks-Scanlon: whether the reasons for closure are
beyond the control of the parties to the collective
bargaining agreement.
3. Information bargaining occurs in those instances where
it is determined that bargaining might be fruitful.
4. Based on the information provided, the NLRB, the
union or bargaining unit, and the firm determine
whether further bargaining is appropriate.
5. Bargaining continues in those instances where two of
the three (the NLRB, the union or bargaining unit, and
the firm) think progress is being made and/or a solution
is possible, but for no more than 90 days after the initial
notice.
6. If bargaining has been in good faith, but no agreement
is reached within the time period, the firm is free to pro
ceed with its action.
7. The firm is required to bargain over the effects.
This proposal has the basic premise that management and
labor will want to obtain a bargain that leads to profitable
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operations and is the best alternative in the labor market. If
the concessions necessary to maintain profitable operations
require wage cuts greater than necessary as dictated by
market alternatives, no agreement will or should be reached.
If operations as profitable as the alternative can be achieved,
management will and should stay at the existing plant. If no
agreement is possible within the parameters, effects bargain
ing can be used to obtain the deferred compensation.
Wachter and Wascher's (1983) examination of the displac
ed worker problem led them to conclude that the earnings
losses experienced by displaced workers can be avoided only
by avoiding job loss in the first place. Job specific skills,
seniority pay and union differentials all result in wages above
the alternatives available in the market. Job training, special
assistance programs or employment vouchers are unlikely to
generate employment opportunities at previous wage levels.
Since public controls, such as direct employment protection,
impose significant costs on the overall economy, Wachter
and Wascher suggest collective bargaining initiatives trading
wage premiums for enhanced job security.
The proposal of this monograph is in the same spirit as
their conclusion. Neither management nor labor have perfect
foresight. Formal negotiations every two or three years can
not accommodate all contingencies. Equity considerations
suggest that workers be afforded the opportunity to
minimize earnings and/or job loss. Recognizing that doing
so also imposes costs on employers, the proposal has been
structured to be flexible and to expedite the bargaining pro
cess.
Requiring decision bargaining is only one element, but a
major one, of a comprehensive policy toward the plant
closure problem. Bargaining will not result in preserving jobs
in all instances. Other programs need to be in place to assist
workers when closure is the only alternative. But in devising
programs, consideration must be given to the "managerial,
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institutional and political factors that determine the effec
tiveness of policies in practice." (Bacow 1980, p. 132) Ex
pansive legislative proposals that prescribe the behavior of
firms intending to close are not consistent with the
managerial, institutional and political constructs of our
economic system. Instead, states have started to turn away
from the regulatory initiatives and have been developing
assistance programs for displaced workers, such as job
clubs, job fairs and retraining programs.
It is important not to stop just with assistance programs
for displaced workers. There are other institutions in place
which, with minor changes, could become flexible enough to
smooth the adjustment to economic change. One is the tax
deductibility of training costs associated with developing a
new skill. Given the adjustment problems of human capital
in the presence of economic change, it is incongruous that in
vestments to deepen one's human capital in an obsolete skill
are deductible for federal income tax purposes whereas in
vestments to broaden one's human capital and develop new
skills are not deductible. Another change would be permit
ting workers to obtain training while receiving unemploy
ment compensation. (It should be noted that this is permitted
in some states under certain circumstances.) Since the
unemployment insurance system is funded by employer con
tributions, it would seem appropriate that these funds be us
ed to support retraining efforts necessitated by industrial
change.
The final point is that funds be available to study the
viability of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) when
closure is being considered. Wintner's (1983) results have
demonstrated that ESOPs can be viable in some instances.
(In fact, her results are very supportive of the potential for
collective bargaining in addressing the plant closure prob
lem.) Since workers generally are subjecting themselves to
double jeopardy in ESOPs—a possible wage reduction plus
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placing their savings at risk—the viability of the ESOP
should be studied thoroughly.
In conclusion, as we consider the plant closure issue and
the problem of displaced workers, one criterion should be
kept in mind as alternative policies are considered. Any pro
gram contemplated should not increase the firm's direct cost
of using labor relative to capital. Increasing the cost of labor
will simply make the adoption of new technology more at
tractive for employers, possibly exacerbating the problem.

Appendix
Displaced Older Workers
The problems displacement causes for older workers re
quire special mention. Hall (1982) has shown that firms in
the United States provide near-lifetime employment (more
than 20 years) for a significant part of the labor force. For
example, 51.1 percent of all men are likely to work 20 years
or more for the same firm. A recent Department of Labor
(1983) study shows that many workers already have been
employed with the same firm for a relatively long time. For
workers between the ages of 40 and 44 years, 42.7 percent
have worked for the same firm for more than 10 years and
for those between the ages of 50 to 54 years, 56.5 percent
have worked for the same firm for more than 10 years. If it is
assumed that the revealed behavior reflects the expectations
of workers, the loss of their job can be a severe blow.
Perhaps more problematic is that many incentives cause
the impact of closure on older workers to be very severe in
the short run. The usual process of attrition and gradual
reduction in employment prior to closure returns younger
workers (less senior) to the labor market first. That attrition
permits these younger workers to search for available open
ings when fewer workers are competing for them.
When closure finally occurs, the older workers are return
ed to the labor market simultaneously. This fact is exacer
bated by policies which require workers to stay until closure
in order to receive severance pay and other related benefits.
Their work skills may be somewhat obsolete, their job search
skills have atrophied and their numbers may greatly exceed
the available openings in the market when they begin to seek
new employment. Moreover, since their skills tend to be
157
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firm- or industry-specific, they may have significant difficul
ty in transferring them to other employment opportunities.
Several studies have documented the extent of the wage
loss incurred by workers who have been displaced by plant
closure. These are instructive even though it is argued in the
monograph that the initial loss can be an artifact of the
firm's compensation schedule. Arlene Holen et al. (1981)
developed estimates of earnings losses from a sample of
9,500 workers who were impacted by 42 different plant clos
ings in 21 different states from 1968 to 1972. The analysis
was restricted to nine different industries.
The differences in earnings loss by age group are very
striking. Workers under the age of 40 experienced a 13.4 per
cent drop in average earnings in the year after closure
relative to the year before closure. Workers over the age of
40 experienced a 39.9 percent reduction in earnings in the
year after closure. Furthermore, the average earnings of
workers over 40 in the year after closure were less than the
average earnings of those under 40, as indicated in table A. 1.
In addition, the labor force activity of the older group
declined by approximately 33 percentage points, whereas the
reduction in labor force activity for the younger workers was
approximately 7 percentage points.
A study of a plant closure in Western Michigan further
demonstrates the impact on older workers (McAlinden
1981). The average seniority for the workers left at the time
of the closing was over 17 years. The average age of the
workers was approximately 45 years. The wages for skilled,
semi-skilled and unskilled workers had been $10.22, $9.97
and $9.43 per hour, respectively. Approximately 11 months
after the closing, the workers were surveyed, and the average
hourly wages for those who had found jobs were $10.02,
$7.51 and $6.52 for skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled
workers, respectively. Skilled workers suffered only a 2 per-
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cent loss in wages, but semi-skilled and unskilled workers'
losses were 25 percent and 31 percent, respectively. Further
more, over one-half of the workers were still unemployed at
the time of the survey, with the largest proportion of them
being semi-skilled and unskilled.
Table A.I
Mean Real Earnings and Labor Force Activity of Males
by Age, Before and After Closure*
Over 40

Under 40
Year prior
to closing
Average earnings

$5,705

Year prior
to closing

Year after
closing

$4,943

$8,111

$4,877

-13.4<7o

Percent change
Full-time labor
force activity (%)

Year after
closing

82.9

76.1

-39.9%

93.5

60.1

SOURCE: Calculations based on data provided in Arlene Holen et al., Earnings Losses of
Workers Displaced by Plant Closings, Public Research Institute of the Center for Naval
Analysis, CRC 423, December 1981.
*1970 Constant dollars.

Older workers suffer significant short term losses because
there are just fewer job offers available for them. Older
workers may be more expensive to hire than younger
workers because defined benefit pension plans are most cost
ly to provide for older workers than for younger workers
(Barnow and Ehrenberg 1979). Assuming a 6 percent rate of
return, $1 of pension benefits will cost an employer $1 for a
worker retiring in a year, whereas the cost will be $. 17 for the
35-year-old worker who won't retire for 30 years. As a
result, even though an older worker and a younger worker
may be willing to work for the same wage, the former will be
more costly to hire if pension benefits are part of the com
pensation. It has been estimated that approximately 70 per
cent of private pension plans are defined benefit plans.
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Older workers may restrict their job search to the local
market because they are homeowners, and to that subset of
relatively high paying jobs because of their wage expecta
tions. Thus, their expected duration of unemployment tends
to be longer and their expected wage loss is likely to be
greater.
Holen's estimates were of the earnings losses individuals
incurred within five years of closure. Jacobson and
Thomason (1979) estimated lifetime earnings losses. Their
analysis determined that the lifetime earnings loss associated
with displacement tends to increase as the unemployment
rate in the local labor market increases. Second, the earnings
loss tends to be inversely related to the size of the local labor
market.
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